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It is a premise of this research that prevention of near-term terrorist attacks
requires an understanding of current terrorist organizations to include their composi-
tion, the actors involved, and how they operate to achieve their objectives. To aid in
this understanding, operations research, sociological, and behavioral theory relevant
to the study of social networks are applied, thereby providing theoretical foundations
for new and useful methodologies to analyze non-cooperative organizations. Such
organizations are defined as those trying to hide their structures or are unwilling to
provide information regarding their operations; examples include criminal networks,
secret societies, and, most importantly, clandestine terrorist organizations.
Techniques leveraging information regarding multiple dimensions of interper-
sonal relationships, inferring from them the strengths of interpersonal ties, are ex-
plored. Hence, a layered network construct is offered that provides new analytic
opportunities and insights generally unaccounted for in traditional social network
analysis. These offer decision makers improved courses of action designed to impute
influence upon an adversarial network, thereby achieving a desired influence, per-
ception, or outcome to one or more actors within the target network. In addition,
this knowledge can also be used to identify key individuals, relationships, and or-
ganizational practices. Subsequently, such analysis may lead to the identification of
weaknesses that can be exploited in an endeavor to either eliminate the network as
a whole, cause it to become operationally ineffective, or influence it to directly or
indirectly support National Security Strategy.
In today’s world, proficiency in this aspect of warfare is a necessary condition
to ensure United States National Security, as well as to promote and maintain global
stability. Quantitative methods serving as the basis for, and discriminator between,
courses of action seeking a path towards peace are a principal output of this research.
iv
Acknowledgements
If it weren’t for my Dean’s rep, I wouldn’t have graduated anytime soon.
If it weren’t for my committee, I wouldn’t have graduated.
If it weren’t for Dr. Deckro, I wouldn’t have been inspired.
If it weren’t for my “red light neighbors,” I wouldn’t have had great friends.
If it weren’t for my loving wife, I wouldn’t have anything.








Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 General Assumptions and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5 Dissertation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
II. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Graph Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Graphs and Social Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 Random and Small-World Graphs . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Social Network Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.3 The Challenges of Network Data . . . . . . . 34
2.3 The Psychology of Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3.1 What should be modeled and why? . . . . . . 41
2.3.2 Rational Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.3 Maslow’s Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3.4 Existence, Relatedness, Growth Theory . . . . 44
2.3.5 Motivation-Hygiene Theory . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3.6 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.7 Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.8 What is a rational terrorist? . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.9 Realistic Model of Rationality . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3.10 Current Behavioral Modeling Efforts . . . . . 51
2.3.11 Potential Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3.12 Terrorist Models and 21st Century Warfare . . 58
2.4 The Ebb and Flow of Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
vi
Page
2.4.1 Katz Status Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4.2 Mechanics of Clique Identification . . . . . . . 67
2.4.3 Information Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4.4 Eigenvector Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.4.5 Multiplexity and Layered Networks . . . . . . 73
2.5 Weighting and Decision Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.5.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Making . . . . . . . . 76
2.5.2 Additive Value Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.5.3 Normalization of the Weights . . . . . . . . . 80
2.5.4 Interpretation of Normalized Weights . . . . . 81
2.5.5 Weighting Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.5.6 Weighting Issues Summarized . . . . . . . . . 96
2.5.7 The Dynamic Decision Environment . . . . . 97
2.5.8 Examples of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.5.9 Conclusions Regarding Weighting . . . . . . . 104
2.6 Mathematical Programming Approaches . . . . . . . . 106
2.6.1 Minimum Spanning Tree Problem . . . . . . . 107
2.6.2 Covering and Partitioning Problem . . . . . . 108
2.6.3 Generalized Network Flow . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.6.4 P-Median Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.6.5 Disconnecting Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.6.6 Path Enumeration Techniques . . . . . . . . . 114
2.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
III. Research Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.2 Assumptions and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.3 Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.3.1 Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.3.2 Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.3.3 Measuring Multiplexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.3.4 A Generalized Social Network Model . . . . . 127
3.3.5 Analysis of Layered Social Networks . . . . . . 128
3.3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
vii
Page
IV. Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.2.1 Contributing Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.3 Assumptions and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.5 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.6 RBAP and Layered Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
V. Target Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.3 Heuristic Approach and Objective Function . . . . . . 161
5.4 Mathematical Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.4.1 Number of Nodes Reached . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.4.2 Reciprocal Distance Reach . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.5 Advantageous Properties of the MP Approach . . . . . 179
5.6 Exemplar Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5.6.1 Number of Nodes Reached Results . . . . . . 183
5.6.2 Reciprocal Distance Reach . . . . . . . . . . . 186
5.7 KPP and Layered Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
VI. Measuring Multiplexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.2 Tie Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.2.1 Distance, Closeness, & Strength . . . . . . . . 198
6.3 Models of Tie Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.3.1 Simple Aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6.3.2 Decision Theoretic Approach . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.4 Weighting & Tie Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
VII. Gains, Losses, and Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
7.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
7.2 Social Network Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
7.2.1 The Flow of Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
7.2.2 Gains and Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
viii
Page
7.2.3 Measurement of Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
7.2.4 Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
7.2.5 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
7.2.6 Solution Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
7.2.7 Network Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
7.2.8 Underlying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
7.3 Notional Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
7.4 Post-Optimality Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
7.4.1 Changes in Gains and Losses . . . . . . . . . . 245
7.4.2 Changes in Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
7.4.3 Changes in Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
7.4.4 Changes in Social Closeness . . . . . . . . . . 251
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
VIII. Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
8.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
8.2 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
8.3 RBAP Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
8.4 Key Player Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
8.5 Network Flow Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
8.5.1 Arcs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
8.5.2 Gains and Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
8.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
IX. Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
9.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
9.2 Dissertation Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
9.3 Recommendations for Future Research . . . . . . . . . 282
9.3.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Appendix A. Code: rbap.m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Appendix B. Code: rbapsa.m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Appendix C. Code: KPP-2 (NR.m) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
Appendix D. Code: KPP-2 (FNRK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Appendix E. Code: KPP-2 (FNR.m) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Appendix F. Code: KPP-2 (DNR.m) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
ix
Page
Appendix G. Code: KPP-2 (PMED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
Appendix H. Note on Information Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Appendix I. Code: jaccard.m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Appendix J. Code: enumeratePaths.m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Appendix K. Code: netflowCent.m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Appendix L. Code: gnfCent.m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Appendix M. KPP-2 and Layered Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Appendix N. Pair-wise Gains Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Appendix O. JI Member Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326




1.1 Layered Social Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Forbidden Triad [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1363] . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Articulator Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Core-periphery partitioning [Degenne and Forsé, 1999, pg. 103] 33
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ANALYSIS OF LAYERED SOCIAL NETWORKS
I. Introduction
“To know them means to eliminate them” - Colonel Mathieu in the movie,
Battle of Algiers [Pontecorvo, 1967].
1.1 Background
This opening quote refers to Colonel Mathieu’s objective of quelling the vio-
lent insurrection lead by the National Liberation Army (ALN), under direction by
the National Liberation Front (FLN). The FLN’s struggle for independence from
French rule in Algeria relied upon underground organizations not unlike the terror-
ist networks highlighted in today’s media. Colonel Mathieu realized that defeating
this elusive organization could only be accomplished by understanding the organiza-
tion’s objectives and its underlying social structure, consequently placing a greater
reliance upon intelligence and analysis than mere application of military force.
Truly knowing these clandestine organizations means understanding how they
arrange and build their structures through recruitment, their underlying motivations
for violent and seemingly irrational behavior, and their methods of operational con-
trol and execution of terrorist activities. Once gained, this knowledge can then be
used to identify key individuals, relationships, and organizational practices. Sub-
sequently, such analysis may lead to the identification of weaknesses that can be
exploited in an endeavor to either eliminate the network as a whole, cause it to
become operationally ineffective, or influence it to directly or indirectly support our
own objectives. In today’s interconnected world, proficiency in this type of warfare
is a necessary condition to ensure U.S. national security, as well as to promote and
maintain global stability.
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Table 1.1: Means to Achieve U.S. National Security Strategy
1. Champion aspirations for human dignity.
2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks
against us and our friends.
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with
weapons of mass destruction.
5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free
trade.
6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the
infrastructure of democracy.
7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of
global power.
8. Transform America’s National Security Institutions to meet the challenges
and opportunities of the twenty-first century.
9. Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) focuses not rather on the “great armies”
and countries with “great industrial capabilities” as was required in the past, but
upon the “shadowy networks of individuals [that] can bring great chaos and suffering
to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank” [The President, 2006,
np]. The second of eight means (see Table 1.1) to achieve the NSS–Strengthen
alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our
friends–deals directly with the subject of terrorism and how to counter its effects
upon the nation. Specifically, it necessitates the disruption and destruction of global
terrorist networks via attacks upon their “. . . leadership; command, control, and
communications; material support; and finances” [The President, 2006, pg. 1].
It can also easily be argued that the remaining means, at a minimum, indi-
rectly focus upon conquering terrorism, either by reducing the conditions that give
rise to future terrorists or by minimizing the risks associated with our country’s
vulnerabilities to terrorist acts. These latter efforts are led by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Accordingly, the prioritized strategic objectives of DHS
include: “prevent terrorist attacks within the US; reduce America’s vulnerability to
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terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” [DHS,
2002, pg. vii].
It is a premise of this research that prevention of near-term terrorist attacks
requires an understanding of current terrorist organizations to include their composi-
tion, the actors involved, and how they operate to achieve their objectives. Further,
the prevention of far-term terrorist attacks requires a number of preemptive mea-
sures both external and internal to current terrorist organizations. Externally to
the existing terrorist networks, the economic, social, and political conditions that
contribute to the recruitment process must be addressed; this appears to be the up-
coming, preferred U.S. strategy. Internally, current members must be convinced (one
way or another) to discontinue the use of violent behavior as the primary means of
achieving their political objectives. The mid-term realm is hypothesized to consist
of a continuous struggle of a combination of offensive (counterterrorism) and preven-
tive (anti-terrorism) measures that facilitate the transition over time to a long-term
approach. The realm of primary interest in this research is to support near-term,
counterterrorism efforts.
1.2 Problem Definition
The overarching objective of this research is to expand operations research,
sociological, and behavioral theory relevant to the study of social networks, thereby
providing theoretical foundations for new and useful methodologies to analyze non-
cooperative organizations. Social networks are classically defined as “the set of actors
[individuals] and the ties [relationships] among them” [Wasserman and Faust, 1994,
pg. 9]. For the purposes of this research, non-cooperative organizations are those
trying to hide their structures or are unwilling to provide information regarding
their operations; examples include criminal networks, secret societies, and, most
importantly, clandestine terrorist organizations [cf., Sparrow, 1991; van Meter, 2002].
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Given the resultant understanding and insights provided by the analytic tech-
niques developed in the course of this research, decision makers are offered better
courses of action that impute influence upon the adversary’s network. Such courses
of action seek to achieve a target influence, perception, or outcome to one or more
actors within the network through either direct or indirect means. The method or
methods of imposing influence upon a network may take on a number of forms;
for example, specific individuals may be directly targeted or a number of relation-
ships between two or more individuals may be exploited or altered via information,
influence, or psychological operations. Further, kinetic, non-kinetic, or a mix of
approaches, may be considered to achieve these methods of influence. In addition,
the time-line upon which influence is applied could range from immediate to long-
term; consequently, options to mitigate near- and far-term terrorist activities can be
explored, respectively.
Quantitative methods serving as the basis for, and discriminator between,
courses of action are a principal output of this research. The quantitative study
of social networks has been undertaken in ‘modern’ sociological and anthropological
studies for some time, beginning with a graphical representation of the social net-
work known as the sociogram [Moreno, 1953]. However, the majority of applications
have been primarily descriptive in nature, focusing on “[measuring] interpersonal
relations in small groups . . . , [describing] properties of social structures and indi-
vidual social environments . . . , and [assessing] the impact of structural arrangement
on group problem solving and individual performance. . . ” [Wasserman and Faust,
1994, pg. 4, 12-13]. There exist a number of works that have investigated clandestine
organizations, which are included within the context of ‘non-cooperative,’ networks
from a SNA perspective [e.g., Sparrow, 1991; Carley et al., 2002; Krebs, 2002; van
Meter, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Xu and Hsinchun, 2004]. The research presented here
builds upon such sociologically-oriented methodologies as well as the recent oper-
ations research-oriented works of Renfro [2001], Sterling [2004], and Clark [2005],
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all of which have bridged gaps between descriptive sociological and anthropological
techniques and prescriptive operations research techniques.
As Renfro and numerous other works within the genre of SNA suggest, the
commodity of influence flows through these social networks, a phenomenon often
used to study the spread of rumors, acceptance of innovations, coalescence of group
opinions, and so forth. However, the rates and capacities of the conceptual flow of
interpersonal influence are predicated upon the situation, the organizational norms,
the relationships between, and the individual characteristics held among the inter-
acting individuals. Analyses that often yield asymmetry of relationship existence
between actors include ‘who works for whom,’ which individuals are opinion leaders
or early adopters of innovation, or even ‘who is friends with whom’ where some re-
spondents forget friends [cf., Brewer and Webster, 1999]. Alternatively, asymmetry
of influence over other individuals may be conjured by the classic ‘E. F. Hutton’
example or any other leader-follower type of relationship1. Further, the direction of
dominance may change, given a change in context. For example, the team captain
may not be the class leader. Means to measure and take advantage of these effects of
influence within operations research methods provide an opportunity to improve the
current social network modeling capabilities, particularly those having underlying
assumptions not amenable to the study of non-cooperative networks.
Renfro also discussed multiple contexts of relationships between individuals
and posited an accompanying multi-commodity network formulation; however, there
remain numerous research questions and clarifications of these concepts and their
underlying theory. For example, when people interact, there is often more than one
affiliation or context upon which that interaction may benefit (e.g., past friendships,
familial, education, religious, and professional contexts). Consequently, modeling
1Recall the advertisement for the brokerage, E. F. Hutton. The typical scene involved a crowded,
noisy, room. When a representative of this firm began to speak, all other conversation immediately





Figure 1.1: Layered Social Network
these contexts as layers of affiliation (see Figure 1.1) may provide a means to gain
new insight into how, why, and to what extent dyadic interactions occur.
1.3 General Assumptions and Scope
Admittedly, social interaction, and therefore the subsequent network compo-
sition and/or topology, is far from a static process. As time progresses, friendships
can strengthen, weaken, or even disappear altogether. Additionally, new friendships
may be formed, either among individuals already within the network, incorporating
entirely new members, or both. Finally, current members may leave the network over
time due to any number of reasons (e.g., alienation by the group, renunciation of
one’s membership to the group, capture, or death). Consequently, a social network
is a dynamic entity.
Interestingly, most studies investigating the propagation of opinions, rumors,
or influence over time throughout a given social network assume a known, and un-
changing, network topology. This is clearly contrary to social interaction observed
in the real world, even for non-cooperative networks that minimize their social inter-
action in an effort to maintain secrecy. Structural change over time is inevitable due
to the risky endeavors often undertaken (i.e., actors and their associated links disap-
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pear due to capture or death); further, the never-ending need to ensure survival of
the organization and the fight for its cause necessitates the creation of new bonds of
trust (i.e., recruitment, shared experience, and so forth). Current developments at-
tempting to overcome this limiting assumption include the computational modeling,
essentially an agent-based simulation approach proposed by [Monge and Contractor,
2003, Chapter 4], and the dynamic network analyses techniques proposed by [Carley,
2003; Marsili et al., 2004].
Unsurprisingly, dynamic analysis is almost certainly more representative of
real-world social network systems and is perhaps the ultimate modeling goal, partic-
ularly for the analysis of long-term anti-terrorism approaches. However, the dynamic
approach subsumes a range of data requirements. For example, in order to model
actor behaviors, one must know, or hypothesize at a minimum, the possible courses
of action available to the actor conditioned upon a multitude of environments, the
likelihoods of the individual taking one of those actions, the subsequent behavior of
other actors in reaction, and so forth.
Another potential issue for viewing and analyzing this problem dynamically is
the underlying assumption of the time-sensitive nature of counterterrorist operations.
It is assumed that, in general, the time-sensitive aspect will be weighed against
both data uncertainty and availability. Said another way, this type of analysis will
likely not enjoy the general assumption of accurate and complete data that prevails
throughout the SNA literature [Thomason et al., 2004].
Uncertainty in the data of both individual and overall network characteristics
will remain an underlying concern despite continuing investigative efforts. Related
dilemmas have been previously studied by Stork and Richards [1992] regarding non-
respondents in studies (akin to a terrorist not answering the question “who are your
fellow terrorists?”); the effects of unintended (or intended, depending upon the con-
text) asymmetries upon structural properties of friendship networks [Brewer and
Webster, 1999]; and the impact upon classical SNA centrality measures as a result
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of incorrect node or edge data Borgatti et al. [2006]. Over time and with more inves-
tigative resources, reliability and confidence in the data may increase; however, the
amount of time reserved for intelligence gathering to reduce this uncertainty is also
provided to the terrorists and their recruiting, operations planning, and execution
activities.
Given these considerations, methodologies that can be implemented quickly to
accommodate updated intelligence and are robust enough in the face of uncertainty to
still permit useful quantification of network phenomena are desired. Sensitivity and
parametric analysis enable testing and characterization of the requisite assumptions
and are assumed to sufficiently alleviate data concerns. Consequently, this research
assumes that a static picture of the network at given points in time is sufficient for the
methodologies proposed for two main reasons: scarcity and questionable accuracy
of available data and the potentially time-sensitive nature of operations that may
apply the methodologies herein.
As in the real-world, research data characterizing not only non-cooperative
networks but the contexts within which they interact is difficult to obtain. In order
to study these multi-level networks and test such measures, data composed of either
open, unclassified sources or of generated notional networks are presented.
As previously noted, short-term goals for the global war on terror include
disbanding, disrupting, and eliminating current organizations; long-term goals seek
to reduce the underlying conditions favorable to terrorism. Although the long-term
strategy is likely the only way to ensure our nations’s future security, the short-term
strategy will not only improve our immediate security but will contribute to the
long-term strategy as well. Therefore, this research focuses primarily upon short-
term strategies that implement counterterrorist options.
In order to develop these options, new measures of inter-personal influence and
modeling techniques to employ them are proposed, accommodating when possible
the nuances of non-cooperative networks. These measures and their accompany-
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ing theory are compared to existing ones when possible for verification purposes.
Additionally, previous mappings between SNA and OR, specifically in the area of
network flow models, require further work in the area of flow typology. Overall,
this research lends itself to improved modeling capabilities regarding the impact of
influence operations upon the individuals within a non-cooperative network.
1.4 Research Objectives
The primary objective of this research is to develop the underlying theory and
associated methodology used to generate and analyze courses of action that may be
applied to networks of non-cooperative individuals. The courses of action specifically
seek to shape the intentions of our adversaries through influence. This activity is
within the context of military psychological operations that strive to influence an
adversarys “. . . emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior
of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” [DOD, 2006a, pg. II-1].
These activities are often undertaken in order to achieve a given political goal. The
ability to quantitatively assess potential courses of action both prior to execution–
to facilitate decision making and alternative selection–and after–to determine the
operation’s efficacy–serves as a crucial first step to improve our understanding and
execution of warfare that extends beyond the realm of physical damage.
To accomplish these objectives, previous SNA and OR cross-sectional works
are built upon. This research differs from earlier works in methodological scope
as well as the investigation of benefits, disadvantages, and incorporation of layered
network perspectives and information into various mathematical techniques. Specific
objectives of this research include:
1. Develop a new centrality-like measure, via extensions of several others in use,
to screen networks for potential actors of interest. The theoretical bases that
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make this measure more amenable to non-cooperative networks, advantages,
and computational challenges are presented.
2. Develop new techniques to identify key members of an organization in line
with the ‘key-player problem’ described by Borgatti [2003a]. Mathematical
programs equivalent to current heuristic approaches are presented and com-
pared. Further extensions of the programs, and therefore the technique, are
developed and discussed to accommodate specific analysis requirements as well
as other methodological constructs presented in other areas of this research.
3. Develop a theory of measuring interpersonal relationships accounting for multi-
plexity. This measurement approach facilitates the incorporation of multiplex-
ity into mathematical programs of social networks. Methods to characterize
and analyze non-cooperative networks as layered, inter-dependent networks
are also investigated. In addition, determining which contexts or layers are of
interest, given a specified organization and scenario, is explored.
4. Exploration and explanation of how to aggregate, as appropriate, multiple so-
cial networks into a single, weighted network upon which classical and newly
developed analyses may be performed. In addition, if psychological operations
are applied to one or more layers, investigation of how the weights may change
over time and the affect upon the network performance and exchange of influ-
ence (or power, or status, etc.) measures in response to these external forces
(courses of action) are performed.
5. Extend current power theory and develop a pair-wise valued measure of gains,
losses, or thresholds of influence between two individuals. Incorporation of
this measure into generalized network flow formulations and its subsequent
impact upon analysis methodology and results are explored. A new measure,
an extension of the centrality measure proposed by Freeman et al. [1991], is
developed.
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6. Apply the mathematical modeling, decision-analysis-like techniques, newly de-
veloped social network measures, and other, related theory to several, un-
classified examples–presenting a process that provides actionable information
facilitating course of action development, analysis, and improved capability to
forecast roles and responsibilities of individuals in a non-cooperative network
when faced with limited information.
7. Combine the most promising techniques into a prototype tool-set, developed
in MATLAB, for intelligence analysis use by the sponsoring organizations.
1.5 Dissertation Overview
The organization of this dissertation document is as follows. Chapter II presents
the literature relevant to the problem areas and builds the case for the contribu-
tion objectives described above. Chapter III provides an overview of the complete
methodology and its general assumptions. Chapter IV presents a new social network
measure that addresses some limitations of currently available approaches which can
be used as a screening technique if limited information exists. Chapter V presents a
mathematical programming formulation for a concept amenable to targeting key in-
dividuals within a social network. Chapter VI develops and discusses various means
to measure the multiplexity of a relationship, which serves as a proxy for the strength
of an interpersonal relationship. Chapter VII explores the nuances of persuasion and
power theory in order to estimate gains and losses of information or influence as a
function of sender-receiver interactions. Although smaller examples are provided
for illustrative purposes throughout the document, Chapter VIII details a larger
example, where all aspects of the research methodology are applied and discussed.




This chapter serves several purposes. First, a brief review of graph theoretic defi-
nitions provide underlying terminology. Second, a review of the history and recent
developments of social network analysis (SNA) literature is provided, with the latter
focusing on the investigation of clandestine (e.g., criminal or terrorist) organiza-
tions. The behavioral literature and current modeling efforts of such networks is
summarized, providing a basis of understanding for the extremist phenomenon.
In light of the ultimate goal of negating the threat of terrorist networks via
the application of influence, ranging from psychological operations to lethal force,
underlying theories related to influence and motivation are presented. A number of
these theories provide an opportunity to quantify interpersonal influence, albeit some
require various assumptions that may or may not lend themselves to the analysis of
non-cooperative networks. Opportunities to merge these social network techniques
with those of operations research (OR), similarly accomplished by Renfro [2001], are
explored.
Several operations research methods have been developed to measure inter-
personal influence, incorporating this information into various models to study or-
ganizational phenomena [Renfro, 2001; Clark, 2005]. Possible areas of opportunity
to enhance existing theory, as well as potential improvements to accommodate non-
cooperative network phenomena, are suggested. Obtaining information character-
izing non-cooperative networks is fundamentally challenging. Consequently, this
research suggests that viewing interpersonal relationships as multidimensional, as
opposed to the generally single dimensional assessment, offers a means to improve
upon existing models of social networks. Measurement of the strength of inter-
personal relationships is derived from a combined and weighted assessment across
multiple relationship contexts or dimensions. This research area is derived from de-
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cision analytic techniques and its underlying theory of attribute weighting, as well
as appropriate graph theory and SNA-related literature.
Lastly, leveraging the output of these techniques as input to a variety of math-
ematical programming techniques comprise a major focus area of this research. As
such, applicable mathematical programming models are reviewed, as well as existing
sociological techniques that may benefit from such techniques. As noted by Borgatti
[2005], the underlying assumptions of information and influence flow play pivotal
roles when choosing a specific social network measure and interpreting its output.
Consequently, mismatches between the type of flow and the type of measure applied
often results in erroneous conclusions. The typology of flow processes within a net-
work and the implications upon network flow formulations are examined. Overall,
the combination of techniques derived or extended from these fields comprise the
various elements of the research methodology.
2.1 Graph Theory
While not a complete review of graph theory, this section serves to establish
a common graph-theoretic lexicon applicable to the SNA methods of interest within
the remainder of this dissertation. Social networks are typically represented and
analyzed via a graph [Moreno, 1953]. A graph, G = (N, A), is comprised of the set N
of n nodes corresponding to the individuals, and the set A of m arcs representing the
ties, relationships, bonds, or some other contextually-dependent connection between
two individuals [Newman, 2003, pg. 173]. An arc going from actor i to actor j is
denoted (i, j). Such relationships can be undirected or directed, the latter resulting
in a digraph. Undirected relationships are symmetric, or (i, j) = (j, i), implying
that the relationship, bond, and so forth runs equivalently in either direction. If
the context of the sociometric data (e.g., accounting for supervisory roles) or if
responses within a sociological survey are not equitable between two given actors
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(e.g., the forgetting of friends), a directed, asymmetric arc is more appropriate [cf.
Brewer and Webster, 1999].
The number of nodes within a graph denotes the order of the graph. The
density of the graph is the ratio of the number of edges to the theoretical maximum
number of edges possible. The maximum number of edges is n(n− 1)/2 for a graph
and n(n−1) for a digraph. Given that the individuals and their existing relationships
are often the focus of analyses, a number of SNA measures attempt to describe how
information, influence, rumors, adoption, and other influences may flow through the
network as a result of its topology.
A walk is defined as “a sequence of nodes and lines, starting and ending with
nodes, in which each node is incident with the lines following and preceding it in the
sequence” [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 105]. SNA literature generally allows
both nodes and arcs to be repeated within a walk [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg.
105] whereas graph-theoretic literature does not [Deo, 1974, pg. 19]. Within the
set of walks are trails and paths. A trail is “a walk in which all of the lines are
distinct, though some node(s) may be included more than once” [Wasserman and
Faust, 1994, pg. 107]. A path is defined as “a walk in which all nodes and all lines
are distinct” [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 105]. Additionally, given a digraph,
the term path also implies that the direction of the arcs within the path also follow
the direction of the path; otherwise it is a chain [Bazaraa et al., 1990, pg. 422]. The
length of a walk, trail, path, or chain is determined simply by the summation of the
lengths of each of its arcs. Paths, directed walks with unique arcs and nodes, are
taken advantage of within a new social measure, discussed later.
A common assumption underlying many SNA measures, either explicitly or
implicitly, requires that information or influence flow along the shortest path within a
network–termed a geodesic path. The geodesic path is defined as “the [not necessarily
unique] shortest path through the network from one vertex to another” [Newman,
14
2003, pg.173]. The length of the longest geodesic path between all possible node
pairs defines the diameter (D) of a network [Newman, 2003, pg.173].
Although graph theory considers the nature of all types of networks, this re-
search pays particular attention to previous efforts related to the study of social
networks and other types of graphs demonstrating properties similar to those in-
duced by the social interaction of individuals. Next, the concepts of ‘random’ and
‘small world’ graphs are briefly discussed and compared to the network that appears
to lie between these realms–the social one.
2.2 Graphs and Social Networks
Recent works such as Watts [1999], Barabási [2002], and Buchanan [2002]
have popularized what is referred to as the ‘small-world’ network phenomena. The
initial concept of small-world networks is often credited with Milgram’s research that
investigated the passing of letters to an unknown individual via known contacts. By
tracing the paths taken by the correspondence, the famous ‘six degrees of separation’
between ostensibly distant and unconnected actors was observed [Milgram, 1967].
Such networks are generally contrasted with the random graphs concept devel-
oped by Erdos and Renyi [1959] due to the underlying processes that form the links
between nodes. However, random and small-world graphs do share some common
properties. The use of random networks to study social network phenomena has
been attempted, but with mixed results [cf. Newman et al., 2002; Newman, 2003;
Borgatti et al., 2006].
2.2.1 Random and Small-World Graphs
In his book, Small Worlds, Watts compares and contrasts the properties of both
random and small-world graphs, often referred to within the literature as exponential
and scale-free graphs, respectively [Watts, 1999]. Watts details the formal definition
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of random graphs, which are essentially “. . . a vertex set, consisting of n vertices,
and an edge set that is generated in some random fashion” [Watts, 1999, pg. 36].
Two prevalent approaches used to develop random graphs are defined as follows.
Definition 1. G (n, M) is a labeled graph with vertex set V (G) = {1, 2, . . . , n},
having M randomly chosen edges (where M usually depends on n). G (n, M) is
frequently abbreviated as GM [Watts, 1999, pg. 36].
Definition 2. G (n, p) is a labeled graph with vertex set V (G) = {1, 2, . . . , n}, in
which every one of the possible Cn2 edges exist with probability 0 < p < 1, independent
of any other edges. G (n, p) is frequently abbreviated as Gp [Watts, 1999, pg. 36].
Noting that the degree of a vertex (k) is defined as the number of edges incident
to that vertex, the distribution of values for degrees among the vertices is one of the
differences between random and small-world graphs [Albert et al., 2000, pg. 379].
The degree distribution of vertices within networks developed as either GM or Gp
tend to be homogenous, with exponential-like distributions, implying that vertices
with high degree are unlikely [Albert et al., 2000, pg. 379]. On the other hand,
the degree distribution of small-world networks is often described as inhomogeneous,
following the power law distribution described by P (k) ∼ k−c [Albert et al., 2000,
pg. 379]. Consequently, highly connected nodes are statistically unlikely in random
(or exponential) networks and statistically significant in small-world (or scale-free)
networks [Albert et al., 2000, pg. 379].
The term ‘scale-free’ was coined by Barabási and his colleagues during their
investigation of link distribution of the Internet. The power law observation, and
therefore the lack of a ‘bell-shaped’ distribution that was expected, lead to Internet
nodes that “defied explanation, almost as if they had stumbled on a significant
number of people who were 100 feet tall . . . ” [Barabási and Bonabeau, 2003, pg.
53]. As Buchanan explains,
[The] power-law distribution is special in that there is no “typical” num-
ber of links. In other words, the network has no inherent bias to produce
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elements with an expected number of links; rather this number varies
widely over a huge range. That is to say, there is no inherent “scale” for
the number of links, and the network is scale-free [Buchanan, 2002, pg.
215].
Numerous connections between real-world, emergent networks and small-world
(or scale-free) phenomenon have been made. Examples include cellular metabolism,
Hollywood movie stars, Internet connections and world-wide-web page links, protein
regulatory networks within cells, research collaborations, and sexual relationships
[Buchanan, 2002; Barabási and Bonabeau, 2003, pg. 54].
As Buchanan points out, a purely random network has the small-world prop-
erty as far as connectivity is concerned [Buchanan, 2002, pg. 54]. Essentially, the
random networks exhibit the ‘six degrees of separation’ effect. However, Buchanan
also states that “. . . for 1,000 people linked together randomly, the degree of cluster-
ing turns out to be about 0.01, which is not even close to what one finds in a real
social network” [Buchanan, 2002, pg. 54].
Clustering, the main differentiating characteristic between random and small-
world graphs, is a topological consequence that results from the underlying “moti-
vations for why we create, maintain, dissolve, and reconstitute our communication
networks” [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 223]. Such motivations fall into one of
three theoretical mechanisms which include homophily, proximity, and social support
[Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 223].
Homophily infers that people are more likely to communicate with others sim-
ilar to themselves, classically referenced by the adage “birds of a feather, flock to-
gether” [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 223]. Additionally, Brass reiterates that
homophily has “been operationalized on such dimensions as age, sex, education, pres-
tige, social class, tenure, and occupation,” and suggested that similarity between two
actors is “thought to ease communication, increase predictability of behavior, and
foster trust and reciprocity” [Brass, 1995, pg. 51].
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Proximity mechanisms assume that closer distances, either physically or, in
light of today’s computer networked world, electronically, facilitate “. . . the likeli-
hood of communication by increasing the probability that individuals will meet and
interact” [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 227].
Lastly, social support theories focus “. . . on the ways in which communication
networks help organizational members to cope with stress” [Monge and Contractor,
2003, pg. 235]. Relationships, and therefore network connections, are developed as
a result of the individual’s need to achieve mental well-being, such as the need to
belong or the need to discuss personal problems, and determine potential solutions,
with an empathetic individual [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 235-6].
In order to more clearly differentiate between random and small-world net-
works, Watts provides definitions of the network properties characteristic path length
and clustering coefficient that, when combined, serve as the accepted technical and
mathematical definition of a small-world network. Such a network is assumed to be
connected.
Definition 3. The characteristic path length (L) of a graph is the median of the
means of the shortest path lengths connecting each vertex v ∈ V (G) to all other





[Watts, 1999, pg. 29].
Definition 4. The clustering coefficient (γ) of a graph characterizes the extent to
which vertices adjacent to any vertex v are adjacent to each other. Therefore, γ = 1
implies that the graph consists of n/(k + 1) disconnected, but individually complete
subgraphs (cliques), and γ = 0 implies that no neighbor of any vertex v is adjacent
with any other neighbor of v [Watts, 1999, pg. 33].
The combination of Definitions 3 and 4 serve as the formal graph-theoretic
definition of a small world network.
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Definition 5. A small-world graph is a graph with n vertices and average degree k̄




, but γ  γrandom ≈ k̄/n, where the asymptotic limit




[Watts, 1999, pg. 56, 114].
The small-world definition essentially states that this type of network “displays
considerable local connectedness while also having a low degree of separation with the
other nodes in the network” [Monge and Contractor, 2003]. Interestingly, although
a variety of real-world networks, including some social networks, have been shown
to adhere to the small-world network construct, it does not necessarily mean that all
social networks are small-world networks, particularly when the networks of interest
are non-cooperative by nature.
As an example, Krebs applied SNA to the hijacker network that perpetrated
the 9-11 attacks. The network, discernable only after the fact and composed of 19
individuals, had a measured characteristic path length of Lterrorists = 4.75 and a
clustering coefficient of γterrorists = 0.49 [Krebs, 2002]. The average degree of this
network was k̄ = 3.47. Using this information and Definition 5, a comparable small
world network would expect γrandom ≈ 3.47/19 = 0.183  0.49 and Lrandom =
ln(19)/ln(3.47) = 2.36. The clustering coefficient appears to meet the small-world
criteria. However, the path length (Lterrorists) is longer than expected.
After adding six additional links, based upon what Krebs presumed would be
necessary and logical in order for the terrorists to conduct their operations, Lterrorists
was reduced to 2.79–much closer to the value expected by definition. Krebs concludes
that the clandestine nature of this network forced the members to limit their com-
munication and connectivity in order to prevent detection.
This observation is in agreement with the findings of Baker and Faulkner who,
in studying organized crime in the electrical industry, determined that the struc-
tural development of such networks “. . . is driven primarily by the need to maximize
concealment, rather than the need to maximize [information] efficiency” [Baker and
Faulkner, 1993, pg. 837]. Consequently, non-cooperative networks may not necessar-
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ily exhibit the small-world properties, either due to our limited knowledge of their
organizational structure, the inherent nature of their operations, or both. Fortu-
nately, this neither disqualifies them as social networks nor prevents the application
of SNA methods upon them.
2.2.2 Social Network Analysis
The field of social network analysis is often traced back to the work of Moreno
[1953], who developed the sociogram, a pictorial representation of a social group
via a graph. Thus, with the natural connection to graph theory, Moreno devised a
means to quantitatively study the qualitative nature of relationships among individ-
uals within a social grouping [Moreno, 1953]. Subsequently, a variety of tools and
techniques have been developed to study the structural nature of social networks
and the implications of topology and personal characteristics upon overall network
behavior. Most of these techniques perform calculations upon the mathematical
representation of the sociogram, the sociomatrix (X).
The sociomatrix is a two-way matrix, “indexed by the sending actors (the
rows) and the receiving actors (the columns) . . . ,” and is equivalent to the adjacency
matrix of a graph when the sociogram captures dichotomous, symmetric relationships
[Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 77]. For a given relation () and the set of g actors
in N = {n1, n2, . . . , ng}, the value xij ∈ X is equal to the value of the tie from ni
to nj on relation  [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 79-80]. For dichotomous
relationships, this value is either 1 or 0 for actors that are or are not adjacent,
respectively; however, when xij is not limited to this data type, it is a valued relation.
Although the majority of sociometric studies within the literature focus upon a single
relationship during analysis, multiple relationships may be evaluated.
Suppose there exist R relations 1,2, . . . ,R, each measured on the same set
of actors. The value xijr ∈ Xr is the value of the tie from ni to nj on relation r.
This ‘super-sociomatrix’ approach offers a means to capture the layers of relations
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Table 2.1: Meta-Matrix [Carley et al., 2002, pg. 83]
Agents Knowledge Tasks
Agents Social Network Knowledge Network Assignment Network
Knowledge – Information Network Needs Network
Tasks – – Task-Precedence Network
as depicted in Figure 1.1 [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 86-7]. Note that the
collection of sociomatrices is also a collection of simple graphs, those accounting
for only one relation [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 145]. A multigraph, or
multivariate graph in the case of directed relationships, is “a generalization of a
simple graph or digraph that allows more than one set of lines” [Wasserman and
Faust, 1994, pg. 146]. The method of storage and subsequent approaches to calculate
measures using this type of multi-dimensional data is one of the key underlying
questions of interest in this research.
Carley et al. [2002] proposed a related concept describing a composite network
that incorporates the multi-dimensionality of interpersonal relations is the meta-
matrix. The meta-matrix concept is based upon the premise that network dynamics
are functions of (1) the social structure, (2) the distribution of knowledge and infor-
mation, (3) the interrelations between domains of knowledge, and (4) the distribution
of work and requirements [Carley et al., 2002, pg. 83]. These network-related as-
pects of an organization within the meta-matrix construct serves as input into an
agent-based network simulation, which evaluates the organization’s ability to per-
form tasks, communicate effectively, and so forth [Carley et al., 2002]. Table 2.1
provides a simplified representation of the meta-matrix concept.
Contained within each of these single-, multi-relational, and multi-dimensional
network constructs are the two fundamental items of interest: the relational ties
and actors. Brass offers general summary of social network measures involving the
relational ties, the actors, and the overall consequences of the network topology
as a result of both [Brass, 1995]. These summaries are shown in Tables 2.2, 2.3,
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Table 2.2: Link Attributes [Brass, 1995, pg. 45]
Attribute Definition
Indirect links Path between two actors is mediated by one or
more others
Frequency How many times or how often the link occurs
Stability Existence of link over time
Multiplexity Extent to which two actors are linked together by
more than one relationship (linkages between two
given actors occur within several contexts)
Strength Amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy, or
reciprocal services (frequency or multiplexity of-
ten used as measure of strength of tie)
Direction Extent to which like is from one actor to another
Symmetry Also referred to as reciprocity, the extent to which
relationship is bidirectional
and 2.4. Note that essentially all of the link and actor attributes have associated
mathematical definitions and measures. However, only those equations required
as part of the methodological development in this research will be presented. For
a complete review of SNA-specific formulations, Wasserman and Faust [1994] and
Monge and Contractor [2003] serve as comprehensive references.
Despite the fact that a majority of sociological studies and topologically-
dependent measures typically approach relationship in a dichotomous matter, it
can be seen from Table 2.2 that links may clearly hold more information than a ‘yes
or no’ response within a given context. Additionally, as Renfro [2001] and Sterling
[2004] have mentioned, the dichotomous approach to link assessment results in a
non-metric measure when the relationships these links capture are asymmetric, or
‘one-way.’ A metric space is defined as follows.
Definition 6. A metric space is a nonempty set M of objects (called points) together
with a function d from M × M to R (called the metric of the space) satisfying the
following four properties for all points x, y, z in M :
1. d (x, x) = 0
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2. d (x, y) > 0 if x 	= y
3. d (x, y) = d (y, x)
4. d (x, y) ≤ d (x, z) + d (z, y) [Apostol, 1974, pg. 60-1].
If the sociomatrix and its constituent relationships are symmetric, the values
within X form a discrete metric space [Apostol, 1974, pg. 61]. However, if the
relationships are asymmetric, Property 3 and possibly Property 4 of Definition 6 are
violated. Nonetheless, as proven by Renfro, non-metric estimates of interpersonal
strength still meet the assumptions of classic linear network flow models and their
multi-commodity extensions; however, this effect can pose some challenges when
dealing with generalized forms of linear flow models [Renfro, 2001, pg. 89-91]. These
models and the challenges associated with them are addressed later.
The concept of multiplexity is intriguing for a variety of reasons. Relationships
maintained and enforced in multiple contexts offer a potential means for measuring
relationship strength, as noted by Brass, as well as its inherent multi-dimensional
and subsequent multi-layered approach. Other than the work of Gould [1991], who
determined that the solidarity displayed within insurgent ranks was due to the com-
bination of pre-existing informal ties with formal, organizational ties, Monge and
Contractor state that “multiple relations on the same set of nodes are quite rare
in the research literature” [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 296]. They further
explain that . . .
most network researchers believe that many networks are predictive of
other networks, that communication networks, for example, are likely to
be highly predictive of friendship networks. Even more obvious is the
fact that autoregressive networks-the same network at previous points
in time-like other autoregressive processes, are likely to predict current
values of the network. But until these relations are demonstrated with
empirical research using valid statistical procedures, they remain in the
realm of speculation [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 296].
Interestingly, Wasserman and Faust recommend against aggregating multiple




Figure 2.1: Forbidden Triad [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1363]
doing so [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 219]. It is an underlying assumption
within this research that there are valuable insights to be gained by investigating
not only each of the relations, but their combined effect, similar to the work presented
by Clark [2005]. However, data collected on non-cooperative networks may not yield
graphs that are connected in each layer. Unconnected graphs often prove to be
problematic when trying to calculate centrality and reachability indices.
An alternative perspective on the combining of relationships is proposed by
Granovetter, who suggested that “the degree of overlap of two individuals’ friendship
networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to one another” [Granovetter,
1973, pg. 1360]. He further defines the strength of a tie as “a (probably linear)
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” [Granovetter, 1973,
pg. 1361]. How such linear combinations are developed remains of theoretical in-
terest. Clark [2005] used a normalized version of the multidimensional centrality
measures between relational graphs, presented by Bonacich et al. [2004] (discussed
in detail later), as a proxy for contextual weighting. Application of this measure,
however, is dependent upon symmetric, unvalued relationship data that comprises a
connected graph. In general, this area poses several opportunities for investigating
trade-offs between aggregate and independent analyses of contextual relationships,
as well as weighting techniques to facilitate aggregation as needed.
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Other areas of interest derived from the concept of multiplexity are due to
implications of strong and weak ties posed by Granovetter [1973]. For example,
consider the relationships depicted in Figure 2.1. Given a strong tie between actors
(A) and (B), if actor (A) also has a strong tie with actor (C), then it is unlikely that
there exists no tie between actors (B) and (C) [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1363]. As
an example, suppose (B) is a male with a strong relationship with female (A) such
that marriage is imminent. Further suppose that (C) represents a member of (A)’s
family. Ultimately, it is inevitable that (B) will meet and establish a relationship
with (C). The amount of time (A) spends with (B) and (C) separately ultimately
leads to a condition of social ‘pressure’ which can only be alleviated by (B) and (C)
establishing a relationship.
On the other hand, the concepts of strong and weak ties studied by Granovet-
ter [1973] had the underlying assumption of normal, interpersonal interaction, as
opposed to intentionally surreptitious relationships of people involved in dangerous
and anti-social behavior. A classic example could include a male (A) that is mar-
ried to (B) but is also romantically involved with (C). In order for (A) to proceed
(successfully) with this duplicitous behavior, keeping actors (B) and (C) ignorant of
each other’s existence is likely required. A similar relationship may be desirable in
a clandestine network for the purposes of organizational security and therefore must
be considered. Such ties are beneficial in limiting exposure to the remainder of the
organization if one individual is caught and interrogated. However, as Krebs sur-
mised, maintaining secrecy of organizational ties and operational activities is socially
costly [Krebs, 2002].
Complete relational triads or relationships that are comprised of a ‘linear com-
bination’ of the aspects described earlier, serve as strong ties according to Gra-
novetter [1973]. Alternatively, weak ties are composed of casual or intermittent
relationships; however, weak ties are potentially strong themselves. The strength of
a weak tie lies in its ability to bridge communication or influence between two or
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more distinct groups, or promote diffusion of influence and ideas between them [Gra-
novetter, 1973, pg. 1363-7]. This relationship may prove valuable militarily and is
discussed within the next category of measures, actor attributes [Granovetter, 1973,
pg. 1364-5].
Table 2.3 summarizes actor attributes commonly used in the SNA literature.
Note that within the SNA literature, ‘actor attributes’ refers not only to attributes
specific to that actor (gender, age, and education, for example), but also those
attributes that are a direct result of network topology. The latter category char-
acterizes each actor’s location and connectivity to adjacent and/or all other actors
within the organization.
Actor roles, shown in Table 2.4, are of particular interest in the context of
military and national security operations. For example, a bridge may be a member
that has a highly-specialized skill and performs critical services, the development of
biological weaponry, perhaps, for a number of the network’s cliques or cells. Liaisons
may comprise the senior leadership and coordination, whereas gatekeepers could be
mid-level leadership. Isolates with no links will likely comprise new suspects un-
dergoing investigation; isolates with few links may be indicative of the next suicide
bomber, the leader practicing good operations security (OPSEC), or the ‘agent in
place’ awaiting activation to execute instructions established long before surveillance
began. As Krebs noted in his analysis of the 9-11 terrorist group, “Those who were
trained to fly didn’t know the others. One group of people did not know the other
group” [Krebs, 2002, np]. In order for the network to function in such a coordinated
fashion, a few select individuals had to occupy such roles. This suggests that isolates
with few ties may be just as much of interest to intelligence, military, and law en-
forcement agencies as the most central actors. Unfortunately, this paradigm results
in extremely large networks, since an appropriate ‘cut-off’ point is oftentimes un-
available. Nonetheless, identification of the individuals performing such ‘structural’
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Table 2.3: Actor Attributes [Brass, 1995, pg. 46]
Attribute Definition
Degree Number of direct links with other actors
In-degree Number of directional links to the actor from other
actors
Out-degree Number of directional links from the actor to other
actors
Range (Diversity) Number of links to different others (others are defined
as different to the extent that they are not themselves
linked to each other, or represent different groups or
statuses)
Closeness Extent to which an actor is close to, or can easily
reach all the other actors in the network. Usually
measured by averaging the path distances (direct and
indirect links) to all others. A direct link is counted
as 1 whereas indirect links receive proportionately less
weight.
Betweenness Extent to which an actor mediates, or falls between
any other two actors on the shortest path between
those two actors. Usually averaged across all possible
pairs in the network.
Centrality Extent to which an actor is central to a network. Var-
ious measures (including degree, closeness, and be-
tweenness) have been used as indicators of centrality.
Some measures of centrality weight an actor’s links
to others by the centrality of those others
Prestige Based on asymmetric relationships, prestigious actors
are the object rather than the source of relations.
Measures similar to centrality are calculated by ac-
counting for the direction of the relationship (i.e., in-
degree)
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Table 2.4: Actor Roles [Brass, 1995, pg. 46]
Role Description
Star An actor who is highly central to the network
Liaison An actor who has links to two or more groups that would
otherwise not be linked, but is not a member of either
group
Bridge An actor who is a member of two or more groups
Gatekeeper An actor who mediates or controls the flow (is the single
link) between one part of the network and another
Isolate An actor who has no links, or relatively few links to others
roles may serve as either an initial target set for influence or application of more
elaborate intelligence measures.
Other roles include representative, itinerant broker, and coordinator are de-
scribed by [Degenne and Forsé, 1999, pg. 128-30]. These . The representative is
similar to a liaison; however, the representative takes a more active role in portray-
ing the network to which they claim membership. The itinerant broker “facilitates
intra-group communication,” acting as a third-party that assists two or more groups
in achieving common goals. An example would include an outside consultant that
mediates or streamlines the operations of several divisions within a company. The
coordinator is similar to the itinerant broker but is part of the two or more networks
involved in communication and therefore not acting as a third party [Degenne and
Forsé, 1999, pg. 129-30]. The articulator roles from both Degenne and Forsé [1999,
pg. 129] and Brass [1995] are depicted in Figure 2.2. The Ego, the person or group
of interest or focus within the given social context, in the diagrams indicates the
structural relationship between two or more individuals, subsets of a given network
or entirely separate networks given a specified position.
The final set of measures (see Table 2.5) summarized by Brass assesses the
global structure of the network. These are also descriptive measures, however, some
concepts may prove useful in developing courses of action intended to affect network
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Figure 2.2: Articulator Roles
characteristics may include actions taken to increase the number of components
within the network. For example, if the negation of a few select links or actors
results in the separation of various terrorist cells, planning and coordination of future
attacks may be more difficult for them. The concept and expectation of transitivity,
considering Granovetter’s forbidden triad, may offer insight into where additional
links should exist based upon current data, but not explicitly revealed due to the
surreptitious nature of the target network. This essentially leads to the notion that
target sets must be developed.
Recent research effort by Borgatti, in an attempt to identify key players within
a network, provides one means to identify potential entry points within a non-
cooperative network. Borgatti defines two ‘key player problems’ (KPP).
Definition 7. (KPP-1) Given a social network, find a set of k nodes (called a kp-set
of order k) which, if removed, would maximally disrupt communication among the
remaining nodes.
Definition 8. (KPP-2) Given a social network, find a kp-set of order k that is
maximally connected to all other nodes [Borgatti, 2003a, pg. 241].
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Table 2.5: Network Attributes [Brass, 1995, pg. 47]
Measure Definition
Size Number of actors in the network
Inclusiveness Total number of actors in a network minus the number of
isolated actors (not connected to any other actors). Also
measured as the ratio of connected actors to the total number
of actors.
Component Connected subset of network nodes and links. All nodes in
the component are connected (either direct or indirect links)
and no nodes have links to nodes outside the component.
Connectivity Also referred to as reachability, the extent to which actors in
the network are linked to one another by direct or indirect
ties. Sometimes measured by the maximum, or average, path
distance between any two actors in the network.
Connectedness Ratio of pairs of nodes that are mutually reachable to total
number of pairs of nodes
Density Ratio of the number of actual links to the number of possible
links in the network.
Centralization Difference between the centrality scores of the most central
actor and those of other actors in a network is calculated,
and used to form ratio of the actual sum of the differences
to the maximum sum of the differences
Symmetry Ratio of number of symmetric to asymmetric links (or to
total number of links) in a network
Transitivity Three actors (A, B, C) are transitive if whenever A is linked
to B and B is linked to C, then C is linked to A. Transitivity
is the number of transitive triples divided by the number of
potential transitive triples (number of paths of length 2).
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Borgatti also relates these problems to those of military interest. For example,
KPP-1 would allow target selection in the classical sense. “Given a network of
terrorists who must coordinate in order to mount effective attacks, and given that
only a small number can be intervened (e.g., by arresting or discrediting), which ones
should be chosen in order to maximally disrupt the network?” [Borgatti, 2003a, pg.
241] Note that network disruption is slightly different than previous efforts targeting
physical networks. Specifically, KPP-1 seeks not only to break the network into as
many components as possible, but seeks resulting components that are as fragmented
as possible, all via the selection and removal of the fewest nodes. Related network
disruption research has primarily relied upon cut-sets that disconnect a source and
sink node [cf. Leinart, 1998; Leinart et al., 2002; Curet et al., 2002]. For KPP-2, the
underlying premise is to find a set of actors that would facilitate “the diffusion of
practices or attitudes . . . ” which, militarily, “translates to locating an efficient set of
enemies to surveil, turn (into double-agents), or feed misinformation to” [Borgatti,
2003a, pg. 241].
The rationale for the development of the KPP methods lies in the fact that
many centrality measures were not developed with the intention of (potentially)
adversely affecting the network under study. Instead, social scientists attempted
to observe, and occasionally predict, behavior. Consequently, the measures that
evolved do not necessarily translate to network disruption or ‘seeding,’ especially if
the objective is to select the optimal set of individuals (k > 1) that accomplishes
these objectives [Borgatti, 2003a, pg. 241-7].
To address these issues, Borgatti develops a heuristic to analyze both problems,
but notes that the solutions are inherently “considerably less than optimal” [Borgatti,
2003a, pg. 247]. Additionally, it does not appear that the measures of ‘goodness’ (of
the solutions) used within the heuristic can account for directed arcs. Variations and
applications of classical covering, partitioning, and p-median problems, discussed
later, address some of these issues [cf. Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1999]. The end
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product is that, as opposed to the heuristic approach currently in use, the application
of mathematical programming techniques are guaranteed to provide the optimal
solution or solutions. However, knowing which actors to target, based upon the
KPP results, implicitly assumes that those actors are accessible.
In their analysis of other network disruption algorithms, Degenne and Forsé
[1999] discuss the actors’ vulnerability as a function of “the risk of becoming iso-
lated if one or more individuals drop out of the relation under study” [Degenne
and Forsé, 1999, pg. 103]. This implies that the higher value targets–those that are
more likely to disrupt (disseminate misinformation) if they are removed (influenced),
respectively–are those with high betweenness centrality and are also those that are
potentially more difficult to reach. This concept is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Note that ‘high-value targets’ in this context does not necessarily imply a key
leader within an organization (e.g., Osama bin Laden is considered a high-value
target within Al Qaeda). The concept of ‘high-value’ in this case refers to the
potential damage, via destruction or dissemination of misinformation, incurred by
removing or co-opting a particular individual or set of individuals. An example
could include the individual that assembles bombs for the local cell’s operations.
For KPP-1 in particular, the trade-offs between resources required to successfully
engage a highly central, but highly valued, target versus a more easily engaged, but
less valued, target must be assessed. This approach, however, implicitly assumes
centralized control of the network and its activities, which is unlikely the case for
semi-autonomous cells operating within today’s terrorist networks.
The KPP-2 concept is important in that the injection and subsequent spread
of influence (e.g., PSYOP or influence operations) requires an entry point into a
network with “formidable barriers to entry and exit” [cf. Post, 2005; Rothenberg,
2002, pg. 39]. Rothenberg notes that “The breakdown of such a network, whether on
the local or global scale, depends obviously on two factors: money and trust. The US
and other governments are in hot pursuit of the former, but appear . . . befuddled by
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Figure 2.3: Core-periphery partitioning [Degenne and Forsé, 1999, pg. 103]
the latter” [Rothenberg, 2002, pg. 40]. With relatively low-technology tactics such
as suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices becoming terrorists’ weapons
of preference, money may simply be an enabler or perhaps not even necessary for
some operations. Trust, and the corresponding relationships it nurtures, appears to
be the main strength of today’s terror networks. For example, the second lesson
of the Al-Qaeda Training Manual is entitled Necessary Qualifications and Character
for Organization’s Members and details the requisite commitment, attributes, and
willingness to undergo martyrdom [Post, 2005, pg. 25-32]. Consequently, techniques
and theory that contribute to attacking trust are appealing. With strength due
to trust in mind, Rothenberg puts forward a view, in opposition to this research,
summarizing the challenges associated with such an effort.
Sowing viruses of distrust is difficult within a network that has major
obstacles to entry, is highly decentralized, and whose leader’s status as a
symbol is likely to be untouched by what will happen to him. Peripheral
persons play a role, but primarily as purveyors of needed goods and not
as participants; such roles may or may not be useful in infecting the
network [Rothenberg, 2002, pg. 40].
In the absence of actual terrorist networks to conduct experiments in this area,
the influence-related aspects of the methodology proposed in Chapter III may not be
readily verifiable in a formal sense. However, such points do highlight the need to ac-
33
count for operational risks when dealing with non-cooperative organizations. Lastly,
Rothenberg notes the complexity of data collection for typical network studies as re-
quiring numerous interviews, ascertaining the levels or strengths of relationships, and
assessing network dynamics [Rothenberg, 2002, pg. 36]. These efforts are even more
problematic when dealing with non-cooperative, adversarial, and adaptive networks
that cannot be easily revealed through open and direct inquiry.
2.2.3 The Challenges of Network Data
Methods traditionally used to collect sociometric data include questionnaires,
interviews, observations, archival records, experiments, and others; this implies that
data sets comprise populations rather than subsets of them [Wasserman and Faust,
1994, pg. 45]. Granovetter notes that “It is clear why network methods have been
confined to small groups: existing methods are extremely sensitive, in their prac-
ticality, to group size because they are population rather than sampling methods”
[Granovetter, 1976, pg. 1287-8]. Due to the potential n (n − 1) number of directed
ties between n individuals, collecting complete and accurate data on large popula-
tions is costly and problematic. Further, Granovetter argues that such studies can
only make implicit connections between the nature of the data collected and the
nature of the true population from which the data came. Ultimately, “. . . we are
left guessing about the representativeness of the patterns of social relations found”
[Granovetter, 1976, pg. 1288].
Unless the individuals that comprise the population are known with certainty,
how representative the sample will be of the true population will always remain
in question. For example, Tsvetovat and Carley [2005] have estimated Al Qaeda
membership to be as high as 120,000. Even if such an extensive network could be
mapped, it is likely that the magnitude would leave most current analysis capabilities
computationally intractable. Hence, samples or subsets of the true networks comprise
currently available data sets.
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Other issues pervading network data that describes non-cooperative networks
includes missing data and potential structural bias as a result of the data gathering
processes available. In order to truly capture the information regarding a relationship
between two individuals, both individuals must be questioned [Stork and Richards,
1992, pg. 194]. When dealing with terrorists, unless both individuals are in custody
and amenable to truthful interviews, this is a difficult process dependent upon the
skills of both the interviewer and the interviewee, as well as some degree of luck. As
a result, analysis must be performed on incomplete data.
Robustness of classical network centrality measures given data errors such as
“. . . edge deletion, node deletion, edge addition, and node addition” has been ex-
plored by [Borgatti et al., 2006]. Unfortunately, the underlying graphs used in their
experiment were random in nature, as opposed to a more representative small-world
network topology. Previous research suggests that random networks, even when
degree distribution is carefully controlled, are not always representative of social
networks due to “. . . non-random social phenomena at work in the shaping of the
network” [Newman et al., 2002, pg. 2571]. Nonetheless, the authors concluded that
responses to error were ultimately a function of error type and network density [Bor-
gatti et al., 2006]. Although similar findings using ‘real’ and experimental network
data are provided in Bolland [1988], the redundant nature of the data may have
biased the experimental results. The sensitivity of other, more general, network
measures such as global efficiency, critical path length, density, diameter, and radius
of scale-free graphs has also been explored by [Thomason et al., 2004]. Whether
these conclusions map to more appropriate network topologies remains to be seen
and, based upon the analysis of network disruption as seen in Albert et al. [2000], is
likely heavily dependent upon where the missing data lies within the network.
As aforementioned, social network studies typically deal with populations as
opposed to samples of a population, for example, all the children in a classroom
[Moreno, 1953], the tribe members occupying a chain of islands [Bonacich et al.,
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2004], family members, and company managers [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg.
738] to highlight a few. Three methodologies appear to dominate the literature
regarding the capture of network data. The first two methods, snowball sampling,
also referred to as expanding selection, and fixed list, or fixed selection, assume that
respondents are either somewhat willing or can be persuaded to provide relational
information. The third, targeted sampling, was developed specifically for the study
of transmission of AIDS among intravenous drug users. The fact that the members
of such a network were involved in illicit drug use essentially results in a clandestine
network not totally unlike that of a terrorist organization [Watters and Biernacki,
1989].
Snowball sampling procedures are defined by a predetermined number of s
stages and k names. The steps of the methodology are shown in Table 2.6. Note
that if the ‘random sample’ in step 1 is replaced with ‘detected or detained set,’ this
procedure is essentially the methodology used by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, with s continuing either indefinitely or until the entire group is discovered
and no longer a threat. However, the respondents in this case, if captured, are
generally unwilling to provide information. Consequently, the approach is similar
but the results may remain limited in comparison to willing responses or biased due
to the reliance upon deceptive information. If information is gathered surreptitiously
(for example, via wiretaps or other forms of electronic monitoring), then unless
the target individuals are cognizant of the surveillance or practicing some form of
operations security, they could be considered ‘willing’ in the sense that they are not
intentionally withholding information. The resultant search pattern, however, will
likely be limited and more sparse compared to an open study simply due to the
inherent security needs of the clandestine organization.
Fixed list sampling entails the provision of a list of other people and getting the
respondents to indicate which ones on the list they consider themselves sharing some
level of relationship within the context under investigation. This is accomplished for
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Table 2.6: Snowball Sampling Procedure [Goodman, 1961, pg. 148]
Step Description
1. A random sample of individuals is drawn from a given finite
population.
2. Each individual in the sample is asked to name k different indi-
viduals.
3. The individuals who were not in the random sample but were
named by individuals in it form the first stage.
4. Each of the individuals in the first stage is then asked to name
k different individuals.
5. The individuals who were neither in the random sample nor in
the first stage but were named by individuals who were in the
first stage form the second stage.
6. The procedure is continued until each of the individuals in the
sth stage has been asked to name k different individuals.
at least all respondents that appear on the original list [Doreian and Woodward, 1992,
pg. 217-18]. In an interrogation setting, detainees may be given such a list and asked
to confirm relationships or are perhaps questioned over time until variations and
inconsistencies arise. These indicators can then be used to draw further information
from the subject.
The most noticeable, implicit assumptions for these methods includes: the re-
searcher must know at least a few of the members of the network; the respondents
are accessible for interview; and, the respondents answer in a truthful manner. All of
these assumptions prove problematic when dealing with non-cooperative networks.
In addition, structural biases may be introduced as a result of sampling technique.
For example, Doreian and Woodward [1992] found that between snowball and fixed
list techniques applied to the same target network, “(1) the [actors] included in the
two selection procedures differ; (2) network-based [measures] differ; (3) the substan-
tive contents of the included ties differ; and (4) the structure of the networks differ”
[Doreian and Woodward, 1992, pg. 216]. Although both snowball and fixed list sam-
pling techniques could be viewed as similar in nature to the interrogation process,
they must begin with a ‘captive’ respondent. As noted in Watters and Biernacki
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however, the responses of captured members of non-cooperative networks and the
subsequent network and member characteristics developed may not be representa-
tive of the network that exists outside of the controlled and persuasive environment
of incarceration [Watters and Biernacki, 1989, pg. 417].
Perhaps the most concrete evidence of a sociometric sampling technique suc-
cessfully resulting in an ‘accurate’ representation of the true (population) network
is the targeted sampling procedure posed by Granovetter [1976]. He suggests “given
a population of size N , the method proposed is to take a number of random sam-
ples from that population, each of size n (with replacement), and within each such
sample ask each respondent some sociometric question about each other respon-
dent” [Granovetter, 1976, pg. 1290]. Granovetter proves that this approach yields
an unbiased estimate of the true network’s density [Granovetter, 1976]. Underly-
ing assumptions are, once again, that network members are known, respondents are
willing to participate, and relations are symmetric (despite the fact that he recom-
mends that respondents be questioned both ways). Granovetter does account for
one-way questioning (that is, relying more heavily on the assumption of symmetry)
but does not discuss to the statistical implications of this approach upon his estimate
[Granovetter, 1976, pg. 1297]. Further, guidelines for the parameters accounting for
“the number of samples taken and the size in each sample” are provided in a similar
fashion to the determination of sample size to meet certain uncertainty criteria [Gra-
novetter, 1976, pg. 1290-95]. However, this again assumes that the true population
membership is known and that the necessary number of samples of the same size of
n individuals is feasible.
Although there are similarities between cooperative and non-cooperative data
gathering, the latter organization will always ‘fight back’ against investigators, pro-
viding either no information or possibly misinformation, the latter of which may
in some cases still be useful. These issues will continue to plague decision-makers
and analysts as long as the target networks are non-cooperative. As opposed to
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Table 2.7: Covertness Factors [Tsvetovat and Carley, 2005, np]
1. Strong religious (in case of Islamic groups) or ideological (in case of Sendero
Luminoso and other South American guerilla groups) views that allow
members to form extremely strong bonds within a cell.
2. Physical proximity among cell members, often to the extent of sharing
living quarters, working and training together.
3. Lack of rosters on who is in which cell.
4. Cell members being given little knowledge of the organizational structure
and the size of the organization.
5. Little inter-cell message traffic.
6. Information about tasks issued on a need-to-know basis, so very few people
within the organization know about the operational plans in their entirety.
7. Cells are often formed on the basis of familial or tribal ties, or strong
interpersonal ties forged in training.
ascertaining the effect upon centrality measures due to errant data, future work
may benefit from approaches that maximize the likelihood of discovering a certain,
hopefully high, percentage of the true network structure. Unfortunately, simply ob-
taining data on these adversarial networks is difficult at best. Tsvetovat and Carley
describe the primary factors that enable a terrorist network to remain covert; these
are provided in Table 2.7. Note that, from a Department of Defense perspective,
the concept of covertness presented by Tsvetovat and Carley actually aligns more
closely with the concept of ‘clandestineness,’ which leverages secrecy to mitigating
potential damage or interruption of operations due to the exposure of members or
activities.
To this point, network topologies, nuances of social networks, and the chal-
lenges of collected data characterizing non-cooperative networks have been discussed.
However, externally affecting such networks involves much more than the topologi-
cally imposed constraints, or opportunities, within which the network members must
work. It is also important to understand how these individuals may react to outside
sources of influence. The next section discusses open source elements of the psycho-
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logical aspects of terrorist decision making, as well as current efforts attempting to
model this phenomena.
2.3 The Psychology of Terrorists
The President of the United States defines terrorism as “premeditated, politi-
cally motivated violence perpetrated against innocents” [The President, 2006, pg. 5].
To better deal with terrorists and terrorist organizations, an understanding of their
underlying psyche, motives, and overall goals is required. This information would,
in theory, allow analysts to model the behavior of such individuals and their orga-
nizations, thus providing an opportunity to learn, predict, and directly or indirectly
thwart this type of threat. Several ongoing efforts attempting to encode behavior
in simulated agents representing terrorists are also reviewed. These simulations are
undertaken in order to gain insight and to provide courses of action that are more
likely to marginalize the threat posed by terrorists.
This section discusses several existing methods that attempt to model the be-
havior of terrorist groups or, more specifically, the terrorists themselves. Potential
benefits of this research thread could include (1) gaining insight into the underlying
causes for motivating an individual to engage in these activities; (2) describing the
incorporation of these concepts into agent-based simulations for study; and (3) il-
lustrating the use of these simulations to evaluate various courses of action, ranging
from close-combat operations to application of other instruments of power and/or
international diplomacy. Although the second and third benefits are beyond the
scope of this research, the first must be addressed when approaching this problem
from either a static or dynamic viewpoint.
Maslow’s hierarchy provides a solid basis for describing behavior “. . . across
cultures, age groups, and generations. . . ” [Johns and Silverman, 2001, pg. 4]. How-
ever, when considering that physiological and safety needs come before all other
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needs, the phenomena of “suicide bomber” presents a dichotomy. Johns and Silver-
man attempt to partially resolve these types of issues by incorporating emotion into
a decision theoretic representation of ‘agent’ behavior. As this work clearly presents
a learning opportunity, the decision theory that underlies this effort requires review.
An effort parallel to that of Johns and Silverman [2001] by Silverman et al.
[2001] extends the agent-based simulation capability by offering a means to ‘dial-up’
an adversary, inferring a capability to choose an adversary and possibly the situa-
tional context with the resulting agent behavior that is tailor-made to accommodate
social, ethnic, and other characteristics that may perturb a basic model of behavior.
These efforts, of course, beg the question of what aspects and underlying psycho-
logical models of decision making, emotion, motivation, and rationality are most
suitable to characterize the adversary of interest, the terrorist.
2.3.1 What should be modeled and why?
Given its inherent complexity, modeling human behavior is in itself a daunting
task. Modeling human behavior that falls within the realm of terrorist activity may
be even more difficult. Some terrorist activities simply fall within what many per-
ceive to be irrational behavior (e.g., suicide bombing) and, very generally speaking,
involves an enemy that ascribes to different ideologies than our own. The “irrational-
ity” of suicide terrorism is a prevalent misconception [Driscoll, 2005]. Terrorists are
not always motivated by fanatical interpretations of religion and do not always origi-
nate from the stereotypical ‘underprivileged’ classes of society. In fact, terrorists are
“deeply committed, maintain excellent intellectual ability, planning, problem solv-
ing, interpersonal skills and self-discipline” [Driscoll, 2005]. It is true that the U.S.
armed forces are willing to sacrifice their lives for our own ideologies (e.g., liberty and
democracy). However, unlike the suicide bomber, Western forces tend to focus on
the capitulation or death of the adversary with minimal loss of friendly forces rather
than intentionally sealing our own troop’s demise during the course of warfare.
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Assuming that this phenomenon can be explained, as attempted by the work
of Sprinzak [2000], what other aspects of terrorist behavior are of interest? Weaver
et al. [2001] and Johns and Silverman [2001] develop models to facilitate military
training, particularly in the area of guerilla warfare within a hostile urban environ-
ment. The ultimate modeling goal may be to predict how a given threat will behave
and consequently understand how to defeat it. From a long-term perspective, im-
proving understanding of terrorist behavior may improve the capability to avoid the
underlying conditions that contribute to the recruitment of future generations of
terrorists.
2.3.2 Rational Decision Making
There are a variety of definitions of rationality in the literature. For example,
in the context of microeconomics, a “rational consumer will choose a market basket
where the marginal utility of the last dollar spent on all commodities purchased is
the same”–essentially where a budget line is tangent to the highest indifference curve
[Mansfield, 1994, pg. 83-4]. In a related, but sometimes more practicable genre,
decision theoretic implementation of multi-objective utility analysis assumes that
once an “assignment of utility numbers to consequences” is complete, the optimal,
and rational, strategy requires selection of the alternative that maximizes expected
utility [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 7]. Noting that selection of alternatives may
also be subject to budget constraints, the decision theoretic approach provides a
deeper focus on the derivation of utility. Hence, the economic approach may prove
useful in determining levels of humanitarian aid or standard of living improvements
required to persuade people from succumbing to the appeal of terrorist organizations,
but its role in trying to understand and predict current terrorist behavior remains
unknown. The decision theoretic approach certainly lends itself to implementation
within a decision model of a simulated actor or agent in agent-based simulations,
shown later in this section. However, in the context of both the actions and ideologies
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of terrorists and their organizations, optimal decision strategies may vary drastically
among individuals. Hence, a more fundamental understanding of human behavior
in the context of decision making must be considered. Commonly accepted, albeit
Western-focused, models of human behavior, along with its role in decision making,
are reviewed.
2.3.3 Maslow’s Hierarchy
A. H. Maslow developed the concept of the hierarchy of needs in order to bet-
ter understand human behavior. His construct has been used extensively in business
organizations to assess what may or may not motivate employees to continuously
improving levels of performance. The needs are hierarchical in nature and are sum-
marized in Table 2.8. Another important aspect of this theory is its underlying
assumptions. Costley et al. summarizes these as follows:
1. Motives are highly complex, and no single motive affects behavior in isolation.
A number of motives are always in operation at the same time.
2. There exists in each individual a hierarchy of needs that requires, in general,
that lower-level needs must be partially satisfied before higher-level needs affect
behavior.
3. A satisfied need is not a motivator. When a need is satisfied, another need
emerges, so that the individual always remains in a motivated state. Higher-
level needs can be satisfied in a greater variety of ways than lower-level needs
[Costley et al., 1994, pg. 219].
Considering that Physiological and Safety are two of the most basic needs (and
therefore, generally take priority over all others), it may be hypothesized that once
these are met, the stage is set to fulfill needs generated within the higher levels.
However, in the context of suicide bombing, the obvious question becomes “Would
an individual guarantee the ruin of the most basic needs (Physiological and Safety)
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Table 2.8: Needs Hierarchy [Costley et al., 1994, pg. 219]
Urgency Need Examples
Most Urgent Physiological Food, water, rest, and shelter
Safety Security and protection
↓ Social Belonging, acceptance, and friendship
Esteem Recognition, status, and self-esteem
Least Urgent Self-Actualization Creativity and self-realization
in order to achieve a need in the higher level of the hierarchy?” Another theory,
developed by Alderfer [1969], offers a potential explanation of this dichotomy.
2.3.4 Existence, Relatedness, Growth Theory
Existence, Relatedness, Growth (ERG) Theory was developed to address some
of the questions surrounding Maslow’s hierarchy. ERG differs from Maslow’s theory
in two major areas, specifically its structure and the assumptions linking the struc-
ture. As opposed to the needs categories defined by Maslow, Alderfer clusters needs
into the three categories: Existence, Relatedness, and Growth. Existence needs ac-
count for material and physiological desires, Relatedness includes relationship needs
of significant others, and Growth accounts for the “creative or productive effects on
himself and the environment” [Alderfer, 1969, pg. 145-6]. Clearly, the structure
mirrors Maslow’s to some extent.
However, this particular classification scheme avoids some of the overlap prob-
lems suffered by Maslow’s hierarchy [Alderfer, 1969, pg. 147]. Additionally, Alder-
fer’s hierarchy is not strictly ordered; consequently, “it does not assume lower-level
satisfaction as a prerequisite for the emergence of higher-order needs” [Alderfer, 1969,
pg. 142]. It is this underlying premise that offers a means to explain a terrorist’s
Jihadist aspirations that essentially guarantee their own demise. Lastly, Alderfer
notes that these categories of needs “. . . provide the basic elements in motivation”
[Alderfer, 1969, pg. 145].
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2.3.5 Motivation-Hygiene Theory
A third, relatively mainstream, theory of motivation is due to Herzberg et al.
[1965]. In an attempt to find the key factors that lead to job satisfaction, Herzberg
et al. developed the theoretical bases for a person’s attitude toward their job
[Herzberg et al., 1965, pg. 3]. Factors associated “. . . with conditions that sur-
round the doing of the job,” thereby affecting the psychological health of the work
environment, comprise the “factors of hygiene” [Herzberg et al., 1965, pg. 113]. Ful-
fillment of such factors may prevent dissatisfaction but do not necessarily guarantee
job satisfaction. Hence, the second basis of the theory deals with motivation factors.
Motivation factors are those that “. . . lead to positive job attitudes [because]
they satisfy the individual’s need for self-actualization in his work” [Herzberg et al.,
1965, pg. 114]. Both factors ultimately serve the psychological needs of the worker,
“but it is primarily the motivators that serve to bring about the kind of job sat-
isfaction and . . . improvement in [future] performance” [Herzberg et al., 1965, pg.
114].
Costley et al. compare and contrast Herzberg et al.’s theory with that of
Maslow’s. Essentially, the motivation factors coincide with self-realization and es-
teem needs, whereas the maintenance or hygiene factors coincide with social, safety,
and physiological needs [Costley et al., 1994, pg. 247]. This approach to modeling
the psychological underpinnings of motivation and rationale for behavior was de-
veloped for, and is continuously applied to, business-employee settings. Although
an abstraction of this theory could be applied to the underlying factors in terror-
ist behavior, such an attempt in this specific area is currently beyond the scope of
this research. However, considering each of these theories attempts to explain what
motivates individuals while also accounting for emotional states in one form or an-
other, a complete explanation of suicidal terrorist behavior is likely dependent upon
a combination of both motivation and emotion.
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2.3.6 Motivation
Decision theory states that people base their decisions upon assumptions and
information that describe which of their choices results in the most favorable out-
come. Costley et al. notes that several expectancy theories of motivation all share
one underlying assumption “. . . that people choose behaviors based on their expec-
tations about the outcomes” [Costley et al., 1994, pg. 232]. This expectation and
consequent measure of motivation is a “function of the value placed on potential
rewards (referred to as valence) and the perceived probability that the effort will be
successful (referred to as expectancy)” [Costley et al., 1994, pg. 232]. Given that
different ideological differences may result in different concepts of what is a ‘reward,’
this implies that in order to ascertain a terrorist’s behavior, it must be done so
through their perspective and not our own.
2.3.7 Emotion
Arguments for incorporating emotion within decision making are discussed in
Ellis and Hunt [1993] and Rolls [2001]. Ellis and Hunt state that “. . . it is apparent
that emotional or affective states can very much influence cognitive processes in
important ways” [1993, pg. 333]. Unfortunately, they then illustrate several studies
that have shown that emotional states (e.g., depression) do not necessarily impede an
individual’s ability to make contingency judgments [Ellis and Hunt, 1993, pg. 353-
55]. Counter to this argument, Rolls suggests that “Emotions can usefully be defined
as states produced by rewards and punishers. Rewards are stimuli for which (a
human) will work, and punishers are stimuli that (a human) will work to escape from
or avoid” [Rolls, 2001, pg. 4444]. Consequently, these phenomena are “. . . reinforcers
in that they alter the probability of behavior” [Rolls, 2001, pg. 4444]. That is,
despite the valence and expectancy values described by Costley et al., the resulting
motivation value may be changed or influenced by emotions or the external conditions
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Figure 2.4: Factors Influencing Motivation
and appears to be the underlying premise of the modeling efforts pursued by Johns
and Silverman [2001].
Rolls summarizes the functions of emotion. Of these functions, several are of
interest in the context of modeling terrorist decision-making. The first function is
that emotion serves to elicit certain autonomic and endocrine responses, preparing
the body for action [Rolls, 2001, pg. 4444]. A classic example of this function is an
athlete getting psyched up using the external stimuli (the crowd’s roars, for example)
to boost performance. A similar event is the fight or flight response invoked when a
human or animal is in immediate and obviously mortal danger.
Rolls also notes that emotion in itself is motivating; previous experiences lead to
future actions performed. [Rolls, 2001, pg. 4445] Essentially, levels of fear (or gusto)
may influence or facilitate the motivation to achieve a goal. Third, he indicates that
“the current mood state can affect the cognitive evaluation of events or memories,
and this may have the function of facilitating continuity in the interpretation of
the reinforcing value of events in the environment” [Rolls, 2001, pg. 4445]. For
example, fear of disappointing Allah, family, comrades, and friends by failing to
achieve a terrorist act may allow the individual to focus and continue their mission
despite the fact that success will result in their own demise. This is closely related to
the next function of emotion–“by enduring for minutes or longer after a reinforcing
stimulus has occurred, it may help to produce persistent and continuing motivation
and direction of behavior, to help achieve a goal or goals” [Rolls, 2001, pg. 4446].
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Finally, “rewards and punishers, and the emotional states they produce, pro-
vide a common currency for the behavior selection process between competing al-
ternative actions” [Rolls, 2001, pg. 4446]. This provides further justification for the
conceptual model noted in Figure 2.4. Additionally, rationality with regard to the
decisions made by terrorists may not fall within the realm of maximizing expected
utility, at least from a Western, decision-theoretic perspective. Extremists’ defini-
tions of acceptable goals, means, and the underlying emotions and motives employed
must be investigated.
2.3.8 What is a rational terrorist?
As previously mentioned, the modus operandi of terrorist organizations is to
achieve their goals by employing tactics that are “. . . almost supernatural, extremely
lethal, and impossible to stop. . . , ” particularly in the case of suicide bombers [Sprin-
zak, 2000, pg. 66]. Tactically, this method is advantageous in that . . .
[Suicide bombing] is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape
routes or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties
and extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact
time, location, and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that in-
terrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their
deaths are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and
media [Sprinzak, 2000, pg. 66-8].
Essentially, Sprinzak suggests that martyrdom has become the terrorists’ pri-
mary option against opponents commanding extremely capable military forces. The
notion of suicide bombers is not new, and dates back to at least “as early as the 11th
century; the Assassins, Muslim fighters living in northern Persia, adopted this strat-
egy to advance the cause of Islam” [Sprinzak, 2000, pg. 68]. However, martyrdom
has remained an underlying requirement for this strategy, but it is “. . . not merely
the product of religious fervor,” and it varies “. . . not only by culture, but by cir-
cumstance” [Sprinzak, 2000, pg. 68]. To further complicate the problem of modeling
this phenomenon, Sprinzak’s review concludes that there is “no single psychological
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or demographic profile of suicide terrorists . . . , but several types of people with the
potential willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause” [Sprinzak, 2000, pg. 68].
Emotions play a key role in leveraging these individuals; specifically, exploiting
religious beliefs and the rewards of an afterlife, “. . . patriotism, hatred of the enemy,
and a profound sense of victimization” [Sprinzak, 2000, pg. 69]. With this in mind,
Sprinzak suggests that the more useful exercise is analyze the leaders, as opposed to
the bombers, that choose this strategy, and indicates that “leaders who opt for this
type of terrorism are usually moved by an intense sense of crisis, a conviction in the
effectiveness of the tactic, endorsement by the religious or ideological establishment,
and the enthusiastic support of their community” [Sprinzak, 2000, pg. 69-70]. It is
these situations that may lend themselves to modeling. For example, application of
various instruments of power or international support may erode the endorsement
and support provided to the terrorist organization. With this in mind, the issue of
mapping such abstract concepts as emotions, their link to motivation, and the result-
ing actions, decisions, and behaviors of terrorist organizations and the individuals
that comprise them is of interest.
2.3.9 Realistic Model of Rationality
Obviously, the task of modeling human behavior and decision-making, partic-
ularly of non-cooperative individuals, is no simple undertaking. Slade notes that
the traditional economic model of rationality requires a great deal of data that is
likely unavailable; even so, if all the data is available, the approach of calculating
the optimal decision may be intractable [Slade, 1995, pg. 126]. In an attempt to de-
velop a more realistic and implementable model of a rational decision-maker, Slade’s
work furthers the concept of bounded rationality developed by Simon, “which in-
corporates information processing constraints in an effort to reflect the limitations
of human cognition” [Slade, 1995, pg. 126]. As opposed to bounded rationality
which presumes a decision-maker must satisfice rather than optimize, Slade’s model
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Table 2.9: Assumptions [Slade, 1995, pg. 126-7]
- An agent (i.e., an individual) has many goals with varying preferences;
some goals are more important than others.
- An agent executes plans (a sequence of actions) in order to achieve specific
goals; this behavior requires resources.
- An agent has limited resources (e.g., time, money, and cognitive capabili-
ties).
- Different agents have different goals and resources; decision-making is sub-
jective.
- An agent allocates resources to achieve their preferred goals.
- Since knowledge is considered a resource, an agent is not irrational if they
fail to achieve a goal due to lack of knowledge.
- Emotions are a reflection of goal states.
- An agent has relationships, positive and negative, with other agents, with
varying strengths.
- Through a relationship, an agent adopts the goals of the other agent with
a preference related to the strength of the relationship.
- Decisions require justification.
requires the decision-maker to justify choice, thus offering a means to incorporate
emotions and motivations with extremists’ decision making processes [Slade, 1995,
pg. 126]. The underlying assumptions for this model are listed in Table 2.9.
These assumptions were used to develop a decision-making model that ex-
plicitly accounts for the “representation of goals, choices, relationships, strategies,
and the use of natural language to produce explanations . . . ” which comprise the
justifications for a given decision [Slade, 1995, pg. 127]. It is important to note
that Slade expanded the traditional focus from a single decision-maker to one that
viewed “decision-making as a social process through the adoption of goals from in-
terpersonal relationships” [Slade, 1995, pg. 129]. Slade suggests that the multi-agent
phenomena of advice, persuasion, and negotiation can be explored by this framework
[Slade, 1995, pg. 129]. Considering that “a suicide terrorist is almost always the last
link in a long organizational chain that involves numerous actors,” this framework
offers a promising modeling approach [Sprinzak, 2000, pg. 69]. In addition, if the
adoption of goals is indeed related to the strength of interpersonal relationships,
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this fact could be exploited when deciding how to develop and execute psychological
operations that seek to influence an organization’s goals. However, just as there are
data issues associated with the traditional economic and decision theoretic approach
(that is, expected utility and single decision-maker assumption, respectively), the
non-cooperative nature of these individuals may pose similar problems. Addition-
ally, the psychosocial aspects considered within an appropriate model are complex.
Harris provides supporting rationale for modeling the decision-making and behavior
(of terrorists) . . .
“We all want to make sense of our world, and at no time more urgently
than when our world is suddenly behaving strangely. But in order to
make sense of such strangeness, we must be able to reduce it to something
that is not strange–something that is already known to us, something we
know our way around” [Harris, 2002, pg. 19].
He also noted, however, that the process of understanding the strangeness
inevitably leads to an analysis from our own viewpoint, and not necessarily from
that of the “culturally exotic” enemy [Harris, 2002, pg. 19]. This likely remains
as one of the most challenging issues to future modeling efforts. The next section
presents an overview and associated challenges of some current, but not necessarily
all-inclusive, agent-based approaches to this problem.
2.3.10 Current Behavioral Modeling Efforts
Today’s demand for realistic video games has promoted the development of
computer science techniques to model virtual, artificially intelligent opponents. These
technologies may serve as a launching point for modeling terrorist behavior. Of
particular interest in the context of modeling decision-making is the agent-based
approach to simulation. This simulation framework “consists of individual agents,
commonly implemented in software as objects. . . that have states and rules of be-
havior” [Axtell, 2000, pg. 2]. Axtell also suggests that the efforts to reduce the
computational challenges associated with agent-based simulation by either limiting
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intra-agent activity or limiting the options available to agents are similar to the
concept of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, the implication is that equilibrium
to a specific answer via this simulation approach may never be achieved. However,
insight is still possible, but one must also consider the accuracy of the input data
when relying upon a definitive answer from this type of model [Axtell, 2000, pg. 9].
Silverman et al. [2001] are actively involved in model development, focusing
on the behavior and decision-making of terrorists and terrorist organizations. One
such effort involves a compilation of Human Behavior Models (HBM). HBM is based
upon diverse, authoritative literature, and attempts to “. . . quantify the impact of
human performance to internal and external stressors, and help to capture the role of
personality and individual differences (within simulations)” [Silverman et al., 2001,
pg. 1]. This approach also incorporates a Performance Moderator Function (PMF),
which relates internal individual or group characteristics and their interaction within
a given environment to estimate a level of performance or behavior as a result of
environmental stressors [Silverman et al., 2001, pg. 1-2]. One of their goals was to
facilitate the difficult task of gathering data useful to mathematical or computational
implementation. Additionally, since the data was to provide a means to simulate
behavior, it had to be collected within the context of a framework. This framework
is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
The steps Acquire, Best-fit Situation, Course of Action, and Direct are anal-
ogous to the well known Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop and are
described by Silverman et al. as:
• The agent “acquires data and cues from the external world (x, x′); based upon
their prior focus of attention (f) and level of arousal or valence (v), and filters
out noise to produce a set of state variables (s) as output.”
• The agent evaluates the situation based on the cues attended to (s) and pat-



































x=vector of input data (x´ is from superiors)
f=focus of attention; v=valence or intensity
s=vector of state variables (cues attended to)
P(s|H)=prob. of those states given situations, H
P(H|s)=prob. of a situational hypothesis (H) being true
=belief set (rules, cases, foe behavior, etc.)
u=desires or utilities of various outcomes
I=intentions or plans to carry out in the environment
z=actions, plan parts




Figure 2.5: Decision-Making Agent [Silverman et al., 2001, pg. 4]
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This leads to several plausible hypotheses (H) each with a corresponding like-
lihood of P (H|s).
• The agent then chooses what course of action to pursue by selecting a decision
rule based on doctrine and on the time available to plan and decide. Depend-
ing upon the overall objectives and temporal constraints, the agent applies
“. . . utility or desire levels (u), emotional intensity levels (v), and belief sets
(β), about the effectiveness of their actions over time and space against the
opponent” in order to ascertain the best course of action, denoted the intended
plan or intent (I).
• The agent then maps actions required to achieve the plan to output signals, de-
noted (y, y′), which are enacted by the subsequent steps (z) “. . . needed to carry
out the plan and achieve the intention.” The overall effect is to “. . . optimally
control its portion of the external world including its own behavior as well as
that of others it might be able to influence” [Silverman et al., 2001, pg. 4].
The other aspect of this framework of interest to this research effort is the meta-
reasoning block, shown in Figure 2.6. As illustrated, the meta-reasoning process
begins with an evaluation of the current emotion level of the agent. Given this
influence and information from external and internal sources, the agent tries to
decide what course of action best suits the agent’s needs, evaluated by the emotion
appraiser [Silverman et al., 2001, pg. 5]. It is interesting to note that the authors
“reject (Maslow’s) concept of seriality of needs” (for example, survival needs must
be fulfilled before intellectual fulfillment) [Silverman et al., 2001, pg. 5]. Therefore,
this approach favors the theory proposed by Alderfer [1969] and consequently allows
for the situation where an individual would place martyrdom or a ‘greater cause’
before their own mortality.
As an example, Hudson notes that the fanatic classification of suicide terrorists
implies that ideological and political rewards come before financial security, and
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Figure 2.6: Meta-Reasoning Module [Silverman et al., 2001, pg. 5]
suicide [Hudson, 1999, pg. 31-4]. Such behavior could be programmed into the
agent under this assumption. Accounting for how different or specific individuals
adhere to this notion via a generalization of psychological, physiological, and external
situations (e.g., economic and political status) has proved to be problematic in the
past [Hudson, 1999, pg. 23, 30].
Assuming now that this model appropriately characterizes the key motives and
resultant behaviors of terrorists, it is clear that different terrorist groups or individ-
uals may require different behavioral functions in order to accurately account for the
cultural, ethnic, gender, and situational differences. Weaver et al. [2001], in collabo-
ration with Silverman et al. [2001], have developed a means to ‘dial-up’ an opponent
such as a terrorist organization by leveraging the PMF approach. By accounting for
the “(current) situation, organization, population, ideological/motivation, strategic,
and tactical layers of their decision making,” simulation setup of virtual opponents
can be accomplished faster [Weaver et al., 2001, pg. 1].
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Unfortunately, with the exception of painstakingly compiled historical data,
limited information exists to accurately describe these layers. Further, this approach
appears to limit the options of the simulated terrorist to actions that have occurred
in the past (e.g., no surprise tactic of intentionally destroying a hijacked aircraft).
However, given that an adversary constructed from and agent with artificial decision-
making capabilities can be developed, the remaining area of interest is how the
members of this project incorporated emotion into the decision-making process. This
methodology is described by Johns and Silverman [2001].
Emotion, or in some cases the complete lack thereof, appears to play a large
role in the decision-making capacity of terrorists and extremists, in general. Johns
and Silverman attempt to develop a cognitive appraisal model that accompanies the
meta-reasoning model depicted in Figure 2.6, with the goal of enabling agents to
“. . . systematically reflect contextually relevant emotions and personality, and . . . ”
study the affects upon their own decision-making behavior [Johns and Silverman,
2001, pg. 1]. Their work builds a relationship between an agent’s emotions and
the underlying “utility functions that drive decision theory” [Johns and Silverman,
2001, pg. 1]. This approach requires knowledge and understanding of the interaction
between an agent’s concerns and memory, both recent and long-term. Further, they
divide concerns into “goals, standards, and preferences,” which in the multi-objective
context can be interpreted as objectives, costs [or constraints], and preferences [or
value tradeoffs either within a single-dimensional value function or as indicated in a
weight].
The decision-theoretic utility models that form the underlying structure of
the model proposed should be scrutinized. For example, the conversion of emotion
intensities (another, emotion-specific function that appears to be equivalent to a
single dimensional value function) to utility of a course of action is provided by the

































Figure 2.7: Goals for Terrorist A [Johns and Silverman, 2001, pg. 6]
Pd is a measure of one of five personality dimensions (surgency, agreeable-
ness, conscientiousness, openness to experience, and emotional stability);
Ex is the “maximum intensity of emotion x (where x could be joy, anger,
relief, etc.) over all possible concern effects times the perceived proba-
bility of this outcome actually occurring [Johns and Silverman, 2001, pg.
4-5].
Although explaining the specifics of these functions are beyond the scope of
this research, a clearer signal that the underlying assumptions of the “pre-existing
decision theory algorithms” claimed to be in use is shown in Figure 2.7. This hierar-
chy of goals is not comprised of mutually independent goals. Overall, the measures,
functions, and weighting schemes do not appear to be of the classical form as seen
in Keeney and Raiffa [1993].
2.3.11 Potential Improvements
Despite the potential theoretical and data acquisition issues associated with the
overall agent-based framework, the goals identified and the realization that emotion
must be incorporated within artificial decision-making systems in order to better
represent and subsequently predict paradoxical behavior are of value. The goals
shown in Figure 2.7 provide an excellent start at identifying the objectives that may
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comprise a terrorist’s value model. The component of emotion, however, could be
included in either the shape of the single-dimensional value functions or, more appro-
priately, the preferences or intensity associated with the sub-goals or sub-objectives.
Due to the inherently non-cooperative nature of terrorist organizations, data
collection will remain challenging but not impossible, as Krebs observed [Krebs, 2002,
pg. 51]. Another possible solution to analyzing the problem of terrorism is to model
everyone else, as they may be either cooperative or at least are not operating within
secrecy and with the constant intent to deceive potential data acquisition efforts. One
of the justifications for this given by Hudson is that “attempts to explain terrorism in
purely psychological terms ignore the very real economic, political, and social factors
that have always motivated radical activists. . . ” [Hudson, 1999, pg. 23]. Hudson
also notes that terrorism and political violence share underlying causes such as
. . . ethnic-, religious-, and ideological conflicts, poverty, modernization
stresses, political inequities, lack of peaceful communications channels,
traditions of violence, existence of revolutionary groups, governmental
weakness and ineptness, erosions of confidence in regimes, and deep di-
visions within governing elites and leadership groups [Hudson, 1999, pg.
15].
Recent evidence that supports this theory is highlighted in an analysis of the
groups responsible for the deadly and disruptive improvised explosive devices plagu-
ing Coalition and Iraqi forces today. The conditions surrounding terrorists and their
organizations, as well as measures to counter their activities may be explored within
a simulation. The overall goal of such a simulation would be to investigate which of
these factors can be addressed as to minimize the spread of terrorist support or the
likelihood of recruitment.
2.3.12 Terrorist Models and 21st Century Warfare
Several authors, such as Johns and Silverman [2001], Silverman et al. [2001],
and Weaver et al. [2001], are focusing on developing the capability to wargame
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courses of action against various terrorist-based representations using agent-based
simulations. Alternatively, these models could be used to predict what a terrorist
might do, given a certain situation, providing insight into courses of action that
might be sought by the terrorists themselves. This could improve prioritization of
force protection efforts, such as securing the most likely target areas against attack.
However, this approach may not provide insight into what the ‘next great attack’
will be, but only individual-individual or group-group agent interaction within a sim-
ulation. The simple act of constructing these methodologies has forced researchers
to bring economic, psychological, and other genres of study together with focused
background investigation of various terrorist organizations. This will inevitably act
as a forcing function to better understand the enemy and possibly provide new means
to defeat them even before they begin, for example, eliminate conditions that pro-
mote recruitment. This leads to another potential role of terrorist decision-making
models, supporting the global war on terrorism.
Terrorism will likely not stop until all of the terrorists either change their
ways or are destroyed. Extinction generally occurs in one of two ways: forced,
such as over-hunting a specific species, or naturally, perhaps due to a sudden and
drastic climate change to which the species cannot cope or adapt. Forced, in this
context, requires the killing of all terrorists, assuming all terrorists could be properly
identified; alternatively, naturally requires a change in the economic, political, social,
and other appropriate climates that results in the destruction of the support structure
and conditions that motivate and encourage terrorism. It has yet to be determined
which of these are (1) more cost effective, including risk, (2) more effective in general,
and (3) required in combination until the end of mankind.
As Harris suggested, researchers tend to model strange phenomena in order
to improve our understanding. To better understand and eliminate terrorists and
terrorist organizations, modeling is an appropriate means to facilitate understanding
of their underlying psyche, motives, and overall goals. The unfortunate catch is that
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efforts are inexorably biased by the analyst’s own perceptions and ideologies, making
it difficult to view decision-making from the target individual’s perspective. As the
theory of Maslow may not be entirely capable of describing terrorist decision-making,
the notion of developing a cognitive appraisal (emotion) model acts as an incentive
to deepen the study of a terrorist’s behavioral characteristics as well as providing an
opportunity to learn, predict, and directly or indirectly thwart this type of threat.
Upon review, several efforts have provided focused research and thought into
these areas, but further work, particularly in the decision theoretic structures imple-
mented within Johns and Silverman [2001], may be required for them to meet the
most general assumptions of decision theory described in Keeney and Raiffa [1993].
Otherwise, current modeling efforts provide potential that it is possible to (1) gain
insight into the underlying causes for motivating an individual to engage in these
activities; (2) incorporate these concepts into agent-based simulations for study; and
(3) use these simulations to evaluate various courses of action, ranging from close-
combat operations, to application of other instruments of power or international
diplomacy.
As a result of their simulation objectives to pit opposing sides against one
another, these methodologies in general do not appear to focus on interactions that
may occur within a terrorist network. Such interactions, often termed influence,
pervade the social sciences literature and may hold a group together, break them
apart, establish authority, and provide constraints upon or opportunities for social
choices.
2.4 The Ebb and Flow of Influence
The seminal work of French described the then–current theory of social power
and analyzed and addressed some of its limitations. In the course of his work, French
defined “the basis of interpersonal power. . . as the more or less enduring relationship
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between (two individuals) A and B which gives rise to power” [French, 1956, pg.
183]. He then described five bases for power: attraction, expert, reward, coercive,
and legitimate [French, 1956, pg. 183-4]. In examining the impact of peer group
influence upon opinion formation, Friedkin’s interpretation of French’s work was
that “[French] first proposed that social influence was a finite distributed resource”
[Friedkin and Cook, 1990, pg. 130]. Within the context of OR methodologies,
Renfro postulated that influence was analogous to a commodity flowing through a
(social) network [Renfro, 2001, pg. 80-1]. These and other works such as Freeman
et al. [1991] substantiate the modeling the flow of influence as a commodity within
a network model.
Measurement of influence in the context of social network analysis (SNA)
is “based upon the importance of relationships among interacting (individuals)”
[Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 4]. Additionally, one of the underlying principles
of SNA is that “. . . individuals view the network structural environment as providing
opportunities for or constraints on individual action” [Wasserman and Faust, 1994,
pg. 4]. This implies individuals take into account opinions of those socially close, or
in positions of authority, for example, when faced with a decision point.
There are a variety of examples in SNA literature that investigate and attempt
to measure this influence [cf. Frank and Yasumoto, 1988; Friedkin and Cook, 1990,
among others]. A predominant concentration of research in this area deals with
determining what conditions, both internal (via the network structure and connect-
edness of individuals) and external (via the outside influences or requirements for a
group-supported decision), are required to bring a group of individuals to agreement
upon a group decision.
Friedkin and Cook discuss social influence in the context of interpersonal re-
lations within a network, and their subsequent role regarding the interpersonal in-
fluence required to enable the “. . . the process of (group) opinion formation” [1990,
pg. 122]. This process utilizes network models to “. . . deal with the attainment of
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collective agreements. . . , usually beginning with a network of fixed and discrepant
opinions” [Friedkin and Cook, 1990, pg. 122]. Modeling the processes of “inter-
personal negotiation” and the subsequent change in individual opinions form the
“unique theoretical thrust of network models of social influence. . . ” [Friedkin and
Cook, 1990, pg. 122-3]. The resulting models essentially attempt to describe the
dyadic interaction required to transform a network of individuals with discrepant
opinions into a network where the individuals’ opinions have coalesced, at least to
some degree. Similar concepts in social network literature based upon an exchange of
influence between individuals include contagion (of behavior) (Leenders [2002]) and
diffusion (the rate of acceptance of innovative and possibly risky ideas or behavior)
[Valente, 1996].
Just as there are many network model formulations within the OR domain,
there exist numerous formulations and approaches within the study of social network
modeling. A recent example, due to Amblard and Deffuant [2004], studied the
propagation of extremist opinions throughout a variety of small-world networks.
Their results suggest that “. . . a critical level of connectivity and some disorder in
the network (is necessary) in order for extreme opinions to invade a population. . . ”
[Amblard and Deffuant, 2004, pg. 738].
However, this phenomenon is not necessarily confined to small-world networks.
As Buchanan states the “infectious movement of desires and ideas from mind to
mind is even the basis of a new theory of advertising known as permission market-
ing” [Buchanan, 2002, pg. 160-1]. Essentially, this connotes the flow of influence
propagating through a general populous, which may not necessarily be a small-
world network in the classical sense. This is an important point because not all
organizations may naturally evolve as small-world networks. However, influence will
inevitably flow regardless of the underlying network structure [Renfro, 2001].
Beginning with French’s influential work, it is clear that the social science re-
search and theory liken the interaction between two individuals or groups to that of
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a commodity that flows between them. Operations Researchers and Social Scientists
generally apply network models differently, a key difference being that social science
models tend to be descriptive, while OR models tend to be both descriptive and
prescriptive, where appropriate. Descriptive models, in general, attempt to describe
how a process or system works via underlying relationships and behaviors. The focus
of prescriptive models is improved decision making by attempting to describe the
best or optimal solution of a given system [Clemen, 1996, pg. 14]. Oftentimes, the
process of obtaining a prescriptive model requires an understanding of the underly-
ing processes or systems inherent to the decision problem and therefore results in a
descriptive model as a byproduct. The next section discusses a few of the seminal,
descriptive measures used within the SNA literature to ascertain individuals of in-
terest. Where appropriate, critiques and potential areas of theoretical improvement
of these measures are offered.
2.4.1 Katz Status Index
In an attempt to improve upon the prevalent status measures, Katz, in the
context of a popularity contest, based individual status not only upon how many
people choose the most popular individual but also accounting for who is doing the
choosing. Katz suggested that this measure may also be “. . . used to study influence,
transmission of information, etc.” [Katz, 1953, pg. 39].
Katz notes that the column sums of X pertain to the number of people that
choose that individual; this form of ‘in-degree’ centrality was the primary means for
assessing status during the time of his research. Further, noting that the elements of
the powers of the sociomatrix, given by Xp, provide the number of directed walks of
length p from i to j, he noted that this equates to the indirect p-step (p > 1) choices
of a given individual by the group [Katz, 1953, pg. 40] [cf. Wasserman and Faust,
1994, pg. 160-1]. All possible walks are accounted for by raising the sociomatrix to
the power of infinity. An additional assumption that longer walks were less effective
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Figure 2.8: Katz Choice Matrix [Katz, 1953, pg. 40]
than shorter ones required an attenuation factor, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Accepting these
constructs, Katz’ objective was to find the column sums of the matrix
T = αC + α2C2 + α3C3 + · · ·+ αkCk + · · · (2.1)
Given the computational limitations of the early 1950s, Katz cleverly sought to take






1 − r , r < 1 . (2.2)
Consequently, substituting r = αC and applying Equation 2.2 to Equation 2.1 yields
T = (I − αC)−1 − I. (2.3)
Considering that the conventional status index divides the column sums by (n − 1),
the column sums of T are divided by the m value that accommodates the new
construct’s underlying technique [Katz, 1953, pg. 42]. Figure 2.8 illustrates the
choice matrix and accompanying digraph.
m ∼= (n − 1)!α(n−1)e1/α (2.4)
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Given this information, the original status vector (one element for each of the
six actors) is s =
[
0.4 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8
]
; essentially, those actors with high
in-degree (that is, actors F, D, and A in descending order) dominate with regards
to status. Alternatively, the status vector using Katz’s measure, with a multiplier
of α = 0.5, is s =
[
0.47 0.04 0.04 0.41 0.22 0.45
]
. Using Katz’s approach,
actor A scores higher than actor F, albeit slightly. Despite the relatively low in-
degree of actor A, his status is highest because both of the actors with the highest
in-degree (actors F and D) choose actor A. Directly stated, “being chosen by a
popular individual should add more to one’s popularity” [Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001,
pg. 192]. The change in status for actors B, C and E from being equivalent to E
differing from B and C is accounted for in a similar fashion [Katz, 1953, pg. 42].
Interestingly, Katz does not offer an interpretation of the elements of the T matrix.
A few points of contention exist: the characteristics of the flow captured or
assumed by the calculations; the potential length of the paths implicitly accounted
for within the measure’s calculations; and, the arbitrary choice of the attenuation
factor. Assuming that this methodology can indeed be applied to the transmission
of information, the matrix powers (p > 2) actually capture a variety of walks that
may not necessarily be conducive to operations security. Deo offers a more precise
definition of the content of the powers of the sociomatrix, which is summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The (i, j)th entry in Xp equals the number of different, directed edge
sequences of r edges from the ith vertex to the jth. These sequences fall into three
categories:
1. Directed paths from i to j: those directed edge sequences in which no vertex is
traversed more than once;
2. Directed walks from i to j: those directed edge sequences in which a vertex may
be traversed more than once, but no edge is traversed more than once; and,
65
3. Those directed edge sequences in which an edge may also be traversed more
than once [Deo, 1974, pg. 222].
Leenders previously pointed out that the information contained within the
powers of the sociomatrix is often misperceived, depending upon the operative defini-
tion of ‘walk’ [Leenders, 2002, pg. 32]. Additionally, the second and third categories
of information flow are likely contrary to the security goals of a non-cooperative net-
work. For example, with p = 4, a possible walk of four between A to D will include
A-F-A-F-D. If the network of interest is trying to maintain secretive communica-
tions, as in the case of Al Qaeda, the banter between A and F may be unlikely [Post,
2005, pg. 39-48].
In addition, the potential length of walks measured goes to infinity. Again,
this would involve an infinite amount of communication between the individuals,
which would likely be counter to their security objectives. This suggests that a more
direct, path-based approach, limited to the length of the longest path given n actors–
or (n − 1)–would be more appropriate. In fact, although the approximation of the
denominator m (from Equation 2.4) is based upon an infinite series, the elements of
this series reduce to zero when considering powers beyond (n − 1). However, using
(α = 0.5) and the choice matrix discussed by Katz, the summation due to (p ≥ 7)
contributes a significant amount to the overall measure.
Finally, the arbitrary ‘attenuation’ factor has been highlighted by previous
works [Clark, 2005; Borgatti and Everett, 2006]. Although the value for α is likened
to the ‘attenuation’ of a signal or influence as a function of distance traveled, it
is simply required for the series to converge, thereby providing a result. For his
measure, Katz suggests “that reasonable, general-purpose values of α−1 are those
between the largest [eigenvalue of X] and about twice that [value]” [Katz, 1953, pg.
42]. Using the same example discussed by Katz, the largest eigenvalue of X (which
corresponds to Figure 2.8) is 1.68; this implies that 0.298 < α < 0.595. Hence, the
assumption space for ‘attenuation’ within which the analyst can work is restricted
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from the onset. Additionally, even within this recommended range, the most ‘central’
actor is ultimately a function of α.
Note also that this approach assumes that each link (or the strength of a link)
is identical to all others. Hence, computational methods that (1) do not rely upon
an arbitrary input merely for convergence and (2) account for weighted links are po-
tentially of interest. Two examples of such measures include the clique identification
approach by Hubbell [1965] and information centrality developed by Stephenson and
Zelen [1989].
2.4.2 Mechanics of Clique Identification
Hubbell’s objective was to also use the concepts of status and choice in de-
termining cliques within a network. His measure is related to Katz’s in that it
accounts for the status of the chooser, but also incorporates “the strength at which
he chooses” [Hubbell, 1965, pg. 382]. Instead of an arbitrary attenuation factor,
Hubbell requires that the value wij be specified–which may be negative, zero, or
positive–for each pair of actors [Hubbell, 1965, pg. 378]. As noted in Katz’s mea-
sure, the matrix of these weights (W) is raised to powers to account for indirect
paths of influence. Consequently, wpij corresponds to “the total strength of j’s in-
fluence upon i at the pth remove” [Hubbell, 1965, pg. 379]. Relying again upon
a geometric series, Hubbell defines the index of association (mij) to “discriminate
intra-clique bonds from inter-clique bonds” [Hubbell, 1965, pg. 379].




ij + . . . (2.5)
mij = mji = min (yij , yji) (2.6)
An additional extension posed by Hubbell permits the incorporation of exogenous
variables (ei) specific to each actor into the status measure. Unfortunately, although
constraints upon wij are specified in order for a solution to exist, the development
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and underlying theory behind all of these values are vague at best. In addition, the
values of mij are compared against a relatively arbitrary threshold in order to discern
pairs within a clique [Hubbell, 1965, pg. 379]. Nonetheless, the notion of strengths
of relationships through the weighted values and the incorporation of information
other than network topology was a substantial improvement over previous measures.
Information centrality, discussed next, offered further improvements.
2.4.3 Information Centrality
Stephenson and Zelen developed a centrality measure based upon the amount
of information (potentially) flowing through “all paths between [all] pairs of points”
[Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 2]. This approach is attractive in that (1) it ac-
counts for the geodesic as well as the non-geodesic communication or flow of influence
through a network and (2) it easily permits the use of weighted graphs. Further,
the measure is not based upon powers of the sociomatrix, thereby characterizing the
potential flows of influence that are more likely within the realm of non-cooperative
network behavior. The author’s unique approach avoids the necessity to explicitly
enumerate all paths; however, this ultimately restricts application of this measure
to symmetric graphs [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 4].
The underlying motivation for developing information centrality was to address
the fact that betweenness and closeness measures essentially neglected “. . .measuring
communication occurring along reachable, non-geodetic pathways” that may be
leveraged by a particular organization [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 3]. The
authors had considered that communication “. . .may be intentionally channeled
through many intermediaries in order to hide or shield information in a way not
captured by geodesic paths” [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 3]. This aspect alone
suggests that it may be an attractive option for analysis of non-cooperative networks.
Using the length of the path as a distance, the information contained on a
path from i to j is defined as the reciprocal of this distance. The authors based
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their approach on “theories of the statistical design of experiments and estimation”
[Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 28]. Ultimately, Stephenson and Zelen posit that
this approach more effectively captures “subtle network infrastructures in complex
situations” [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 27]. Such complex situations are
likely those encountered by members in a non-cooperative organization attempting
to limit exposure to their communications. A final genre of centrality measures that
also avoids the common assumption of ‘efficient communications’ is based upon the
eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the sociomatrix.
2.4.4 Eigenvector Centrality
The underlying premise of eigenvector centrality is summarized by Bonacich
and Lloyd.
Being chosen by a popular individual should add more to one’s popularity.
Being nominated as powerful by someone seen by others as powerful
should contribute more to one’s perceived power. Having power over
someone who in turn has power over others makes one more powerful
[Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001, pg. 192].
Mathematically, given the entries in the adjacency matrix, denoted (aij) for this mea-
sure, implies that i contributes to j’s status, and xi denotes the status of individual
i, this concept is shown in Equation 2.7 [Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001, pg. 192-3].
xi = a1ix1 + a2ix2 + . . . + anixn (2.7)
In order to determine solutions to this system, a generalized form is shown in Equa-
tion 2.8, with a specified scalar λ.
λxi = a1ix1 + a2ix2 + . . . + anixn (2.8)
In matrix notation, this is denoted by Equation 2.9, which is commonly known as

















Figure 2.9: Hypothetical Network [Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001, pg. 192]
with columns comprised of the eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix (A) and λ is an
n × n diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of A [Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001, pg. 193].
ATX = Xλ (2.9)
As expected, network structure plays an important role in the results of this analysis
method. However, there are unique cases where the numerical results may not
capture the more intuitive understanding of centrality. For example, all actors within
each of the hypothetical, directed networks shown in Figure 2.9 have zero status due
to “. . . positions that receive no choices have no status and contribute nothing to
any other position’s status” [Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001, pg. 139].
To get around this conceptual and mathematical issue, Bonacich and Lloyd
proposed “α-centrality” that provides every individual some level of status, inde-
pendent of existing or non-existent connections to others [Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001,
pg. 193]. With the vector of exogenous sources of status (e) and a parameter re-
flecting the “. . . relative importance of endogenous versus exogenous factors in the
determination of centrality” (α), the matrix solution for status is given by


























Figure 2.10: Notional Hypergraph [Bonacich et al., 2004, pg. 190]
Note that Katz’s model is similar to this approach, and differs by a constant of one
[Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001, pg. 194]. Although the theoretical development, range,
and magnitude (other than being a vector of ones in their example) of e are not
discussed, the new approach both permits analysis of asymmetric relationships and
is equivalent to the original formulation as α approaches λ−1max [Bonacich and Lloyd,
2001, pg. 196-7]. Clearly the development of the theoretical nature of the exogenous
vector offers a target of opportunity; for example, an extension of the discriminate
analysis technique used by Clark [2005] to ascertain actor position may provide a
useful first step.
A recent extension to this concept facilitates the determination of centrality for
hypergraphs and hyperedges, which account for the effects of multiple dimensions
within a relationship (e.g., time, place, and group membership) [Bonacich et al.,
2004, pg. 192] [cf. Seidman, 1981, which addresses some methods to deal with
social structures via hypergraphs]. For example, consider the set of four actors with
relationships or interactions captured at three different time periods (see Figure
2.10). Representation of all three graphs simultaneously may be accomplished via
an incidence matrix where “each edge is represented by a row and each vertex by a
column” [Bonacich et al., 2004, pg. 193]. Note that this storage format also prohibits
the analysis of directed and/or weighted graphs. From Figure 2.10, the number in
parenthesis (i) corresponds to the ith row in the incidence matrix shown below. The
first four columns correspond to the actors A, B, C, D and the last three columns
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correspond to the time periods 1, 2, 3. As an example, the first row of matrix E




1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 1




For the complete set of results, the reader is referred to [Bonacich et al., 2004,
pg. 195]. According to the centrality values and Bonacich et al., one may conclude
that actor A (C) is the most (least) central; time period 2 the most central among all
three time periods; and, hyperedge 7 is the most central [Bonacich et al., 2004, pg.
195]. Unfortunately, the interpretation of the centrality of a network within a set of
networks remains unclear. Clark used multidimensional centrality between networks
as weights, after normalization, as a proxy for the importance of a given contextual
network [Clark, 2005, pg. 3-29].
This technique, like many others, relies solely upon the network topology
present within a given relationship context as opposed to the importance of the
context from a cultural perspective of the actors within that network. For example,
given a set of actors, suppose that known relations within a given context are fewer
in number than another context considered in the analysis. It is hypothesized (and
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therefore an issue that must be addressed in the underlying theory/methodology)
that the lack of data (for one reason or another) will affect the multidimensional cen-
trality score for that contextual network. Suppose further that this smaller network
is a context that plays a significant role in the solidarity of the group, perhaps much
more than any of the other contexts. Using multidimensional centrality of each net-
work context, therefore, has the potential to underweight the key relationships that
exist among multiple contexts. This leads into the next concept of interest within
this research–multiplexity.
2.4.5 Multiplexity and Layered Networks
Given a set of actors, when more than one relationship or context of interaction
is studied the analysis is considered multiplex [Monge and Contractor, 2003, pg. 35].
This term, like many other concepts in SNA, appears to be borrowed from commu-
nications theory, which defines multiplex as combining multiple signals into one to
facilitate transmission, in such a way that they can later be separated as required
[DOD, 2005, pg. 354]. Consequently, communication and interaction between two
individuals will generally transmit through several different contexts simultaneously.
As Haythornthwaite noted, “we operate in a multiplex world, maintaining multiple
roles and relations with others, sustained through a variety of media” [Haythornth-
waite, 1999].
Although interaction between two individuals naturally involves these multi-
ple relations (for example, family, friend, co-worker, fellow student, any combination
thereof, and so forth), surprisingly few articles actually incorporate multiplex re-
lations within their analysis. Such lack of previous studies may be attributed to
the complexity encountered when dealing with multiplex networks. Interestingly,
Wasserman and Faust recommend that commonly used centrality and prestige mea-
sures be calculated for each relation separately and recommend against aggregating











Figure 2.11: Improper Multiplex Aggregation
rationale for this is not provided, the answer is likely the loss of information incurred
when merely combining occurrences of links among relations.
For example, consider the three possible instances within which two individu-
als can share relations in two out of three contexts (Figure 2.11). Assuming that the
contexts were ‘familial,’ ‘frequently interacts with,’ and ‘is fond of,’ one could posit
examples where all of these possibilities would yield different strengths of relation-
ships. However, a simple summation of dichotomous occurrences results in identical
‘strengths’ and is therefore likely insufficient to capture or infer the strength of a
relationship based upon multiplex data.
Nonetheless, when two people interact, regardless of the value of the rela-
tionship’s strength or a means to quantify it, it is assumed that both actors are
cognizant of the underlying contexts that prevail and make their relationship either
strong or tenuous. This may imply that social network measures, applied to each of
the networks or contexts independently, will fail to capture the combined effect due
to the multiplexity inherent within the relationships. This suggests that, prior to
determination of centrality, prestige, and so forth, an aggregation of contexts would
be analytically prudent. One potential means could comprise a weighted function,
based upon how the actors internal to the network of interest place importance upon
each context. A notional example of this is illustrated in Figure 2.12. Of course,
one could ask the question “Is a familial link equivalent in strength to a tie that













Figure 2.12: Potential Aggregation Scheme
in either case equals 0.5?” The most likely answer is ‘it depends,’ and is therefore
an underlying question within this research.
In order to begin an understanding of weighting schemes, their limitations, and
their strengths, a review of decision analytic weighting techniques is discussed.
2.5 Weighting and Decision Analysis
Decisions are a “ubiquitous activity,” that involves a “commitment of
resources. Resources need not be financial, natural or even material”
[LaValle, 1978, pg. 3].
In today’s complex and interdependent world, the commitment of resources
LaValle cites is not necessarily limited to implementing a decision. Additionally,
it often entails up-front data gathering, decision maker (DM) and stakeholder in-
volvement, and analysis required of thoughtful and conscientious decision making.
Within the multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) framework, this section focuses
upon one such up-front activity–the construction of weights, also referred to as scal-
ing constants, for additive multi-attribute value functions.
With a few assumptions regarding the decision environment, the nature of
the decision problem, and the expense of up-front costs, a conceptual extension
to a variety of weighting schemes is possible. In the field of multi-attribute value
theory, or more generally, multi-objective decision analysis, there exist a number
of elicitation techniques to weight attributes within a value model. Each technique
has its strengths and weaknesses; however, all are subject to expenses such as time,
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money, and judgment errors and biases due to the requisite decision-maker(s) and
analyst(s) interaction and involvement. One of the focal points of this research seeks
to economize upon this aspect of decision analysis. Beginning with a brief review of
the MCDM approach and the circumstances under which the proposed methodology
shows promise, the evolution and sometimes conflicting paradigms of weighting are
discussed. Extending a few of these techniques to permit a dynamic realization of
weighting vectors is proposed in Chapter VI; this concept proves useful in not only
providing the theoretical underpinnings of weighting the contextual layers of a social
network, but also permitting dynamic weighting of alternatives, of infrastructure
network layers, and other MCDM-oriented applications.
2.5.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Making
MCDM provides a systematic approach for thinking about and structuring
objectives in the context of a given decision problem. Decisions are made to meet an
overall objective where, in general, “an objective generally indicates the direction in
which we should strive to do better. . . ,” in the context of a given decision problem
[Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 32-4]. Unfortunately, within the context of today’s
multifaceted decision environment, the overall objective may almost certainly be
accompanied by conflicting sub-objectives. This environment comprises the inherent
nature of complex decisions in that trade-offs must be made when selecting a ‘best’
course of action or alternative [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 15].
The prescriptive nature of MCDM forces decision makers to think critically
about the various problem dimensions, breaking objectives into sub-objectives, and
continuing this process until each sub-objective may be measured by an attribute.
An attribute “indicates the degree to which alternative policies meet this objective”
[Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 32]. The desirable properties are summarized in Table
2.10 [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993].
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Table 2.10: Attribute Properties [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 50-3]
Complete Attributes cover all important aspects (sub-objectives) of the
problem
Operational Useful and meaningful to the decision maker; facilitates decision
making
Decomposable The nature of the attributes allows simplification of the evalua-
tion process by breaking it into parts
Non-redundant Limits double counting
Minimal Keeps the problem dimension small as possible
The MCDM process seeks to “systematically think about ranking a set of con-
sequences when each consequence is described in terms of performance values on
many attributes” [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 28]. For the purposes of this re-
search, it is assumed that this task is achieved via a multi-attribute, additive value
model. Additive models, as opposed to multiplicative models, are not only easier
to understand and analyze, but also perform well despite some of the theoretical
criticisms. For example, Stewart devised a simulation experiment to test the ro-
bustness of additive models and their ability to “reproduce the ‘ideal’ preference
ordering of the alternatives” [Stewart, 1996, pg. 305]. Stewart’s findings indicate
that, with some care exercised by the decision analyst, additive value models per-
form well despite violations of underlying assumptions such as non-linearities in the
single dimensional value functions, additive independence, and inadvertent omission
of a small portion of the model criteria [Stewart, 1996, pg. 308].
2.5.2 Additive Value Model
A value model offers a means to quantitatively measure a decision maker’s
preferences. Assessments of this nature trace back to the psychophysical study of
judgments regarding subjective phenomena (e.g., loudness, pitch, and brightness)
[von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 209]. Decision science attempts to lever-
age this field, enabling the quantitative measurement of the subjective phenomena–
preference [von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 209].
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Let the vector, x, represent the characterization of a given alternative (or act),
a, within an n-dimensional consequence space such that x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). Each
dimension corresponds to a measurable attribute. Therefore, the characterization
is achieved through evaluating the alternative with respect to each attribute. A
single-dimensional value function (SDVF) that evaluates the given alternative with
respect to ith attribute provides the realization of xi, mathematically shown as
Xi (a) ≡ xi, ∀ i. In general, a value function, connoting decision making under
certainty, “associates a real number v (x) to each point x in an evaluation space
. . . , [that represents] the decision maker’s preference structure provided that” the
function output can discern between indifferent and preferred alternatives [Keeney
and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 80]. Given two alternatives denoted x′ and x′′, Keeney and
Raiffa highlight these two requirements mathematically in Equations 2.12 and 2.13,
respectively.
x′ ∼ x′′ ⇔ v (x′) = v (x′′) (2.12)
x′  x′′ ⇔ v(x′) > v(x′′) (2.13)
These mappings between preference and the value function output, particularly from
Equation 2.12, play a key role in the weight elicitation method proposed by Keeney
and Raiffa [1993], discussed later in Section 2.5.5.2.
Although there are a number of underlying forms for value functions, the model
assumed for this effort is the simple additive value model (cf. [Keeney and Raiffa,
1993, pg. 81] and [von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 276]). As mentioned
by Keeney and Raiffa [1993], verification of the requisite independence assumptions
for multiplicative models can be difficult with even relatively small models of five
or more attributes. Keeney also notes that “. . . if any of the independence condi-
tions are not appropriate, it is an indication that an objective in addition to those
articulated for the problem is relevant” [Keeney, 1988, pg. 153]. Therefore, another
alternative to implementation of the multiplicative model could include revisiting the
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objectives hierarchy and determining whether or not an additional objective and its
corresponding attribute should be incorporated within the model. Nonetheless, the
dynamic weighting approaches developed later could be applied to either construct.
According to Keeney and Raiffa [1993, pg. 91], in order for the additive pref-
erence structure to hold, the model must be in (or transformable to) the following
form,
v(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = vX1(x1) + vX2(x2) + · · ·+ vXn(xn). (2.14)
From Equation 2.14, Xi, (i = 1, . . . , n) indicates the ith attribute, whereas
xi, (i = 1, . . . , n) indicates the score of a given alternative with respect to the ith
attribute.
Definition 9. The attributes X1, . . . , Xn (n ≥ 3) are mutually preferentially in-
dependent if every subset Y of these attributes is preferentially independent of its
complementary set of evaluators [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 111].






exists if and only if the attributes are mutually preferentially independent [Keeney
and Raiffa, 1993]. Note that for Equation 2.15, the subscripts Xi are simply replaced
with i for notational convenience.
The final component of the value function involves the weights, often referred to
as scaling constants. Given an additive value function of the form shown in equation
2.15, Keeney and Raiffa note that, for purposes of convenience, the overall score,
v(x), as well as the single-attribute [or single-dimensional] value functions, vi (xi),






which is also an additive value function equivalent to Equation 2.15, assuming that
the scaling for both the single dimensional value functions and the weights is consis-
tent [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 116-7].




wi = 1. It is important to understand the underlying rationale for normal-
izing the weights, and their interpretation, prior to extending the various weighting
methodologies; proposed extensions are discussed in Chapter VI.
2.5.3 Normalization of the Weights
Similar to the reason observed by Keeney and Raiffa, Lootsma suggests that
weight normalization within this modeling approach provides “a uniform scale to
judge the alternatives under the respective criteria, . . . (and to) easily quantify the
gradations of the relative importance of the criteria” [Lootsma, 1999, pg. 36]. Es-
sentially, if the single-dimensional value functions are all scaled consistently (e.g., all
range from 0 to 1, 0 to 10, or 0 to 100, as suggested by the decision environment),
normalizing the weights will result in an overall value function score that is within
the same range. This facilitates interpretation of the overall scores yet does not
change the end result with respect to the preference order of the scored alternatives.
For example, suppose a three-attribute value model, comprised of SDVFs,
vi (xi) ∈ [0, 1] and i = 1, 2, 3, were developed and weights elicited. In Table 2.11,
the Raw weights are the original numbers elicited; the corresponding Normalized
weights carry the same effect but now sum to 1. The scores in Table 2.12, based
upon each set of weights, results in the same rank order by preference. However,
using the normalized scores results in an overall score v(x) ∈ [0, 1], which is the same
range as each of the single-dimensional value functions. This is referred to as the
consistency condition [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 271].
Note that unless the value function is a measurable value function, the differ-
ences between alternatives’ scores indicate ordinal preference ranking only. Assuming
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Table 2.11: Weight Normalization
w1 w2 w3
Raw 81 162 15
Normalized 0.31 0.63 0.06
Table 2.12: Consequence of Normalized Weights
v1 (x1) v2 (x2) v3 (x3) Score (Normalized) Score (Raw)
a1 0.50 0.80 0.10 0.67 171.6
a2 0.60 0.70 0.50 0.66 169.5
a3 0.10 0.40 0.30 0.30 77.4
the example in Table 2.12 is not a measurable value function, it can be stated that
the decision maker prefers a3 over a2, but it cannot be stated that the value of a3 is
over twice the value of a2 [cf. Dyer and Sarin, 1979; Kirkwood, 1997, pg. 241-4].
Normalization of the weights subsequently limits the weight-sets, w, to lie
within a bounded polyhedral set such that W = {w : 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, ∀i}; this was also
observed, and leveraged for their studies, by Wolters and Mareschal [1995, pg. 283]
and Ma et al. [2001, pg. 67]. The weight space for two- and three-dimensional
value functions are shown in Figure 2.13 and Figure 2.14 respectively. Graphically,
the two-dimensional weight space is a line, and the three-dimensional weight space
is the triangular plane. In general, the bounded polyhedral is formed in any n-
dimensional (n ≥ 2) space. Theoretically, and as a consequence of the structure of
W , any combination of weights within the set W is possible, although some are not
as likely, such as having the weight of one attribute equal to zero.
2.5.4 Interpretation of Normalized Weights
When interpreting the normalized weights for each attribute within a value
model, Keeney and Raiffa emphasize that the values derived for the weights do not
indicate the attributes’ relative importance [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 271-2].





Region of feasible weights
Figure 2.13: Weight Space (2-D)

























Figure 2.14: Weight Space (3-D)
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proaches either in use or provided in popular decision analysis texts, particularly the
direct weighting schemes discussed later in Section 2.5.5.1. Several issues contribute
to this quandary.
Theoretically, although Keeney and Raiffa appear to develop the construct of
weights from an economic perspective (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution), the
substitution effect or relationship may no longer be relevant in the context of an
additive value function [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993, pg. 74-77]. Schenkerman, in his
discussion of the general abuse and misunderstanding of weights, concludes that
the weights are “estimates of marginal preferences. . . ” that capture decision-maker
tradeoffs [Schenkerman, 1991, pg. 371-2]. However, Schenkerman also notes that
constant rates of substitution implies all of the single-dimensional value functions
are linear–a circumstance that cannot be guaranteed for all decision models and is
easily accounted for by exponential, piece-wise linear, and other non-linear single-
dimensional value functions discussed in the literature [Schenkerman, 1991, pg. 372]
[For examples, see Kirkwood, 1997, pg. 64-68].
In order to understand the nuances of weighting and the potential issues that
may arise due to dynamic extensions of the weighting methodologies, a few of the
methods prevalent within literature are discussed.
2.5.5 Weighting Methodologies
As shown in Table 2.13, von Winterfeldt and Edwards provide a cogent tax-
onomy of techniques used to construct attribute weights. These techniques have
spawned a variety of specialized procedures, some of which will be discussed; how-
ever, those methods developed since 1986 appear to be a derivation of one or more
of the techniques shown in Table 2.13.
2.5.5.1 Numerical Estimation
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Table 2.13: Weighting Taxonomy [von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 274]
Numerical Estimation Methods Indifference Methods
Ranking
Direct Rating Cross-attribute Indifference
Ratio Estimation Cross-attribute Strength of Preference
Swing Weighting
von Winterfeldt and Edwards state that ranking and direct rating are simpli-
fied variations of ratio estimation. Ranking generally involves the ordering of the
attributes from most to least important. Rating is often accomplished by the dis-
tribution of a limited number of points to each of the attributes to capture relative
importance [von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 284]. The family of simple
multi-attribute rating techniques (SMART, SMARTS, and SMARTER) comprise
the ratio estimation, swing weighting, and ranking methodologies. Although, the
numerical estimation techniques are generally the easiest to implement, they are not
without their disadvantages. For example, numerical estimation techniques “explic-
itly involves the notion of attribute importance,” criticized by Keeney and Raiffa
[1993, pg. 271-2] and often fail to capture effects due to subsequent changes within
the attribute ranges von Winterfeldt and Edwards [1986, pg. 285]. Another disad-
vantage, specifically associated with the ranking and rating techniques, involves the
type of numbers involved and the calculations performed on them.
A variety of ranking procedures are described by von Winterfeldt and Edwards
[1986] and Stillwell and Edwards [1979]. Those discussed in detail below include:
the rank reciprocal rule, rank sum, rank exponent, and decision rule ranking. For
each of these techniques, Ri is the rank for attribute i and the model accounts for a
total of j attributes. Decision rule ranking is a two-fold technique that elicits both
an ordering of attributes as well as an estimate for the weight of the most important
attribute. The ranking method chosen is the one that “. . .most closely approximates
the weight elicited for the first dimension” [Stillwell and Edwards, 1979, pg. 11]. All
of these elicitation approaches, shown in Table 2.14, are among the most straight-
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Table 2.14: Ranking & Rating Methods [von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg.
284]
Method Formula
Rank Reciprocal Rule wi =
1/RiP
j 1/Rj
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Figure 2.15: Effect of z upon weight
forward with regards to demands placed upon a decision maker and decision analyst.
The differences lie within the equations used to ascertain the weights themselves.
Note that Rank Exponent method is simply a variant of the Rank Sum method
with z = 1). Further, if z = 0, then the Rank Exponent methods merely distributes
the weights evenly. The parameter z is often estimated from “some convenient pair
of attributes (e.g., the most and least important)” [von Winterfeldt and Edwards,
1986, pg. 284]. For the Rank Exponent method, the effect upon the weights, as a
result of the parameter z is shown in Figure 2.15.
As an example of the decision rank rule, once the DM provided an estimate





















Rank Exponent (z = 2)
Figure 2.16: Weighting Scheme Comparisons
could be used to compare the ranking schemes, facilitate selection, and illustrate the
implications of the scheme to the DM. For example, the rank sum scheme is linear,
whereas (comparatively) both the rank reciprocal and rank exponent methods will
assign more weight to the higher ranked attribute and possibly less weight to the
least ranked attribute. Again, the focus of such approaches should be insight into
the problem as a whole.
Although these methods are the easiest to elicit due to their intuitive interpre-
tation, it is important to note that the ranks used as input to these functions (Ri)
are ordinal in nature-an inherent limitation in the ranking approach in general. That
is “(1) the data classifications are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and (2) data
classifications are ranked or ordered according to the particular trait they possess”
[Lind et al., 2002, pg. 11]. An example could include ranking targets with priorities
(e.g., priority one, priority two, and so forth). Unfortunately, this also implies that
even though the attributes may be ranked 1 through j, the calculations might as
well operate algebra on ‘one,’ ‘two,’ ‘three,’ . . . , and ‘j.’ In order for these techniques
(specifically the mathematical calculations required) to work, the ranking data must
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Table 2.15: Scale Types [Narens and Luce, 1986, pg. 168]
Scale Admissible Transformations Examples
Absolute x → x John is twice as tall as Bill
Discrete
Ratio
x → kn, constant k > 0, n ∈ Z length in lines of code




x → knx + s, constant k > 0,
n ∈ Z, s ∈ R





x → sxkn, constant k > 0, n ∈
Z, s ∈ R
murder rate : police force
(per 1000)




x → sxr, r, s ∈ R+ density, fuel efficiency in
mpg
Ordinal x → f (x) , fmonotonic beauty, hardness
Nominal x → f(x), f ∈
1 - to - 1 functions
names, numbering on ath-
letic uniforms
be at least interval in nature. Lind et al. define interval data as having the same
characteristics as ordinal data, plus the “data classifications are scaled according to
the amount of the characteristic they possess, and equal difference in the character-
istic are represented by equal differences in the measurements” [Lind et al., 2002,
pg. 11]. More formal definitions of scale types are shown in Table 2.15.
Therefore, according to Narens and Luce, any monotonic transformation will
retain the order of the weights, but does not imply that information regarding the
interval between the weights after transformation is meaningful. Despite the lack of
a meaningful distance between ranked data, the use of these techniques continues,
likely due to the interpretability and repeatability offered to decision makers who may
not have extensive training in decision analysis theory [von Winterfeldt and Edwards,
1986, pg. 312]. Interestingly, Barron and Barrett, in their study of several ranking-
based techniques (rank ordered centroid, rank sum, and rank reciprocal) concluded
that these methods “. . . represent excellent tradeoffs between ease of assessment and
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efficacy of selection of the best or near best alternative” [Barron and Barrett, 1996,
pg. 1520].
The other major limitation in these ranking techniques is the explicit involve-
ment of “. . . the notion of attribute importance [with respect to each other]” [von
Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 285]. This, as Keeney and Raiffa suggest, is an
inappropriate interpretation of the weights which are (1) solely for the purpose of
providing an aggregate value score and (2) directly dependent upon the range of the
SDVF [cf. von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 285].
Unless the decision maker is forced or reminded to take into consideration the
attribute ranges during a rank-based elicitation process, the “concept of importance
as a basis for weighting” is problematic [cf. von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg.
285-6]. von Winterfeldt and Edwards propose the swing-weighting technique instead,
and suggest that this approach not only “. . . counters the criticisms of using extrane-
ous and perhaps even distorting importance judgments. . . , [but also], given carefully
anchored SDVF elicitation techniques is virtually indistinguishable. . . ” from theo-
retically appropriate indifference methods such as difference measurement, conjoint
measurement theory, and weak order models [cf. 1986, pg. 286-7].
In order to implement these techniques in a dynamic environment, application
of the rating- and rank-based procedures would likely involve an a priori rank or-
dering specified by the DM (e.g., a ranking of attributes or objectives applicable to
the targeting cycle for each phase of the war). The rank reciprocal rule, from Table
2.14, may also be applied in a fashion similar to the approach taken by Pruitt [2003].
For example, in an effort to improve U.S. Homeland Security, the decision model
implied a preference for improving capabilities that were at currently inadequate or
low levels [Pruitt, 2003]. Subsequently, an alternative that scores high implies that it
meets the DM’s needs to improve upon current capabilities. For the rank reciprocal
rule, these percentages may be substituted for the rankings. A lower percentage
level of current capability will result in a higher weight–implying that the DM will
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Table 2.16: Example Rating Techniques [Bottomley and Doyle, 2001, pg. 553-554]
Direct Rating Rates each attribute on a scale of 0 to 100; scores are
normalized to produce weights
Point Allocation
(Max100)
Assigns the most important attribute a rating of 100;
rates subsequent attributes relative to the most impor-




Assigns the least important attribute a rating of 10; rates
subsequent attributes relative to the least important one
with no specified scale; scores are normalized to produce
weights
prefer to focus first on what objectives need improving the most. As this scheme
is dependent upon the current state, it is philosophically but not mathematically
similar to the method proposed by Li et al. [2004]. However, a potential limitation
of this approach is that, over time, weights would tend to be distributed equally,
as opposed to having a distribution representative of their true preferences among
the different objectives. At the point where this occurs, the DM should revisit the
model and resort to a method that more closely represents his or her preferences.
Three examples of rating methods are described and compared in a case study
in Bottomley and Doyle [2001]; the methods are summarized in Table 2.16. Again,
in order to implement these in a dynamic weighting fashion, the ratings should be
accomplished in advance, with a rating corresponding to a particular phase or period
of time during with the decision model will remain applicable.
Another popular family of weight elicitation methods comprises the rating,
ranking and swing-weight techniques–SMART, SMARTS, and SMARTER [Edwards,
1977; Edwards and Barron, 1994]. SMART is a ten-step method, described in detail
in Edwards [1977] and summarized in Table 2.17. Acknowledging the theoretical ties
between attribute preferences, ranges, and the weight values, Edwards and Barron
actually recommend against the further use of SMART since “the procedure ignores
the fact that range as well as importance must be reflected in any weight” [Ed-
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Table 2.17: SMART Methodology [Edwards, 1977, pg. 327-9]
1. Identify the person or organization whose utilities are to be maximized.
2. Identify the issue(s) to which the utilities needed are relevant.
3. Identify the entities to be evaluated.
4. Identify the relevant dimensions of value for evaluation of the entities.
5. Rank the dimensions in order of importance.
6. Rate dimensions in importance, preserving ratios.
7. Sum the importance weights and divide each by the sum (i.e. normal-
ization).
8. Measure the location of each entity being evaluated on each dimension.
9. Calculated the utilities for entities.
10. Decide.
Table 2.18: SMARTS Methodology [Edwards and Barron, 1994, pg. 307-9]
1. Identify the purpose and decision makers.
2. Elicit a value tree.
3. Identify the entities to be evaluated (alternatives).
4. Formulate an alternatives-attributes matrix.
5. Eliminate ordinally dominated options.
6. Reformulate data from step 4 into single dimensional values (SMARTS
assumes all single-dimensional value functions are linear).
7. Implement swing weighting.
8. Normalize weights and calculate overall scores.
9. Decide.
wards and Barron, 1994, pg. 316]. Interestingly, a proposed solution to this initial
theoretical shortcoming, SMARTER also ignores this connection. SMART, Point
Allocation (Max100), and Point Allocation (Min10) are examples of ratio estimation
techniques. To remedy the problems associated with SMART, SMART using Swings
(SMARTS) was developed. The steps for this process are summarized in Table 2.18.
Swing-weighting (required for step 7) “. . . refers to the operation of changing
the score of some object of evaluation on some dimension from one value to a different
one” in order to compare two hypothetical alternatives [Edwards and Barron, 1994,
pg. 316]. The other proposed improvement the authors suggest is SMART Exploiting
Ranks (SMARTER) [Edwards and Barron, 1994]. This methodology is identical to
90
that of SMARTS, with the exception of step 7. In lieu of swing weighting, a rank









Clearly, other than specific guidance from the analyst to the DM during the elic-
itation process, the weights derived from SMARTER do not directly account for
the associated attribute ranges. Nonetheless, it is easy to see that a multitude of
numerical estimation techniques for attribute weights (ranking, direct rating, ratio
estimation, and swing weights) offer straightforward estimates of attribute weighting.
Although these methods are not without their shortcomings, Stillwell and Edwards
investigated and reassessed previous multi-attribute case studies, finding that vari-
ous rank-based weighting techniques (other than equal weights) as “approximations
to ratio weights provided remarkably good results” [Stillwell and Edwards, 1979, pg.
28].
Indifference methods are discussed next, primarily to round out the discussion
of weighting methodologies available to the decision analyst. However, these elic-
itation techniques are more complicated and time consuming. Consequently, their
application within a dynamic environment may be even more limited.
2.5.5.2 Indifference Methods
Indifference methods systematically explore either indifference judgments, as
seen in [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993], or the strengths of preferences among attributes,
illustrated in [von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 287]. Three classes of these
techniques are discussed by von Winterfeldt and Edwards [1986], which are sum-
marized in Table 2.19. As opposed to the numerical estimation methods discussed
earlier, the indifference methods yield weights that are ratio in nature. Consequently,
further mathematical operations may be justified in the context of dynamic weights.
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Indistinguishable from SMARTS; assumes independence
and additivity of attributes; this approach may be ex-
tended to multiplicative models [cf. Kirkwood, 1997, pg.
71-2 for an illustrative example]
Conjoint Measure-
ment
Assumes additive model; does not require strength-of-
preference judgments; requires preference and indiffer-
ence judgments; may be extended to multiplicative mod-
els;
Weak Order Model Requires no underlying assumptions regarding attribute
additive or independence; “Exploits the assumption of
transitive indifferences to trade multi-attribute alterna-
tives off sequentially until they become comparable;” use-
ful for complex (i.e., non-additive models); extremely dif-
ficult in elicitation and expectation of DM to make con-
sistent tradeoffs
Recall that Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt theoretically interpret weights as
“how much a (value) unit in one attribute contributes to overall worth relative to
a unit in another attribute” [Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt, 1978, pg. 2]. This in-
terpretation confounds the value of the weight with the somewhat arbitrary ranges
specified for the single-dimensional value functions [Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt,
1978, pg. 2]. Since the derivation of weights via an indifference method explicitly
incorporates information regarding the range of the SDVF, the requisite implicit
assumption follows that any change in the range of a SDVF must result in a con-
comitant change in its associated weight [Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt, 1978, pg.
2]. The following example demonstrates the theoretical connections, and explores
areas where the change is not always as expected.
Suppose a value model has two attributes, each of which has a corresponding,
linear SDVF function represented as v1(x1) = (x1)/30, x1 ∈ [0, 30] and v2(x2) =
(x2 − 20)/40, x2 ∈ [20, 60]. Further suppose that the objectives are preferred such
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Figure 2.17: Weight Effects due to Range Changes
advantage of requirement 2.12 was made by the decision maker.
v(0, 40) ∼ v(30, 20) ⇒ w1v1(0) + w2v2(40) = w1v1(30) + w2v2(20)
⇒ w2v2(40) = w1v1(30)









In order for the expected phenomena to occur, the SDVFs involved must (1)
both be anchored at a natural or proxy zero that cannot decrease and (2) are both
either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing. Assuming that the
value of x′2 remains the same regardless of the range change, several cases of the
SDVF for v2(x2) are exhibited in the Figure 2.17.
As shown in Figure 2.17, an increase to the right in the range increases the
value of w2, shown by










However, an increase to the left in the range decreases the value of w2, given
by









Experimentally, von Nitzsch and Weber note that a number of “empirical stud-
ies indicate that weights are not adjusted properly to changes in range” due to the
decision maker, the analyst, the elicitation process itself, or a combination of these
elements [von Nitzsch and Weber, 1993, pg. 937-8]. The authors attempt to capture
to what degree this type of error promulgates within the decision analysis process.
Once a value function is elicited using a given scale (worst to best or endpoints),
changing the scale is often problematic, which leads to the tendency to “choose end
points very likely to include any possible future alternatives” [von Winterfeldt and
Edwards, 1986, pg. 230]. von Winterfeldt and Edwards also recommend the use of
an ‘acceptable’ range, described by the relationship: actual ⊆ acceptable ⊆ available
⊆ theoretically feasible [von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986, pg. 230-1].
The model of interest within the experiment conducted by von Nitzsch and
Weber was an additive value model under certainty, comprised of linear value func-
tions. They studied three ranges: an initial range based upon the decision makers
intuition, a smaller range half of the initial range, and a larger range twice the initial
range. For each range, the authors elicited weights via direct-ratio, described in
[Edwards, 1977, pg. 328], and a regression technique called conjoint analysis that
explores implicit tradeoffs between attributes during the decision maker’s evaluation
of hypothetical alternatives [von Nitzsch and Weber, 1993].
The authors mentioned the value trade-off recommended by Keeney and Raiffa
[1993], but noted that “the derivation of weights from these statements can be done
to guarantee the range sensitivity to be equal to one” [von Nitzsch and Weber, 1993,
pg. 939]. This implies that the value trade-off approach is the most theoretically
appealing when trying to ensure that the decision maker accurately accounts for
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changes in ranges during the development and communication of the weights. They
mathematically define range sensitivity as s = (memp − 1)/(m − 1).
This measures percentage change in range accounted for by the decision maker
during the development of the new weights ([von Nitzsch and Weber, 1993, pg. 938-
9]. Using an increase in the range of attribute 1 as an example, m is defined by the














The modified weights (w′) result from using essentially the original information
elicited to construct the initial weights (w). For example, if preference trade-offs
were used, the original indifference point elicited would be used to calculate the new
weights associated with the larger range for attribute 1. Once the ranges are com-
municated to the decision maker, weight elicitation is re-accomplished, new weights
(w′′) are calculated, and the final piece of information is available for Equation 2.19














Note that m and memp are essentially the theoretically required and empir-
ically observed changes in weights respectively [von Nitzsch and Weber, 1993, pg.
938]. Ultimately, von Nitzsch and Weber concluded that both weighting methods
employed resulted in s < 1, implying that “subjects only partially adjusted their
weight judgment to the change in range,” and that this “process was especially bad”
when the direct ratio elicitation method was used, often resulting in biased weights
[von Nitzsch and Weber, 1993, pg. 942].
In practice, Lootsma suggests that “criteria have emotional or social values
which neither depend on the actual decision problem itself nor on the method of
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analysis” [Lootsma, 1999, pg. 33]. Therefore, it appears to simply be a human
tendency to infer a certain level of relative importance from the values of the weights.
In their early experimentation, using an approach similar to that adopted by von
Nitzsch and Weber [1993], Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt note,
. . . that people can give importance orderings without specified alterna-
tive and ranges may mean that they have some plausible set of alterna-
tives and ranges in mind, when judging importance. According to this
interpretation the importance judgments should only change when the
environment radically changes the plausible set of alternatives [1978, pg.
28].
This finding is also observed by Bottomley and Doyle, who state that “intuitive
weights reflect a subject’s general attitude towards an attribute, and an implicit
range of outcome values, . . . ” thus enabling decision makers to specify attribute
preference (weights) without specific knowledge of attribute ranges [Bottomley and
Doyle, 2001, pg. 554].
2.5.6 Weighting Issues Summarized
With respect to the requisite change in weight as a result in the change of at-
tribute range, the gap between the theoretical and practical results remains. Keeney
cites “assessing value trade-offs independent of the range of consequences” as one
of the ‘top 12’ mistakes in decision analysis [Keeney, 2002, pg. 940]. The results
of Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt indicate that subjects found it difficult to adhere
to the theoretical requirements in practice and attribute these findings to either an
inherent flaw in their test problem or the complexity of the task (or both) [1978,
pg. 20, 22]. Unfortunately, in an effort to resolve this issue, another experiment led
them to conclude that. . . “Even in an absurdly simple problem subjects apparently
had problems appreciating the sensitivity of importance weights to a change in the
range of an attribute” [Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt, 1978, pg. 25-7].
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Pöyhönen and Hämäläinen, who provide a more recent study of a variety of
weighting techniques, not only arrive at this same conclusion, but also suggest that
weight values are more dependent upon the number of attributes rather than the
elicitation process [2001, pg. 581]. Resolving this long-standing issue is beyond
the scope of this research. Ultimately, any modeling effort should be undertaken in
order to improve the fundamental understating of the decision problem, in which the
weighting process provides the most benefit [Hämäläinen and Salo, 1997, pg. 340].
As there are several interpretations of weights, there are several techniques used to
elicit them. The general context in which these weighting techniques will be applied
is presented next, followed by example applications of various dynamic weighting
schemes.
2.5.7 The Dynamic Decision Environment
Space is more or less tangible and/or visible, but time and preference are
volatile. Living creatures have a surprising ability, however, to control
a time-dependent series of rhythmic actions like walking, running, and
tapping, which are controlled by a timekeeper. Many living creatures also
have a biological or physiological clock to measure the time which elapsed
since a particular moment. So, if time can subjectively be measured, the
gradations of preference may be measurable as well [Lootsma, 1999, pg.
9].
As Lootsma suggests, the theoretical underpinnings of the field of decision
science not only deals with preference, but time-dependency of preference as well.
Indeed, he argues that the values and weights are situation-specific, essentially be-
coming irrelevant once the decision of interest is made [Lootsma, 1999, pg. 33].
He also presents the counter argument in that decision makers seek consistency
“. . . over a coherent collection of decision problems” [Lootsma, 1999, pg. 33]. Dy-
namic weights, then, appear to lie within these bounds, their values dependent upon
time, the decision environment (and consequently the collection of decision problems
addressed), or both [cf. Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1989, pg. 86]. Either way, the
common denominator for both perspectives is the assumption that the weights are
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valid for a given period of time, either instantaneously or during a phase of closely
related decision problems.
Edwards posits two general types of decision theory–static and dynamic [1962,
pg. 59]. Static represents the traditional, one-time use of a decision model garnered
from approaches such as multi-objective decision analysis, value focused thinking,
multi-attribute utility analysis, and others. Dynamic represents the enactment of
a sequence of related decisions, where each subsequent decision may (or may not)
benefit from either the results or the information obtained via the consequences
of the previous decision [Busemeyer, 2002, pg. 3903], [Edwards, 1962, pg. 59-
60]. Interestingly, Busemeyer notes categories of decisions within this realm include
“. . . fighting fires, navigational control, battlefield decisions, medical emergencies,
etc.” [Busemeyer, 2002, pg. 3903]. Busemeyer also suggests that dynamic decision
making is characterized by three features:
1. A series of actions must be taken over time to achieve some overall goal;
2. The actions are interdependent so that later decisions depend on earlier actions;
and,
3. The environment changes both spontaneously and as a consequence of earlier
actions [Busemeyer, 2002, pg. 3903].
The notion of dynamic decision making plays an important role in Bayesian
networks, decision support systems, and expert systems. Mussi discusses the incorpo-
ration of utility theory (value models under uncertainty) to measure (and compare)
consequences analyzed in such systems and includes an approach to dynamically
weight the models used to facilitate selection of the next course of action [Mussi,
2004, pg. 95-6]. However, the dynamic nature of his model is essentially the selec-
tion of a pre-determined weight set (elicited in advance), based upon the current
system state [Mussi, 2004, pg. 95]. Figure 2.18, adapted from Busemeyer [2002],











Figure 2.18: Dynamic Decision Environment [Busemeyer, 2002]
namic decision environment. The environment is (potentially) affected by general
uncertainty as well as decisions made in the past-a complicating factor not found in
the static realm of decision theory [Edwards, 1962, pg. 60]. Ultimately, a decision
maker will implement a decision policy, enacting decisions to shape the environ-
ment, in order to ‘close the gap’ between the current, observed state and a desired
end state.
Another study somewhat related to this research is the work of Weisbrod et al.
[1977]. Weisbrod et al. developed a decision aid that complemented a decision
maker’s decision process by incorporating information from a simulated environ-
ment. The next set of calculations was predicated upon the previous actions which
determined what information would be available at the time of the next decision.
However, this approach focused upon an expected utility or probabilistic approach
rather than the deterministic assumption taken here Weisbrod et al. [1977].
A more closely related approach is described by Li et al. [2004], who interpret
the weights as indicators of relative importance, develop the transformation from a
single weight vector to one that is dependent upon the current system state Li et al.
[2004, pg. 163-5]. Despite the extremely detailed development of the fuzzy math
underlying the “state dependent weight vectors” they propose, neither a means to
elicit nor a means to tie these states directly to the environment is suggested Li
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et al. [2004, pg. 168-78]. In his research in dynamic decision making, Busemeyer
concludes the following:
[Subjects] who perform best are those that set integrative goals, col-
lect systematic information, and evaluate progress toward these goals.
Subjects, who tend to shift from one specific goal to another, or focus
exclusively on only one specific goal, perform more poorly [Busemeyer,
2002, pg. 3907].
Therefore, the overarching assumption is that a decision model is developed
that captures a decision maker’s preferences in extraordinary detail, but at extraordi-
nary cost. The multi-objective decision modeling approach strives to avoid the latter
reason for poor performance while careful selection of the time period to which this
model applies will help avoid the former reason for poor performance. As opposed
to a ‘one-time’ decision, suppose also that this model could be used to evaluate al-
ternatives in the same decision context, but in a different time period, allocating
potentially different weights to the objectives. In order to clarify the decision prob-
lems and contexts in which this approach may apply, a few illustrative examples are
provided.
2.5.8 Examples of Interest
Although value models are not explicitly constructed, the following examples
are intended to illustrate the decision situations that may yield deterministic multi-
attribute value models applicable to a series of related decision problems, with the
only change in structure being the weights over time.
2.5.8.1 Company Valuation
A recent improvement was proposed to the process of fundamental analysis,
which examines “the underlying forces that affect the well being of the economy,
industry groups, and companies. . . ,” with the goal of predicting future performance
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Table 2.20: Levels and Focus of Fundamental Analyses
Level Areas Examined
Company Financial data, management, business concepts,
and competition
Industry Forces of supply and demand
National Economic data permitting assessment of present
and future economic growth
and profitability [Anonymous, 2005]. This analysis typically involves three economic
components, summarized in Table 2.20.
DeGraw noted that these types of analysis are generally based upon the two
following assumptions–“that each of the three components is weighted equally and
that their relative importance doesn’t change over time” [DeGraw, 2001, pg. 78].
However, he notes that “Since [initial public offerings] are smaller, less liquid and
considerably more dynamic, industry differences appear to be considerable, and the
relative influence of the valuation components appears to vary across industries”
[DeGraw, 2001, pg. 78]. This is an ideal example of the underlying situation assumed
for the proposed dynamic weighting approach. The result is a decision model with
objectives applicable to the range of alternatives (initial public offerings to blue-
chip companies) that can accommodate different weights based upon the context
of the analysis (i.e., the time-line associated with the company’s level of financial
maturity). Of course, it could be argued that a different model could be developed for
each industry’s level of maturity. However, in defining such models, their specificity
will naturally limit their applications as well incur more development and analysis
costs in the process. Another potential modeling situation, also financially oriented,
is consumer preference.
2.5.8.2 Preferences for Consumption
Consumer demand for various goods and services may also fit the genre of
dynamic weighting methodologies. For example, the distributions associated with
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portfolio asset allocation will (generally) change over time based upon the preferences
for a given objective (capital gains, steady growth, etc.) and its corresponding value
in the context of that investor’s age. Similarly, building upon the classic ‘choose the
best automobile’ example, there are clear areas where time will affect the distribu-
tion of weights, given that the remaining structure of the model remains constant.
For example, consider the objectives “comfort and refinement, fuel consumption,
safety and security features, ride and road handling, performance, aesthetic appeal,
reliability, running and maintenance costs, and space and practicality” examined by
[Bottomley and Doyle, 2001, pg. 555].
An excited, newly licensed driver (also likely to be a hormonal teenager) is
prone to value performance-related objectives over comfort and practicality. Whereas,
the older, more mature driver, particularly one with a family, may value safety- and
practicality-related objectives over those associated with high-performance vehicles.
(An exception to this may involve an individual enduring a ‘mid-life crisis,’ during
which their values would revert back to that of the teenage decision maker.) Next,
a military example is posed, where the time-lines potentially associated with a dy-
namic weighting approach occurs on much shorter intervals-minutes to months, as
opposed to years.
2.5.8.3 Joint Targeting Cycle
According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, the joint targeting cycle (JTC) has
six phases:
1. Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent;
2. Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization;
3. Capabilities Analysis;
4. Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment;
5. Mission Planning and Force Execution; and,
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Figure 2.19: Phases of the Joint Campaign [DOD, 2001, pg. III-19]
6. Combat Assessment [DOD, 2001, pg. III-28].
Although a decision model that takes advantage of dynamic weighting may
have application in all phases of the JTC, phases (4) and (6) are specifically discussed.
Within the “Commander’s decision and force assignment” phase, available as-
sets are assigned to various missions based upon operational, and generally time-
dependent, needs. This assignment is accomplished through a process called appor-
tionment, defined by Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1, Air Warfare, as
follows.
Apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected
aerospace effort by percentage, priority, weight of effort, or some other
appropriate means, that should be devoted to the various aerospace op-
erations and geographic operations for a given period of time [USAF,
2000, pg. 50].
Generally, the time periods are either the duration (or a subset thereof) of a
phase in the campaign. These phases are highlighted in Figure 2.19. The process
of air apportionment assists Joint Force Commanders in ensuring “. . . the weight of
the joint force air effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives” [DOD,
2001, pg. III-29].
The efforts to which these weights are assigned (apportioned) are defined as
functions, which comprise the “broad, fundamental, and continuing activities of
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aerospace power” (e.g., Counter-air, counter-space, counter-sea, counter-land, strate-
gic attack, and counter-information, among others) [USAF, 2000, pg. 5]. As progress
is made throughout the phases of the campaign, there will be requisite shifts in levels
of effort placed toward these functions. Ultimately, major changes in weights (i.e.,
apportionment) may occur at each campaign phase. However, due to the dynamic
nature of war and the interaction with an adversary that has goals and objectives
contrary to our own, the associated weights may change even more frequently. The
feedback process of the phase (6) of the targeting cycle, combat assessment, will
likely employ a dynamic weighting process that is dependent upon the operations
tempo, which involves time periods from minutes to weeks.
Combat assessment (CA) is the evolution of the traditional process of battle
damage assessment (BDA) within today’s complex battlefield, and is formally de-
fined as “the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during
military operations” [DOD, 2001, pg. IV-17] The underlying uncertainty involved in
this type of information lends itself to multi-attribute utility models instead of their
deterministic counterpart–multi-attribute value models. Nonetheless, CA plays a vi-
tal role in the use of limited resources (e.g., fuel, sorties, time to complete objectives,
weapons, and so forth) and essentially affects the apportionment process to ensure
that the commander’s objectives are met. One possible use would be to improve the
Time Critical Targeting (TCT) process. TCT occurs when a Time Sensitive Target
(TST) (e.g., location of enemy leader becomes known) is found and the ATO needs
to be updated to put resources on the TST.
2.5.9 Conclusions Regarding Weighting
Indifference methods offer a theoretically sound approach to establishing at-
tribute weights that not only account for attribute importance, but also accommo-
date the range of the attribute’s SDVF as well. However, this section has highlighted
several studies that suggest decision makers have difficulty in responding with appro-
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priate weight changes as a result of changes in ranges. Additionally, several studies
have determined that the overall decision recommendation is somewhat insensitive
to the preference indifference methods recommended by Keeney and Raiffa [1993]
and other, less theoretically-pure methods often categorized as numerical estimation
techniques [cf. Pöyhönen and Hämäläinen, 2001].
The ease of use suggests that numerical estimation techniques are likely more
suited to dynamic weighting in an operational setting. Further, several researchers
have concluded that “None of the more complicated weighting procedures performed
any better than the simple technique of directly assessing the rank ordering and
arithmetically transforming the ranks into weights” [John et al., 1980, pg. 22], [cf.
Stillwell and Edwards, 1979, pg. 28]. Overall, “The maxima of utility theory are
very flat, which means that modest errors in changing numbers are unlikely to affect
orderings” [Gabrielli and von Winterfeldt, 1978, pg. 20]. As always, it is important
to remember that the purpose of decision analysis is to provide insight. Through
the process of making judgments explicit, “it is easier to identify weaknesses in
the reasoning behind a decision” [Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1989, pg. 86]. An
automated (or semi-automated) method to dynamically weight value models may
limit the benefits associated with the process-critical thinking. Then again, thinking
about a particular decision problem within current and future contexts may prove
beneficial to the analysis process, yielding an advantage to those who have a dynamic
process implemented within today’s dynamic environment. Ultimately, higher level
trade-offs must be made between the DM’s time, their amount of involvement, and
the acceptance of the assumptions regarding the nature of weights over time.
Dynamic weighting for several weighting methodologies is developed in Chap-
ter VI; such techniques would lend themselves to the dynamic scenarios discussed
earlier. This concept is further leveraged for the aggregation, as required, of mul-
tiple, contextual layers of social networks in order to facilitate other computational
analyses. The next section discusses mathematical programming formulations that
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may serve as a means to quantitatively analyze the networks in situ as well as the
effects of influence operations applied to the network.
2.6 Mathematical Programming Approaches
Mathematical programming (MP) plays an important role within this research,
which extends some of the concepts initially developed by Renfro [2001] and applies
this modeling technique to other, traditionally sociological types of problems. These
efforts further the analysis capabilities within this field of research. For example,
slight modifications of the adjacency matrix serve as a direct input into a variety of
mathematical programs, thereby offering prescriptive analysis capabilities. As dis-
cussed earlier, a modified version of the node-edge incidence matrix of the same social
network is useful in studying the literal flow of influence [Clark, 2005; Renfro, 2001]
as well as estimation for the potential of influence flow to ascertain actor centrality
Freeman et al. [1991]. Extensions, both theoretical and applied, of these works are
included within the primary research goals. Several mathematical programming for-
mulations and their roles within this research are briefly reviewed. Other than the
works previously mentioned, very limited substantive connections between mathe-
matical programming and social network analysis have been made.
Recall that a given social network is typically described by a graph, G =
(N, E), where N is the set of nodes (or individuals in this setting) within the network
of interest and E is the set of relations upon which the context of G has been
constructed. For example, if G is the network of ‘who knows whom,’ then an edge
or relation, eij ∈ E implies that individual i knows individual j [Wasserman and
Faust, 1994, pg. 150]. The sociomatrix, denoted X, is one of the primary tools used
by sociologists and is equivalent to the network’s corresponding adjacency matrix.
If actor 1 is adjacent to actor 2 within a particular context of study, then x12 = 1,
zero otherwise [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 150]. Generally, X is symmetric,
but asymmetric relationships can be indicated whenever xij 	= xji.
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In addition to direction, sociometric data may be valued, rather than simply
indicating the existence (1) or non-existence (0) of a contextual relationship between
two individuals within a social network. This necessitates a valued, directed or undi-
rected, graph to accurately represent the social network, as opposed to the symmet-
ric and dichotomous relationship oftentimes assumed in past sociometric studies. As
Buchanan noted, “In a social network, the bonds between good friends are not the
same as those between weak acquaintances” [Buchanan, 2002, pg. 145]. Means to
numerically estimate the potential of such bonds has been posited by Renfro [2001]
via a social closeness function–the stronger the bond, the greater the value of social
closeness. More recently, Clark [2005] suggested another potential influence function
based upon multi-network structures as well as external, demographic-oriented data
of the individuals comprising the network.
This suggests that potential opportunities lie within the theoretical improve-
ments to be made in the merging of these two sciences, sociology and operations
research. Each problem of interest is summarized and followed by findings available
in literature, if any, and potential applications of these techniques in the endeavor
of studying social networks are posited.
2.6.1 Minimum Spanning Tree Problem
Since several elements of this research deal with network flow formulations,
spanning trees in general are clearly of interest due to the relationship between rooted
spanning trees and non-singular bases in network flow programs [Ahuja et al., 1993,
pg. 450] [Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1999, pg. 77]. Renfro also posited the use of
spanning trees, from either a minimum or maximum perspective, to ascertain the
social connectivity of members within a network, using social closeness as the arc
weights [Renfro, 2001, pg. 48].
As discussed earlier, Borgatti defines KPP-2 as the subset of members maxi-
mally connected to the entire network [Borgatti, 2003a, pg. 2]. The impetus behind
107
Borgatti’s key player problem is realization that some traditional SNA measures,
such as closeness or betweenness, that attempt to measure the importance of a spe-
cific individual do not translate well when a subset of the individuals are of interest
[cf. Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. Consequently, improving upon this methodology
by combining the measures developed by Renfro and Clark, as well as those within
this research, may allow solutions to improved, ‘operational’ constructs of the key
player problem. The minimum spanning tree and forest concepts are extended to
KPP-2 to achieve this goal.
Note also that the KPP-2 concept may be abstracted beyond that of social
networks. Suppose, for example, that the branches of the maximal spanning social
tree served as communications- or influence-interdiction targets. Diffusion of inno-
vations, rumor theory, and other related literature and methodologies may benefit
from the use of such a tree as an initial starting point from which to generate an
external influence upon a network. For example, if the objective were to reach as
many individuals within a network as possible, targeting the well connected individ-
uals or frequently used (or heavily relied upon) communications channels would be
of interest. However, individuals could comprise populations and networks of com-
munications channels could be comprised of major cities, street intersections within
a town, popular web pages, and so forth.
2.6.2 Covering and Partitioning Problem
Borrowing from Nemhauser and Wolsey [1999, pg. 6-7], a problem with a
constraint set Ax ≥ 1,x ∈ {0, 1} (Ax = 1,x ∈ {0, 1}) is generally referred to as a
covering (partitioning) problem, respectively. It will be shown that a modified ver-
sion of the reachability matrix results in a covering problem that solves the KPP-2
problem. This MP approach provides several benefits over the heuristic approach
developed by Borgatti. These benefits include: a guaranteed optimal solution, in-
corporation of directed networks, ability to incorporate valued relations, ability to
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Table 2.21: GFP Variable Definition
Variable Definition
cij ≡ the cost per unit flow induced from node i to node j
xij ≡ number of units of flow from node i to node j on arc
(i, j), xij ∈ [0, uij]
bi ≡ 0 if node i is a transshipment, or ‘pass-through,’ node;
< 0 if demand is required by node i; and, > 0 if supply
is provided from node i
gij ≡ a rational value > (<)1 that indicates if arc (i, j) is gainy
(lossy); if gij = 1, then the arc (i, j) is neither one
N ≡ the set of nodes (individuals) within the network
A ≡ the set of arcs (i, j) (connections between individuals)
that form the network
discount actors not reachable by external influences, ability to encompass multiple
dimensions of relationships, and so forth. Further modifications, leveraging the use
of slack variables, may yield a partitioning problem that permits the selection of a
set that attains a percent goal, such as a subset, of the population reached. This
mirrors an aspect of Borgatti’s research and offers another element of flexibility to
the MP approach.
2.6.3 Generalized Network Flow
As seen in [Renfro, 2001; Clark, 2005; Freeman et al., 1991], network flow
models provide a useful methodology for the study of influential actors within a net-
work. These works, however, focus upon the development of interpersonal measures
that serve as capacities of inter-personal influence. Suppose in addition to this in-
formation, inter-personal measurements provided differential influence assessments–
specifically, gains, losses and thresholds of persuasion. The generalized network flow
problem (GFP) has the ability to mathematically accommodate such phenomena.
Variants of this problem include the maximum flow and minimum cost formulations.
Ahuja et al. [1993] provide a general formulation for the GFP. Variable definition











gijxij  bi ∀i ∈ N (2.21)
0 ≤ xij ≤ uij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (2.22)
The objective function, given by Equation 2.20, seeks to minimize the total cost of
flow through the network, subject to the constraints, given by Equations 2.21 and
2.22. Constraint 2.21 is an extension of the mass balance constraint that allows for
potential violations of traditional conservation of flow assumptions. This extension,
a relaxation of the original formulation of Equation 2.21, replaces the equality, “=”,
with “≥” as shown. Typical minimum cost maximum flow problems further specify
that the sum of flow entering the system must equal the sum of flow exiting the
system. This relaxation facilitates feasibility, particularly when gains and losses
affect flow (e.g., 1 unit enters and, due to gains, say 2 or more must exit) and when
arcs are capacitated (e.g., there exists a maximum amount of flow that may traverse
the arc-the social closeness serving as an upper bound in this case).
As previously mentioned, a variant of the GFP is the maximum flow problem.
The formulation, modified from [Ahuja et al., 1993, pg. 168] to incorporate gains
and losses, follows.
v ≡ value of the flow (the sum of all sources must equal the sum of all sinks)
s ≡ value of the flow provided by a source











v ∀i ∈ s
0 ∀i ∈ N − {s ∩ t}
−v ∀i ∈ t
(2.24)
0 ≤ xij ≤ uij ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (2.25)
This formulation is useful in determining whether or not a flow between two targets
(or target sets) of interest through the network is even possible, implying that the
course of action (to induce a flow of influence between two or more nodes of interest)
offers an opportunity for achieving its objectives.
The GFP and its variations provide a means to deal with a variety of real-world
problems. Various processes that undergo degradation or improvement over time or
distance may be modeled. As an example, picture a ditch irrigation system. In hot
weather, evaporative processes diminish the volumes of water as it flows though the
system. Alternatively, precipitation (rain, snow, etc.) may increase the volume of
water. These are losses and gains in flow, respectively. Further, ignoring losses and
gains for a moment, at any point in the system, a junction, the law of conservation
of mass dictates that the amount of water flowing into the junction must equal
the amount flowing out. Gains and losses at a junction are then modeled by the
right hand side, where (bi > 0) and (bi < 0) respectively. Using the work of Renfro
[2001] and Renfro and Deckro [2003] as a launching point, continued development
of parallels between the flow of commodities in the physical world and the flow of
influence in the behavioral realm are sought.
A recent work delineating the types of flows through social networks offers a
complicating factor to several network formulations. Borgatti developed a typology
of flow processes observed in social networks for various ‘commodities.’ Gossip, for
example, “spreads by replication rather than transference . . . [and] normally does not
pass the same link twice, but can pass the same node multiple times.” [Borgatti,
2005, pg. 57] Current formulations as described above of network flow within social
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networks are incapable of modeling this phenomenon and others within Borgatti’s
typology. This is primarily due to the mass balance constraints as well as the nature
of the solutions in general.
2.6.4 P-Median Problem
Another potential approach to apply to the KPP-2 issue is that of the p-
median problem. Suppose key players are viewed as facilities that serve, or influence,
themselves and other members not within the key player set–all of which are viewed
as customers. The objective, in general, is to minimize demand-weighted distance
between the facilities and customers. Let dij be the distance from actor i to actor j;
let (Xj = 1) if actor j is selected as a key player, zero otherwise; let (Yij = 1) if actor
i is ‘influenced’ by actor j, zero otherwise; and, let P be the size of the kp-set. Note
that, due to the nature of the variables, both symmetric and asymmetric graphs can
be evaluated. Additionally, distances no longer need be limited to two steps away.
In fact, any non-zero distance may be incorporated, as well as weighted (e.g., with
social closeness or aggregated multiplex values) networks are available for analysis.
Assuming the demand is a constant (unity), the formulation is as follows. (Modified










Yij = 1 ∀ i (2.27)
∑
j
Xj = P (2.28)
Yij − Xj ≤ 0 ∀ i, j (2.29)
Yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j; Xj ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j (2.30)
Constraint 2.27 ensures that each actor is assigned to only one key player; Constraint
2.28 specifies the number of key players to be used; and Constraint 2.29 ensures that
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an assignment cannot be made to an individual j unless that individual is indeed a
key player. Various extensions of this formulation could be applied. Unfortunately,
unless advanced techniques are applied (e.g., Lagrangian relaxation), solving a large
problem of this nature to optimality may be computationally challenging.
2.6.5 Disconnecting Sets
Recalling the KPP-1 definition and the current interest in disrupting vari-
ous aspects of terrorist networks–such as the financial, support, and communication
layers–disrupting the overall functionality of a non-cooperative network by discon-
necting it into distinct components (e.g., isolating cells from one another to impede
planning efforts). Several works have examined disconnecting sets in the context of
adversarial networks, physical and social. The research of Jarvis [1968] and Green-
berg [1968] discuss aspects of optimal attack strategies of command and control
networks, both from a multi-commodity perspective. More recently, Leinart [1998];
Leinart et al. [2002] and Pinkstaff [2001] have explored essentially the same topic,
but from a cut-set enumeration and valuation approach, generally focusing on a
single-layered network. Lastly, Kennedy developed a methodology to evaluate cut
sets and optimize the targeting process for multi-layered infrastructure networks.
[Kennedy, 2003]
Renfro posited two forms of multi-contextual analyses: multi-criteria and multi-
commodity. The former incorporating relational aspects or contexts independently,
whereas the latter considers multiple contexts but assumes that all contexts share
a given capacity of potential influence between any two individuals. [Renfro, 2001,
pg. 67] Such concepts are of interest due to the layered network approach of this
research.
Unfortunately, the transition from single- to multi-commodity networks poses
some challenges, as the max-flow, min cost cut set easily found for the former does
not generalize to the latter. [Jarvis, 1968, pg. 40] In addition, “. . . in general, for
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multi-commodity graphs the minimum disconnecting set is not necessarily a cut-set”
[Jarvis, 1968, pg. 40]. Given a graph with m nodes and r commodities, enumeration
of all chains of all possible lengths can equal r2(m−n+1), resulting in cut-set verification
or enumerative methodologies computationally problematic when applied to large
single-commodity or reasonably-sized multi-commodity networks [Jarvis, 1968, pg.
47]. Further, the technique of replacing an undirected arc with an equivalent set of
two directed arcs does not extend well to the multi-commodity network problem as
“. . . only the forward arcs contribute to the capacity of a single-commodity cut-set”
[Greenberg, 1968, pg. 13-15].
2.6.6 Path Enumeration Techniques
Although path (or chain for undirected graphs) enumeration may be com-
putationally expensive, there may be reasons that support such an endeavor. For
example, the promising approach by Stephenson and Zelen [1989], described earlier,
is capable of analyzing valued graphs, but is limited to symmetric networks. This
essentially eliminates the possibility of incorporating gains and/or losses, as well as
aggregate values capturing multiple dimensions that are not necessarily symmetric
in nature. The method is unique in that it avoids path enumeration. However, it is
posited that since explicit path enumeration of a symmetric, dichotomous graph is
demonstrated to be equivalent to the information centrality measure, then explicit
path enumeration may provide a more flexible (but potentially computationally in-
tractable) measure. Several path enumeration methods exist-from one node to all
others Misra and Misra [1980], all paths of a given length Parthasarathy [1964], and
all paths between two specified nodes Migliore et al. [1990], are just a few prominent
examples within the literature.
Clearly, given the current context, operations research offers an array of models
that can be used to analyze social networks.
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2.7 Summary
To this point, a number of methodologies and theories dealing with both open
and non-cooperative social networks have been presented. These works include a va-
riety of Operations Research, Sociological, and Behavioral Theory efforts, all of which
provide the bases for this research. The overall goal of which is that new and useful
theory, and concomitant methodologies, describing and analyzing social networks of
non-cooperative organizations will be realized. Given the improved understanding
and insights provided by the proposed research, decision makers can then be offered
better courses of action that impute influence upon the network in order to achieve
a target influence, perception, or outcome to one or more actors within the network
through either direct or indirect means. The next chapter presents an overview of




This chapter outlines the research activities seeking to improve the theoretical
and methodological approaches available to analyze layered social networks. A series
of approaches are developed to investigate aspects of social networks. The layered
concept primarily provides a means to (1) derive a measure of relationship strength
and (2) offer insight into potential courses of action that may increase the fragility of
the target network or disrupt it entirely through the use of information operations.
In addition, the use of exogenous data characterizing the individuals within the
network to ascertain power or persuasion differentials is explored. This measure of
persuasion, also referred to as influence, of one individual over another is used as a
multiplier in generalized network flow applications, again to explore various courses
of action as well as supporting a new social network analysis measure.
Recall the layered network diagram presented in Chapter I and repeated in
Figure 3.1. In this figure, each layer represents a context within which the actors
may or may not be affiliated. Context examples could include familial relationships,
training camps attended together, known friendships, business interactions, known
animosities, resources shared, specialized skills or training, and so forth. For each
layer or context, if an actor is connected to any other actor in the same context, those
actors and that link are recorded. Given that the network of interest is comprised of
N individuals, each layer can include no more than the same set of N individuals.
Examining the diagram from directly overhead, an actor appearing in more than one
context would be aligned vertically, as noted by the ‘unique actor’ indicator.
It is assumed that human interaction simultaneously accounts for multiple,
underlying relationships or contexts within which those relationships were developed.
For example, two complete strangers may be treated differently based upon the





Figure 3.1: Layered Social Network
the difference between a random individual standing beside you on a sidewalk and the
lady just introduced to you as the new fiancée of your brother. Both are strangers,
yet an inevitable difference between the strengths of the two relationships occurs due
to the implied trust gained from a familial context. Consequently, it is suggested that
by increasing or at least acknowledging the dimensionality of information gathered
on individuals of interest, a better understanding of the overall network behavior
can be achieved.
It should be noted that this approach has at least two potential drawbacks.
First, methods attempting to measure strength of ties are generally criticized when
applied to non-cooperative networks, such as terrorist organizations, in that increas-
ing sophistication of analysis methodologies “may still not yield a more useful map”
towards understanding the underlying network behavior [Fellman and Wright, 2003,
pg. 5]. Nonetheless, ignoring this type of information automatically presumes all
interpersonal ties are homogenous. When considering leaders, followers, and actors
that serve as bridges, liaisons, and gatekeepers, knowing not only which particular
individual may successfully be exploited, but which of their interpersonal relation-








Figure 3.2: Layer Aggregation and Strength
The second potential drawback deals with the natural tendency for individuals
to cognitively account for multiple relationship contexts simultaneously. This implies
that when attempting to ascertain a flow of information or influence throughout a
social network, decomposition-like techniques are likely inappropriate models of the
way individuals conduct interpersonal relations and exchanges. However, if a decision
maker were interested in leveraging weaknesses or strengths within a specific context
so as to disrupt or affect overall network connectivity, strength, and so forth, single-
context analyses may lend themselves to such objectives. Both problem aspects,
model formulations, and potential applications are discussed in later chapters.
The dilemma then is that the second drawback suggests that multiplexity must
be considered as a combined effect between two individuals, whereas the first draw-
back maintains that it should not. The impasse can be resolved when considering
the statement that “[multiple relations should not be combined] unless there is a
substantive reason for doing so” [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 219]. For this
research, the ‘substantive reason’ is the proposition that multiple, interpersonal ties
contribute to relationship strength in the manner proposed by Granovetter, suggest-
ing a probably linear combination of contexts [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1361].
It is hypothesized that, in general, the more individuals have in common, the
stronger the relationship between them, as suggested by Haythornthwaite [1999].
Chapter VI explores a number of combination techniques and their implications,
some of which involve the allocation of weights for each layer. The weighting corre-
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sponds to the importance that the target network in toto places upon a particular
relationship context. As the majority of this data is unlikely to be directly measur-
able, expert opinion familiar with the culture, indoctrination procedures, and insti-
tutional foundations will always play a vital role in providing guidance regarding the
weights. However, the use of a dynamic weighting can help ascertain the impact of
information operations upon the network relationships. For example, compare the
bottom layer to the top two in Figure 3.2. If information operations marginalized the
weight of the top two layers from the individuals’ point of view, a fissure between the
network members may be observed. Therefore, despite the ability to measure exactly
how much each context contributes to the strength of interpersonal relationships, the
sensitivity of a given network to perturbations of the weight set, and the subsequent
impact upon associated measures can be explored. As today’s terrorist organizations
are increasingly multi-cultural, extensions allowing for individual-specific weight sets
are also examined.
An additional measurement aspect of this research is the theory of gains and
losses. This research effort attempts to extend the work of French [1956] and Fried-
kin [1986] regarding social power. Couched in the goal of explaining the dynamics
of opinions among individuals, both works essentially suggest that “the influence
process in groups can be explained in terms of patterns of interpersonal relations”
[French, 1956, pg. 81]. French defines interpersonal power as “the power of A over
B (with respect to a given opinion) is equal to the maximum force which A can in-
duce on B minus the maximum resisting force which B can mobilize in the opposite
direction” [French, 1956, pg. 183].
This research suggests that such interpersonal power, or lack thereof, is anal-
ogous to gains or losses. Interestingly, French mentions bases of power that are not
necessarily related to network topology as focused upon by both French [1956] and
Friedkin [1986]. The bases are attraction, expert, reward, coercive, and legitimate
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Gains & LossesPersonalCharacteristics
Figure 3.3: Sources of Gains and Losses
power. All of these bases connote factors extending beyond network topology, such
as personal characteristics or formal and informal organizational roles.
For example, attraction power may be dependent upon the charisma, appear-
ance, and professional, educational, and religious backgrounds of the individuals.
Within the context of a generalized network flow model, any two given individuals
perceiving each other as their peer would result in the power of one over the other to
be the same, resulting in a multiplier equal to one. Alternatively, an individual may
demonstrate a greater influence, pressure, or power over another due to a socioe-
conomic or status differential, resulting in a multiplier > 1. Lastly, communication
emanating from an individual that is perceived as an underling, unreliable, untrust-
worthy may carry a negative undertone, resulting in a multiplier < 1. However, the
only basis French elaborates upon is that of attraction, noting that cohesiveness has
been ‘operationalized’ in past studies to account for attraction between individuals
within a network [French, 1956, pg. 185]. Figure 3.3 depicts the general notion of
this concept, which is further detailed in Section 3.3.4 and Chapter VII.
It is therefore hypothesized that the combination of tie strength and measure-
ment of gains and losses of influence provides a more robust and capable model of
network behavior. Additionally, the act of seeking this information inevitably con-
tributes to an improved understanding of the extent and nature of the interpersonal
relationships of the target network. A new social network analysis measure, and
new techniques derived from its application, to accomplish this in a more efficient
manner, is developed in Chapter IV.
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When it comes to affecting the network in some way, presumably via infor-
mation operations that may involve kinetic and non-kinetic means, the evaluation
of potential target sets and courses of action must be accomplished. Chapter V
builds upon and extends the analytic capabilities of the key player concept through
mathematical programming techniques. Chapter VII combines the measurement
of multiplex relations discussed in Chapter VI with the measurement of gains and
losses. These new techniques facilitate a generalized network flow model of influence
similar to that described by Renfro [2001], which can be used to evaluate influence
courses of action.
The overarching goal of this research is to use these combinations of models to
improve understanding of potential behavioral patterns that belie the target network,
and their reactions to the information operations that may be imposed upon them.
Subsequently, such understanding may be used to develop improved courses of action
to effectively achieve a specified change in behavior in one or more actors within the
target network. These efforts, and the research endeavors presented within this
dissertation, require several underlying assumptions.
3.2 Assumptions and Limitations
As discussed in Chapter I, it is assumed that the data required for the method-
ologies presented is available and known with certainty. The mathematical nature of
the approaches presented permit the investigation of relaxations to this assumption
via sensitivity analyses, involving both ‘one-at-a-time’ and parametric approaches
to the impact of uncertainty. However, these techniques may not always avail them-
selves to determining the potential effects when uncertainty pervades the entire net-
work.
Since one of the objectives requires the forced flow of influence through a
network, specific paths upon which the influence travels result. As with many social
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network analyses, independence is assumed, potentially contrary to typical social
interactions. For example, when one person passes on a message, information, or
influence to another, that person may also provide the previous source, either for
informational purposes or for emphasis. As an example, in reality there may be
a different influential impact between “our co-worker said we need to do. . . ” and
“our boss said we need to do. . . .” This scenario implies dependence and, despite a
potentially closer tie to reality, is assumed not to hold for computational convenience
[cf. Friedkin, 1986].
The other major assumption underlying this research is the static approach to
network topology, both the structure and the perceived strengths of relationships. It
is certain that over time, some individuals may change their opinions or strategies,
relationships evolve and devolve, and the overall social network structure changes due
to recruitment of new individuals, new opportunities for interaction, and departures
from the network. However, given the nature of available intelligence information
and the near-term focus to which these techniques are amenable, it is assumed that
key changes in the network are primarily due to the actions or influence imposed
upon it. With the possible exception of dynamic programming, this appears to be the
preferred way to deal with other, albeit open, social networks in current sociological
and anthropological literature. Other efforts are pursuing the capability to simulate
dynamic network behaviors, Carley [2003], for example; however, this also requires
collecting a great deal more information that may or may not be available.
3.3 Approaches
The theoretic and applied contributions from this research involve successive,
conceptual steps that may, as applicable, build upon each other or provide compli-
mentary analyses. The steps may either be used stand-alone or combined to provide
a theoretically sound analysis methodology for the study of layered social networks.
As mentioned earlier, some concepts are more amenable to layered networks than
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others. The social networks of particular interest are comprised of adversarial and
non-cooperative individuals; however, the proposed methodologies are not necessar-
ily limited to such organizations.
The most benefit gained from the approaches developed occurs when there
exists data characterizing both (1) the dimensions of interpersonal relationships and
(2) individual attribute data. Although the most detailed level of analyses requires
both classes of data elements, some approaches may still be used if only limited
data is available. Each of these approaches are generally described in the following
sections; detailed discussion and notional analyses of each are presented in following
chapters.
3.3.1 Screening
A new social network analysis measure is offered that attempts to assess an
actor’s position from the standpoint of centrality, power, or prestige. The position
type is dependent upon the sociometric data available. Use of symmetric adjacency
matrices yield actor centrality. Use of asymmetric adjacency matrices can yield both
power and prestige positions. This reach-based measure builds upon concepts such as
information attenuation as a function of path length [cf. Katz, 1953; Stephenson and
Zelen, 1989] and reach type [Valente and Foreman, 1998]. Although this measure is
restricted to the analysis of dichotomous networks, it has several analytic advantages
over similar, traditional social network measures. The mathematical development
of this measure, its theoretical bases, and the characteristics that make the measure
amenable to the study of non-cooperative networks are provided. Methods to apply
this measure to layered networks are presented.
3.3.2 Targeting
The appealing concept, from a military perspective, of the KPP-2 problem
discussed in Section 2.2.2 is extended in a variety of ways. New mathematical pro-
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grams are developed to provide a more robust alternative to the insightful, but ini-
tial, heuristic approach devised by Borgatti [2003b]. Assuming that some individuals
within a target network are accessible, or can be made accessible, the models and
techniques developed in this research offer a means to build and evaluate possible
target sets. There are, of course, advantages and disadvantages of this approach.
Advantages over Borgatti’s approach include: (1) the ability to address asym-
metric networks; (2) the ability to solve to optimality the kp-set; (3) the collection
of multiple optimal solutions; and, (4) the ability to extend the problem aspects to
other dimensions of interest. Relationships between classic operations research mod-
els such as covering and partitioning problems, dominating sets, and the p-median
problem and the sub-objectives of the KPP-2 concept are established. This not only
offers improved solutions, but enables improved capabilities through the blending of
models and the incorporation of specialized constraints.
Examples of such capabilities include the use of goal programming to evaluate
trade-offs between competing objectives (e.g., kp-set size and network coverage); the
a priori designation of individuals as accessible or inaccessible; the incorporation of
costs, real or perceived, to access and co-opt a key player; and, the enumeration of
multiple optimal solutions, thus providing more viable and optimal alternatives for
the decision maker. These methodologies and illustrative examples are provided.
3.3.3 Measuring Multiplexity
There are few sources within the literature to date that deal directly with
attempts to measure quantitatively relationships that vary in strength, other than
those that, for convenience, assume or hypothesize the researcher could obtain those
values. Of those that do acknowledge the dimensionality of interpersonal relation-
ships, none, with the exception of Renfro [2001] and Clark [2005], have thus far been
uncovered that attempt to take multiple contexts or characteristics and formally
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develop an approach to differentiate quantitatively relationships between pairs of
individuals.
Measuring the strength of a relationship by incorporating a number of appro-
priate contexts comprises the first step and provides inputs for other model formu-
lations. Contexts of interest are drawn from Marsden and Campbell [1984] and Hite
[2003] (as discussed in Chapter VI) as starting points. However, depending upon the
nature of the intelligence collection process, contextual analyses may only be feasible
after an initial set of individuals has been established and a common set of contexts
that comprise their relationships have been discovered.
Note also that multiplexity is only one of many aspects that could contribute
to the strength of a tie. Previous works such as Granovetter [1973], suggested dura-
tion and frequency serve as proxies for multiplexity. Consequently, a model defining
the theoretical building blocks that contribute to the ‘strength’ of a relationship is
developed. Other works such as [Carroll, 2006; Friedkin, 1990, 1980; Gould, 1991;
Marsden and Campbell, 1984] are analyzed, summarized, and synthesized to serve
as a basis for the theoretical model. This effectively builds upon the seminal work of
Granovetter, who stated the general definition of the strength of an interpersonal tie
is “. . . a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional inten-
sity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize
the tie” [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1361]. Areas left ‘for future study’ by Granovetter
include the “operational measures and weights attaching to each of the four ele-
ments. . . ” [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1361]. Such weighting schemes that accompany
the model of tie strength are discussed in Chapter VI.
Renfro [2001] evaluated pair-wise comparisons of individual psychological states
to determine asymmetric social closeness values. Clark [2005] developed a weighted
combination of structure-based, pair-wise centrality results that were further weighted
by a method accounting for individual characteristics. The article by Friedkin dis-
cusses the construction of a Guttman scale–where different stages or assessments can
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imply others–that incorporates claims of frequent discussion, of seeking help, and of
close friendship [Friedkin, 1990]. Friedkin’s work, however, assumes that each of
these claims contributes equally to the tie strength. This may ultimately be a con-
sequence of the Guttman scale approach. Other than these, none of the preliminary
works mentioned directly address this concept in any reasonable detail, especially if
an analyst wanted to associate a value indicating strength with an edge in a social
network graph using different types or classifications of network data (e.g., familial,
training, and so forth).
Therefore, this research effort incorporates the use of decision analytic tech-
niques to capture the essence of the model initially proposed by Granovetter, while
accounting for the taxonomies provided by Hite and the findings that may have
changed initial perceptions of what makes a strong tie; for example, Marsden and
Campbell found that “there are difficulties with frequency and duration of contact
as indicators of strength” [Marsden and Campbell, 1984, pg. 482].
It is presumed that such a contextual aggregation technique involves weights
that, from the adversary’s perspective, indicate the importance a given context plays
within interpersonal relationships [cf. Clark, 2005]. In addition, if psychological oper-
ations are applied to one or more layers, but not necessarily all of them, investigation
of how these weights may change over time and the affect upon the network per-
formance and exchange of influence (or power, or status, etc.) in response to these
external forces–courses of action–are performed. Determining the contexts or layers
of interest is potentially one of the more difficult areas of this research, as the types
of ties that result in the strong, trusting relationships are likely dependent upon
the origins of the organization and the scenario under analysis, or simply predicated
upon the available intelligence information.
Regardless of the technique chosen to perform future analyses, a key aspect that
must be considered in this area is that of data acquisition, particularly when dealing
with non-cooperative networks. Consequently, a secondary goal of this research,
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regardless of the area, is to develop the theory and requisite methodologies amenable
to information that must be gathered from a distance.
All of these efforts serve as an ideal input for an extension of Renfro’s flow
model formulation from a single, possibly multi-commodity network to a multi-
layered network is planned. Although Renfro proposed a multi-commodity flow
formulation, characterization and analysis of non-cooperative networks as layered,
inter-dependent network formulation is investigated in greater detail.
3.3.4 A Generalized Social Network Model
The overall goal of this research thread is to quantify an individual’s power of
persuasion over another. Renfro suggested that gains and losses within a generalized
network model were analogous to preconceived notions or poor communication. This
research contends that these effects are due to a person’s ability, or lack thereof,
to persuade other individuals. Ultimately, this research effort relies upon works
such as persuasion theory [Seiter and Gass, 2004]; methods incorporating individual
attribute data [Clark, 2005]; and, the bases of interpersonal power [French, 1956].
Two immediate benefits are derived from a measure of interpersonal persua-
siveness. First, this measure is incorporated into a generalized network flow model of
a social network. This provides a means to examine the efficacy of potential courses
of action in further detail. These courses of action, in general, seek to influence
specific, and presumably inaccessible, actors within a target network. The influence
is indirectly transferred by using accessible actors and the target network’s own re-
lations. Analysis methods and techniques taking advantage of sensitivity analysis
procedures are discussed with the objective of improving insight into the adversary.
Another immediate use for the gains and losses measure–as well as the measure-
ment of relationship strength discussed earlier–is the incorporation into information
flow centrality measures as presented by Freeman et al. [1991] and Brandes and
Fleischer [2005]. For example, Freeman et al. [1991] developed a centrality measure
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by evaluating various maximum flow characteristics of the network. The flow model
required arc values, representing the strength of a relationship, which were assumed
to be available. Elaborating upon these ‘strength’ values via the aggregation of con-
textual layers benefits this research area in a fashion similar to that of Renfro [2001]
and Clark [2005]. However, the inclusion of gains and losses due to persuasion also
provides an extension of Freeman et al.’s centrality measure, incorporating a general-
ized, and assumed to be more representative, network flow model. Justifications for
inclusion of this aspect of interpersonal behavior are discussed and, as accomplished
by Freeman et al. [1991], comparisons to the initial network flow centrality measure
and other measures of betweenness is explored.
All of these measures and methodologies are expected to provide information
and insight regarding actors of interest or the implications of imposing external
influences upon a target network. The assumptions and flow processes underlying
network flow models of social networks, however, must be carefully considered.
3.3.5 Analysis of Layered Social Networks
Verification, comparisons to other techniques, and demonstrative analyses can-
not be performed without data. Subsequently, notional networks are evaluated
throughout the document, illustrating the various aspects of this research. The
application of all techniques developed within this dissertation to a subset of the Al-
Qaeda terrorist network is presented in Chapter VIII. This case study demonstrates
the various theories and associated methodologies developed within this dissertation.
3.3.6 Summary
The overall framework for this research effort is depicted in Figure 3.4. The
flow of research tasks is from left to right; the arrows indicate predecessors and
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Figure 3.4: Research Framework
methodology, but also helps to identify and tie together the theoretical aspects of
this research.
This framework, composed of an interrelated and complimentary suite of anal-
ysis approaches, facilitates the gaining of insight into the adversarial network. Such
insight can be leveraged in a number of ways. For example, the development and
estimation of the efficacy of courses of action against the network and improved capa-
bilities to forecast roles and responsibilities of individuals within a non-cooperative
network–all despite limited information. The next chapters provide the details of




A number of centrality measures that rely upon the structural characteristics
of a social network to assess the importance of each actor within the network exist
[cf. Wasserman and Faust, 1994]. In the context of evaluating non-cooperative,
clandestine networks, measures that can be efficiently calculated and perform well
despite limited information are of increasing interest to counter-terrorist applications
of social network analysis.
The measure developed in this chapter is designed to serve as a screening
tool to identify individuals within a given adversarial, clandestine network (an ac-
tive terrorist organization, for example) who may play important roles in achieving
organizational objectives. Those actors with such roles are of interest and are can-
didates for focusing intelligence surveillance and analysis resources. Importance is
assumed to be positively correlated with how easily or efficiently a given actor can
communicate, directly or indirectly, with all other actors in the group.
In the context of typical network analyses, the nature of such roles is often
predicated upon network topology. For example, network data that captures di-
rected relationships invokes the notions of prestige and power. A prestigious actor
is “one who is the object of extensive ties” [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 174].
Alternatively, a powerful actor is one that “influences the behavior (either overtly
or covertly) of others in accordance with his own intentions” [Goldhamer and Shils,
1939, pg. 171]. Power thereby implies a focus upon ties emanated. Symmetric
(undirected) data simply fall within the study of, and have accompanying measures
to assess, actor centrality [cf. Wasserman and Faust, 1994, Chp. 5]. This measure is
shown to be applicable to all three of these analytic categories (prestige, power, and
centrality), assuming that appropriate steps are taken to ensure that the measure is
indeed capturing the information or influence flow of interest [cf. Borgatti, 2005].
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Reach-based assessment of position (RBAP) was initially motivated by the
concepts within the status measure of Katz [1953], discussed in Chapter II. This
effort ultimately resulted in computational and theoretical changes making Katz’s
measure potentially more suitable for analysis of clandestine networks that rely heav-
ily upon secrecy for their operational success [cf. Post, 2005; Baker and Faulkner,
1993]. In addition, RBAP is conceptually related to the radiality measure developed
by Valente and Foreman [1998], which “refers to the degree an individual’s relations
reach out into the network providing access to many and diverse others” [Valente
and Foreman, 1998, pg. 90].
This initial development of RBAP is focused upon screening a clandestine net-
work, characterized by a binary (i.e., denoted by 1 if there exists a relationship
between two individuals, 0 otherwise) and not necessarily symmetric adjacency ma-
trix, for actors with the most power or influence over all other actors. Thus, the
measure can be viewed as (1) a variant of out-degree centrality [Wasserman and
Faust, 1994, pg. 199]; (2) a modification of the status measure by Katz [1953]; and,
(3) a modification of eigenvalue-based centrality measures that are similar to Katz’s
measure [Bonacich, 1987; Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001, pg. 195]. The screening pro-
cess attempts to identify the most interesting actors by virtue of very high, or very
low, RBAP scores. This group of actors would then serve as the focus of limited
intelligence resources.
In the following sections, the aspects and criticisms of related works are briefly
reviewed, and the theory underlying RBAP is developed. The chapter concludes
with a demonstrative example and discussion on how this measure may be applied
to layered social networks.
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4.2 Background
Given a dichotomous representation of an adversarial, clandestine network, a
measure that seeks to identify actors that are able to reach or influence all other
actors within the network as quickly as possible is desired. In the context of a
dichotomous network, quick refers to the number of steps between actors within a
network. This automatically invokes a common underlying assumption prevalent
in many social network analysis measures–that influence or information propagates
through a network via shortest, or geodesic, paths. Recall that the geodesic path is
defined as “the (not necessarily unique) shortest path through the network from one
vertex to another” [Newman, 2003, pg. 173]. The definition, however, implies that
there could be multiple shortest paths of a given distance between any two given
actors, a phenomena leveraged in the classic betweenness centrality measure as well
as RBAP [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 188-91].
From a communications point of view, flow via the shortest path may minimize
the likelihood and impact of errors or misperceptions that often plague human in-
teraction. However, as several authors have contended, communication or influence
between individuals within a clandestine network may not necessarily flow along the
shortest path. For example, regarding the impetus behind their centrality measure
that accounts for all possible paths between any two individuals, Stephenson and
Zelen [1989] point out,
it is quite possible that information will take a more circuitous route ei-
ther by random communication or may be intentionally channeled through
many intermediaries in order to ‘hide’ or ‘shield’ information in a way
not captured by geodesic paths [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 3].
Other previous works suggest that when an organization is faced with trade-
offs between efficiency and concealment, the subsequent network structure evolves in
a manner that may be contrary to classical sociological expectations [Krebs, 2002;
Baker and Faulkner, 1993, pg. 856]. However, the actual interpersonal communica-
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tion may still follow the shortest path relative to the secretive network, despite the
fact that such a path could be shorter if the network were operating and evolving
freely without recourse. If secure communications are required, one can assume that
longer communication chains offer more opportunity for interception of message traf-
fic and associated operational risk. Hence, communication among paths other than
the geodesics is (potentially) contrary to the organizational goals of secrecy [e.g.,
Post, 2005, Chapter 2].
The following sections discuss existing measures that lead to the development
of RBAP. These measures include the status index of Katz [1953], the radiality and
integration measures proposed by Valente and Foreman [1998], and the centrality
measures for asymmetric relations developed by Bonacich [1987]; Bonacich and Lloyd
[2001]. For a more comprehensive comparison between the related measures, the
reader is referred to Wasserman and Faust [1994, pg. 198-219] and Borgatti and
Everett [2006].
4.2.1 Contributing Measures
Recall the discussion of the status measure proposed by Katz in Section 2.4.1.
Katz’s recursive status measure, taking advantage of the convergence of a geometric
series, captured ‘all possible walks’ of infinite length with a relatively easy calculation
and the reasonable assumption that the effect of communication or influence along
a path decreased as a function of the path’s length. However, this measure suffers
several conceptual and theoretical problems, particularly when considering and ana-
lyzing the behavior of non-cooperative social networks. These problems include: the
characteristics of the flow assumed and actually captured by the calculations; the po-
tential length of the paths implicitly accounted for within the measure’s calculations;
and, the arbitrary choice of the attenuation factor.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, the flows captured by Katz’s index include not
only all possible walks, but all possible paths, as well as directed edge sequences
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that fit neither the walk nor the path definition–an observation previously noted by
[Leenders, 2002, pg. 32]. To further complicate the potential application of this
measure to non-cooperative networks, directed edge sequences of infinite length are
also incorporated within the status values. These sequences do indeed contribute
to the status scores of the individuals and effectively measure phenomenon that is
contrary to the behavior inherent within the networks of interest. Recall Theorem 1,
due to Deo [1974], which categorizes the entries within the powers of the sociomatrix
as either directed paths from i to j, directed walks from i to j, or directed edge
sequences that are neither paths nor walks.
Directed edge sequences that fall within the second category, walks, could
be perceived as inefficient communications practices among network members. For
example, suppose actor A wanted to transmit a message or influence to actor D. With
other actors B and C, a valid walk, assuming the network connectivity exists, from
A to D could include A-B-C-A-D. In this particular example, it is more efficient for
actor A to communicate directly with D instead of routing the same message through
B and C only to have it return to actor A.
Similarly, directed edge sequences that fall within the third category essen-
tially include repetitive banter between two or more individuals. For example, with
two actors A and B, a directed edge sequence of length 3 (p = 3) could include
the path A-B-A-B. With three actors A, B, and C, directed edge sequence of length
5 (p = 5) between A and C could include the path A-B-A-B-A-C. Assuming that
each interaction or period of communication imparts a potential risk of being uncov-
ered, captured, or providing an adversary with additional and sensitive information,
Katz’s status measure is inappropriate for analysis of non-cooperative or clandestine
networks.
In addition, the potential length of walks measured goes to infinity. Again,
this would involve an infinite amount of communication exchanges between the indi-
viduals, which would likely be counter to operational security objectives. Note also
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that, given a graph with n vertices, the maximum length of a path is n − 1. The
maximum length of a walk given the same graph and assuming that the path A-B
is considered different from the path B-A is n(n− 1). Unless the network of interest
is an infinite graph, Katz’s status index provides an unrealistic characterization of
information or influence patterns within an organization. This suggests that a more
direct, path-based approach, limited to the length of a worst-case scenario–a path of
length (n − 1).
The final points of contention include the arbitrary nature of the attenuation
factor, α, as well as the restricted range of its acceptable values being predicated
upon the network structure. These facts detract from the overall analytic power
of this concept and resulting measure. Even within the ranges recommended by
Katz, the most ‘central’ actor is often dependent upon the value of α; explaining
this phenomenon is even more complicated when dealing with an infinite number of
paths, walks, and directed sequences levied upon a finite graph.
As an example, using the notional network in Figure 2.8, Figure 4.1 depicts the
results of Katz’s measure with varying levels of α within the recommended range.
The graph simply captures the rank order of the status for each of the six actors,
with the values 6 and 1 indicating the highest and lowest ranking status scores,
respectively. Interestingly, two crossover points exist, resulting in actors A and D
exchanging status rankings around α = 0.36, and actors A and F exchanging status
rankings at around α = 0.48. If the value of α is likened to the attenuation of
influence or status as a function of distance, the range, and therefore the possible
range of assumptions regarding the amount of attenuation, is unfortunately limited
by necessity in order to determine a solution to the system of equations.
Related approaches, based upon the eigenvectors of X, due to Bonacich and
Lloyd [2001] and Bonacich et al. [2004] are frequently used within the sociological
literature. Recall from Section 2.4.4 that eigenvector centrality views the nature





























































































Figure 4.1: Change in status with attenuation
mathematical underpinnings to the measure developed by Katz. Consequently, this
measurement approach suffers similar difficulties regarding the types and lengths of
flows of information, status, or influence between a network’s individuals. Although
there is an α component of eigenvector centrality, it is used to tradeoff the impor-
tance of exogenous (e.g., actor attributes) and endogenous (i.e., network topology)
factors as contributing to status. Ultimately, the value and permissible range of this
particular parameter is also predicated solely upon network structure.
Valente and Foreman [1998] developed a dual-purpose measure based upon a
reverse geodesic distance approach. Given that the measures of interest are integra-
tion (“can be reached by many others rapidly”) and radiality (“the degree to which
an individual’s relations reach out into the network”), the measure is dual-purpose in
that the input is either the adjacency matrix or its transpose, respectively [Valente






n − 1 , (4.1)
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where n is the total number of actors within the network, RDjk is the reverse geodesic
distance, computed by subtracting the geodesic distance between j to k from (1+D)
[Valente and Foreman, 1998, pg. 92].
To calculate radiality, the measure is applied to the transpose of the adjacency
(or nomination) matrix [Valente and Foreman, 1998, pg. 93]. Note that there is
no attenuation factor associated with longer geodesic paths. In addition, RDjk only
counts single instances, if they exist, of a geodesic path between any two given actors.
Consequently, radiality may not truly capture “the degree to which an individual’s
relations reach out into the network” if multiple shortest paths implies more potential
for the exertion of influence or power.
Lastly, a reach-based measure of centrality that “counts the number of nodes
each node can reach in k or less steps” is offered by Borgatti et al. [2002]. This too
can be applied to directed and undirected networks, as well as give indications of
status or power. However, this particular measure does not accommodate multiple
shortest paths and, from the documentation available, the method of attenuation, if
any, is neither immediately apparent nor theoretically justified.
Although the measure developed by Katz is easy to implement, Katz’s mea-
sure captures network behavior that goes beyond the circuitous paths posited by
Stephenson and Zelen. Therefore, a new measure is sought that assesses the po-
tential influence an individual can propagate throughout the network via efficient
information channels (i.e., shortest paths), which also accounts for the number of
options available for information flow via multiple shortest paths. From these previ-
ous efforts, an opportunity clearly exists to (1) enhance the concept of radiality and
integration posited by Valente and Foreman [1998] and (2) separate the concept of
‘attenuation’ from the conditions required for system solution.
137
4.3 Assumptions and Development
What differentiates RBAP from existing measures of power is (1) the use of
multiple instances of shortest paths; (2) the process of accounting for the options
available, if any, to the actors regarding alternative shortest paths; and, (3) uncou-
pling the concept of ‘attenuation’ from conditions necessary for a system solution.
Recall that the shortest path between any two individuals of a connected net-
work ranges between 1 and (n − 1). Deo’s theorem is extended via Corollary IV.1
to enumerate the number of all pair-wise shortest paths, by raising the adjacency
matrix to powers ranging from 2 to (n − 1). Note that this approach requires a
dichotomous representation of the network; therefore, this measure assumes that all
links are of length 1.
Corollary IV.1. Given an adjacency matrix X, by raising it to the power p, p =
(1, . . . , n − 1), the first non-zero element xpij , i 	= j of Xp yields the number of shortest
paths of length p from i to j.
Proof. ∀ xpij ∈ Xp, i 	= j, xpij > 0, and xkij = 0, k = 1, . . . , (p − 1) ⇒ no directed edge
sequences of length 1, . . . , (p − 1) exist. Therefore, the shortest path between i and
j must be of length p and further implying that the value xpij must fall in the first
category stated by Deo, which is the number of directed (shortest) paths from i to
j.
Use of Corollary IV.1 facilitates the enumeration of shortest paths and their
lengths between all actors. From this, the following definitions serve as the basis for
RBAP.
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α  an attenuation factor, with a similar, penalizing purpose to
that used in [Katz, 1953]; however, for RBAP there is no re-
striction other than α ∈ [0, 1]
RXi  (n × n) matrix that stores the number of shortest paths of
length i from any two given actors where the criteria of Corol-
lary IV.1 are satisfied
r(k)i  number of other actors reached by actor k via a shortest path
of length i
ri  (n×n) diagonal matrix where ∀ r (m)i > 0, ri(m, m) = r (m)−1i
for m = 1, . . . , n; zero otherwise
One other underlying assumption of this measure is that the highest level of
power is obtained when an actor is adjacent to all other actors within one step.
Consequently, the numbers provided in the matrices (RXi) must be normalized to
avoid actors with numerous but indirect paths to all other actors scoring higher
than actors that can reach all other (n − 1) actors within one step. This process is
accomplished with the variable, r(k)i.
For example, consider the network in Figure 4.2. Actor i, reaches three other
actors via a shortest path of length 1. Therefore, to reach any other actor, j, the
maximum number of shortest paths of length 2 is bounded above by r(i)1 = 3. If
the three dashed paths existed in the network, the value of RX2(i, j) would be 3.
This value and all other values in the ith row of RX2 are normalized by dividing by
r(i)1 = 3.
Suppose further that from node i, two new nodes were reached via a shortest
path of length 2 (nodes d and e in Figure 4.3). Therefore, to reach any node j via
a shortest path of length 3, there are at most 3 × 2 = 6 possibilities, given by the
paths (i− a − d − j), (i− a − e − j), (i− b − d − j), (i− b − e − j), (i− c− d− j),
and (i− c−e− j). Consequently, this requires that the value RX2(i, j), as well as all

















Figure 4.3: Paths to j given r(i)1 = 3 and r(i)2 = 2
calculation, the matrix satisfying the conditions of Corollary IV.1 is pre-multiplied
by the matrix ri.
An attenuation factor, α ∈ [0, 1], not unlike those seen in related works, rep-
resents the diminishing effectiveness of communication or influence as a function of
path length. However, unlike the works of Katz [1953] or Bonacich and Lloyd [2001],
calculating the RBAP measure is not predicated upon finding a specific value for α.
While this does not resolve the ambiguity issue regarding the effects of longer path
lengths upon power or status, it does offer some analytical freedom, as α can take
on any value within its range without negating the measure’s results. Additionally,
the attenuation is assumed not to begin until p ≥ 2. Therefore, RBAP simply re-
duces to degree centrality (simple, in-, or out-degree depending upon the data and
application) when α = 0 and is bounded above by the total number of other nodes
that can be reached from any given node when α = 1. Hence, both ends of the
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range offer both conceptually and mathematically meaningful interpretations. The
range from 0 to 1 can also be interpreted as an actor’s position relative to all others
from a local to global perspective, respectively. Additionally, α may be varied in
order to perform sensitivity analyses, potentially gaining insight into the positions
and possible roles various actors serve within their organization. With 1 being an
(n × 1) vector of ones, the (n × 1) RBAP result is
RBAP = [RX + αr1RX2 + α





A proxy measure for α could include the clustering coefficient of the network,
denoted γ (G), which is the average of the clustering coefficients for each of the
actors within a network. The clustering coefficient for a given actor i is denoted
γi (i). Given the number of neighbors of i (bi), the individual-specific clustering
coefficient is the “ratio of actually existing connections between the bi neighbors and
the maximal number of such connections possible (b2i − bi)” [Sporns, 2002, pg. 178]
[cf. Watts, 1999, pg. 32-3]. Consequently, higher clustering coefficients may imply
more cohesive and interactive groups and therefore lower communication or influence
losses (i.e., higher values of α).
Although not a necessary condition to perform the calculations, application of
this procedure assumes that the network of interest is connected. Considering that
this measure is reach-based, the centrality calculated for isolates is 0, as expected.
However, if the graph is comprised of more than one component, all output will be
relative to the specific components and not to the network in total. Subsequently,
caution must be taken to avoid misinterpretation of the output by unknowingly
comparing results among two or more components rather than across all actors,
particularly if the values are normalized. If the graph is comprised of several compo-
nents, analysis should be accomplished on the component(s) of interest, rather than
applying this measure to a number of disconnected components at once.
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Table 4.1: Katz and RBAP Comparison (α = 0.5)
High Rank (value) Low
Katz A (0.47) F (0.45) D (0.41) E (0.22) B and C tie (0.04)
RBAP F (4.25) D (3.50) A (3.25) E (2.37) B and C tie (1.00)
Katz (mod) F (0.25) A (0.24) D (0.22) E (0.11) B and C tie (0.04)
Finally, since the RBAP value for any given actor is bounded above by (n−1)
regardless of α, this measure may be normalized for a given network using
RBAP′ =
RBAP
n − 1 . (4.3)
Without normalization, the interpretation of RBAP is the number of other
actors that can be effectively communicated with, persuaded, influenced, and so
forth, ranging in value between an actor’s immediate contacts, to the entire network
of individuals. With normalization, the interpretation is similar, but is in the context
of percent of the other (n−1) actors. Some examples to explore the resulting nature
and meaning of this measure are now discussed.
4.4 Discussion
As an initial investigation, RBAP was applied to the transpose of the choice
matrix specified by Katz [1953]. This permits a comparison between Katz’s status
results and the status (as opposed to power) use of RBAP. With α = 0.5, the Katz
and RBAP status rankings are shown in the first two rows of Table 4.4.
Observing that there are similarities, and differences, between the two ap-
proaches, a more equitable comparison was sought between the two methods. Recall
that in Equation 2.1, Katz allowed infinite path lengths. Considering that, in the
context of influence or communication among clandestine networks, this may be an
unrealistic assumption, suppose a limit identical to that imposed for RBAP (n − 1)









































B, C, D, and E
A a, b, c, and d
e











The results, denoted ‘Katz (mod)’ in Table 4.4, show improved comparisons
between the two approaches. Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation between
Katz and RBAP and between Katz (mod) and RBAP are 0.83 and 0.94, respectively;
both are statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level of confidence [cf. Lind et al.,
2002, pg. 605]. The differences are essentially due to Katz’s inclusion of directed
edge sequences other than shortest paths. However, given the underlying differences
between the measures, perfect correlation between RBAP and any other existing,
path-based measure is not one of the research objectives.
Applying the sensitivity analysis procedure for RBAP to all three hypothetical
networks discussed by Bonacich and Lloyd [2001] (from Figure 2.9) the results are
shown in Figure 4.4 and are as expected. For example, from the perspective of
radiality, actors 1 and 2 in Network 1 are more effective than all others in reaching out
to the remaining actors. Whereas, actor 5 has no outward connections and therefore
has no capacity to influence others. Note that the original purpose for RBAP was to
determine the potentially most influential individuals; the results should therefore
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1 N32
Figure 4.5: Line graph of size N
be considered from the perspective of power. However, to apply this measure with
similar objectives as Bonacich and Lloyd [2001] and Valente and Foreman [1998],
performing the RBAP measure on the transpose of the adjacency matrix for the
same network yields insight from a perspective opposite to power, status. The results
generally agree with that of Bonacich and Lloyd [2001], where “unchosen individuals
are ignored and have no effect on the status of others” [Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001].
A logical concern for the RBAP is that of computational efficiency. From
Equation 4.2, the time required for calculation is dominated by the term, RXi , which
is worst-case O(N3). Since the measure calculations are complete when all actors
have been reached, the worst-case times required for evaluating a given network are
dependent upon the network’s diameter. To quantify this characteristic, RBAP was
applied to a number of line graphs (as shown in Figure 4.5), ranging in size from
N = 10 . . . 1330, so that the measure must continue to the largest diameter possible,
(N − 1). The performance (in seconds) is compared to N in Figure 4.6.1 The solid
line in Figure 4.6 represents the polynomial (of degree three) equation fit to the data;
this can be used as a rough estimate of the worst-case time required to compute the
RBAP measure given a network of size N . Noting that the polynomial is increasing
substantially with N , and that the size of clandestine networks, particularly terrorist
networks, can be much larger than 1330 individuals, worst-case run times may be
prohibitive. This limitation is also unfortunately shared by other social network
analysis approaches, which use O(N3) algorithms to determine related measures,
such as all-pairs shortest paths and reachability [e.g., Cyram, 2004].
1Machine used: Pentium 4, 3.4 GHz, 1GB RAM, running Windows XP Pro.
144




















4.52x10−7 N3 + 4.08x10−4 N2 − 0.25 N + 24.03
Figure 4.6: Network Size (N) versus RBAP runtime
However, the line graph represents an extreme, and unlikely, topology of a
social network, even if the members are engaged in clandestine activity. As an ex-
ample, the trusted prior contacts of the 9-11 hijacker network analyzed by Krebs had
19 (known) individuals; the diameter of this network, based upon the relationships
ascertained from open source data, was 9 [Krebs, 2002, pg. 46]. The relationship
between population size and network diameter has been of interest since Milgram
traced correspondence paths, wherein the famous six degrees of separation between
ostensibly distant and unconnected actors was observed [Milgram, 1967]. Such a six-
degree graph would yield a variation of the polynomial in Figure 4.6, and would result
in dramatically reduced computational requirements as illustrated in Figure 4.7. Re-
lated works have popularized this small-world property [Barabási, 2002; Buchanan,
2002; Watts, 1999].
Numerous connections between real-world, emergent networks and small-world
network behavior have been made. Examples include cellular metabolism, Holly-
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wood movie-stars, Internet connections and world-wide-web page links, protein reg-
ulatory networks within cells, research collaborations, social networks, and sexual
relationships [Buchanan, 2002; Barabási and Bonabeau, 2003, pg. 54]. As a result
of the small-world property, “their diameter is O(log N) instead of O(N)” [Eppstein
and Wang, 2004, pg. 40]. Similar findings have been made in analyzing networks
evolving via preferential-attachment mechanisms described by Barabási and Albert
[1999] [Liben-Nowell, 2005, pg. 16-8]. In addition, more recent research by Leskovec
et al. [2005] has shown diameter to actually decrease with increased network size.
These observations translate directly to corresponding savings in RBAP computa-
tional performance. Figure 4.7 summarizes the run time required to perform the
RBAP measure for networks ranging from 100 to 1400 nodes with varying diameters
as opposed to the worst-case diameter of (N − 1). As expected, if D  N then
the computation time required is reduced significantly. For example, the 1300-actor
network with D = 1299 required 1344.9 seconds to complete. A comparable 1300-
actor network with D = 30 required 38.8 seconds. Therefore, in lieu of real-world,
large, terrorist network data sets, initial experimental results indicate that this is a
promising approach with regards to computational efficiency.
The equivalence between social networks and network data gathered to charac-
terize actors and relationships enmeshed within clandestine activity remains an open
question. The object of study is still comprised of people with links indicating some
form of interaction. Fortunately, previous authors have addressed some of the issues
that often plague the application of social network analysis techniques to clandestine
networks. For example, several efforts have studied the implications of network sam-
pling upon classic centrality measures using social network data Costenbader and
Valente [2003] and random networks Borgatti et al. [2006]; the former concluding
that the stability of measures is dependent upon network topology, and the latter
indicating stability, using random graphs, is somewhat predictable, particularly for
denser networks. In addition, there is increasing interest in applying social network
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Figure 4.7: Impact of Diameter upon RBAP runtime
analysis techniques to terrorist organizations [cf. Krebs, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2002;
Carley et al., 2002; Fellman and Wright, 2003; Thomason et al., 2004, to name a few]
Consequently, for this research, it is assumed that clandestine networks are indeed
social in nature and will ultimately exhibit the small-world property such that the
diameter (D) will be much less than the number of actors within it (N). Since the
practical computational bounds of RBAP are dependent on D, this property alone
will contribute to improved performance, given reasonably-sized networks.
Given that the underlying motivation for this measure is to provide a means to
identify potential actors within an adversarial network that exhibit greater amounts
of power or influence among the others (i.e., leaders, potential leaders, coordinators,
liaisons, etc.), an analysis of the hijacker network presented by Krebs [2002] is of
interest. Analysts must always consider that the adversarial network is constantly
trying to either avoid detection or steer our resources in their favor [cf. Sparrow,
1991; Xu and Hsinchun, 2004; Baumes et al., 2004].
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Figure 4.8: RBAP and Katz Network
4.5 Examples
Applying the RBAP measure over the range of α to the Katz network shown in
Figure 2.8. The results in Figure 4.8 show similar behavior to Katz’s measure in that
the most influential individual is dependent upon the level of attenuation selected.
However, for RBAP, all values of α provide valid results, given that the attenuation
level is justified by careful analysis of the network as a whole. Note that at α = 0,
the RBAP measure reverts to simple out-degree centrality. At α = 1, the RBAP
scores are bounded above by the number of reachable actors. The most influential,
actors B and C are able to reach all other actors but have limited options in doing
so. Such topological consequences are captured by ri and therefore results in scores
less than (N − 1 = 5) for these actors.
Turning now to the 9-11 hijacker network studied by Krebs [2002], the network
of trusted prior contacts was extracted from open source information and is shown
in Figure 4.9. To facilitate analysis an identifying number, shown in parenthesis by
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Figure 4.9: Trusted Prior Contacts [Krebs, 2002, pg. 46]
therefore applying RBAP to this data is in the context of centrality rather than
status or power.
An initial look at the rank orderings based upon RBAP scores and varying
levels of α are provided in Figure 4.10; higher RBAP scores result in higher rankings
which for this network range from low (1) to high (19). As observed with the Katz
data, determining the most central individuals according to the RBAP measure is
predicated upon the amount of attenuation assumed. Mohammed Atta (actor 5),
the purported ring leader, is initially tied with seven other individuals, all having a
degree of 3, for rank 9. However, as α is increased to 1, meaning less attenuation

















































Figure 4.10: RBAP and Hijacker Network
may reveal individuals that are strategically connected from a local perspective, but
effectively cut off from the remainder of the network from a global perspective. Such
an individual could serve as a cell or team coordinator practicing good operational
security techniques, or may be a specialist kept at a distance to the main group. If
they correspond to a critical skill or capability, they may be the trigger mechanism
for an impending operation.
Other interesting results from Figure 4.10 are those actors who remain low
(or high) regardless of the level of α as well as those who start low at α = 0 and
move up with increasing α. Consider actors 1 Suqami and 2 Wail Alshehri whose
RBAP measures tend to stay relatively low over the range of α. These terrorists are
not only in the periphery of the network, but they are both connected via actor 3,
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Waleed Alshehri, who is also somewhat isolated from the network and whose RBAP
measure exhibits similar behavior to that of Atta (decreasing with α).
In contrast, two other apparently isolated actors, A. Alghamdi (12) and S.
Alhazmi (16), are connected directly to two of the most central actors (11 and 15)
from a betweenness, information centrality, eigenvector, and Katz perspective [veri-
fied by Cyram, 2004]. Consequently, despite the low degree of actors (12) and (16),
they are connected directly to the core of the network which significantly improves
their corresponding RBAP scores as the impact of attenuation is diminished. Note
also that the most central actors, H. Alghamdi (11) and N. Alhazmi (15) not only
begin with a high rank (due to their high degree) but maintain their relatively high
ranking throughout the range of α.
4.6 RBAP and Layered Networks
When considering layered networks, let Xr denote the sociomatrix for the
relationships r ∈ R of interest to the decision maker or analyst. By this very
construction, each Xr is considered to be a separate network, disconnected from the
others due to the different context in which those individuals interact; additionally,
some layers may be comprised of multiple components. Recall that RBAP should
be applied only to connected networks to facilitate interpretation of the results.
Nonetheless, two different approaches to the use of RBAP on layered networks are
conceived.
The first, is to apply RBAP to each, presumably connected (i.e, a single com-
ponent) layer independently. Actors demonstrating high centrality, power, or status
in each layer could be candidates for further scrutiny. Actors demonstrating these
characteristics in more than one layer would therefore be of even more interest. Di-
rect comparison of RBAP results between two or more layers, specifically the values,
should only be accomplished if each of those layers is connected and has the same
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number of actors, N . This is due the the connectedness requirement as well as the
limiting path length of (N − 1).
The second approach involves an aggregation of network layers prior to imple-
menting the RBAP measure. Since the input required is merely a dichotomous rep-
resentation of the network, information characterizing the contexts and potentially
different contributions to the strength of interpersonal relationships is regrettably
lost, a criticism of all other social network analysis measures using similar inputs
within the literature. Nonetheless, the underlying motivation of serving as an initial
screening methodology, it is assumed that this is a reasonable tradeoff in some situa-
tions. Methods such as the derivation of multiplex-indices may be used to aggregate
layered networks into a single, dichotomous representation of the network, captur-
ing the overall effects of multiple relationship contexts [Wasserman and Faust, 1994,
pg. 219]. As an example, a simple boolean summation, denoted x⊕, of all relation-
ships, r ∈ R, for each possible relationship, x(i, j) ∈ X is mathematically shown in
Equation 4.5.






r x (i, j)r  1∑
r x (i, j)r = 0
(4.5)
Borrowing from Wasserman and Faust [1994], a conditional boolean summation
would require a threshold for a relationship to exist between two individuals i and j
in m or more contexts; this approach is mathematically defined by Equation






r x (i, j)r  m∑
r x (i, j)r = 0
(4.6)
This second technique essentially acts as a filter, including only those interpersonal
ties that may be significantly stronger than others due to their inherent multiplexity.
Suppose that if certain patterns of interaction, represented by a subset or
combination of subsets of relationships, were sufficient (or required) to indicate an
interpersonal tie that should be included in further analysis. These patterns could
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also be used to filter the necessary relationships for input into RBAP. For example,
assume that a relationship pattern of interest, {℘}, is defined as a subset of the
individuals relations, r ∈ R, such that {℘} ⊆ {R}. This subset {℘} could be
comprised of one or more of the relations, r. In addition, there may be one or more
patterns of interest, p = 1, . . . , P . Therefore, a third method to aggregate multiple
contexts into a single sociomatrix for input into RBAP is defined:
x (i, j)⊕ =
⎧⎨
⎩ 1 if x (i, j)r = 1 ∀ r ∈ ℘p, ∀ p ∈ P0 otherwise. (4.7)
RBAP may be compared to the results of other measures through the use
of nonparametric statistics such as Spearman’s coefficient of rank correlation [Lind
et al., 2002, pg. 605]. With n denoting the number of paired observations and d
denoting the difference between the ranks for each pair, the coefficient is defined as
rs = 1 − 6
∑
d2
n (n2 − 1) . (4.8)
To test the statistical significance of rs, assuming the network size is comprised






and then compared to the Student-t value with a desired level of significance and
(n − 2) degrees of freedom [Lind et al., 2002, pg. 607].
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test seeks to find statistically significant changes
in the rank orderings of a given set of individuals. This nonparametric method is
“based on the differences in dependent samples, where the normality assumption
is not required” [Lind et al., 2002, pg, 591]. Since the null hypothesis is defined
as no difference in the rankings, a rejection of this hypothesis could be used in at
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least two different ways. The first would facilitate arguments about the specified
level of α desired as input for the RBAP measure. If uncertainty or argument
regarding a specific value for α is prevalent, then this statistical technique may
assist in ascertaining whether the subsequent changes in individual rankings due to
a minor change in α is significant. If the hypothesis is rejected, then argument and
further analysis of α is warranted due to its impact upon the statistically significant
differences in actor rankings. If the method fails to reject the hypothesis, there is
insufficient evidence to conclude that there is a statistically significant difference
between the two rank orderings. However, decision makers must assess the tradeoffs
between further data collection or continuing with an agreed-upon level of α in the
interim.
The second potential application of this method would facilitate change de-
tection. Suppose that the α level was agreed upon and constant data collection
regarding the relations among a set of actors was being collected. Increased or de-
creased activity, and the concomitant links created or removed among the members,
could result in changing positions (RBAP values) among the set of actors of inter-
est. Changes in roles, responsibilities, communication activity and patterns, and so
forth, may then be captured by these varying RBAP values. Statistical comparisons
between previous and new rankings based upon the RBAP values offer a means to
detect a statistically significant change in actor centrality, ceteris paribus. Detection
of this event would then facilitate when further analysis and/or intelligence resources
are required.
4.7 Summary
The measure presented in this chapter shares some aspects of other walk and
path-based approaches to gaining insight into an actor’s potential for influence or
power based upon their position within a given network. However, RBAP provides
more analytic freedom regarding the common assumption of attenuation as a function
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of distance between individuals. In addition, the small-world property often inherent
to social networks provides a degree of computational efficiency to the measure.
Consequently, assuming that the network of interest is reasonably sized (e.g., 3000
actors or fewer) this measure should be responsive to changing information.
The intended purpose for RBAP is to facilitate the investigation of adversarial
non-cooperative networks, particularly if the network consists of large number of
actors. Actors of interest may be identified by consistently high or low RBAP scores
as well as those that improve or decrease significantly with a corresponding change in
α. Those individuals that are identified through this process can then be subject to
increased intelligence scrutiny, either to improve the accuracy of the network data,
or to set the stage to affect the organization for political purposes.
Such political endeavors often involve persuading an organization to change
position on a given issue, to modify the inherent approach used to achieve their goals,
or to even disband entirely. Given that an adequate amount of information regarding
the individuals and their associated relationships has been obtained, courses of action
to achieve these political endeavors could include persuading the entire organization
from within. For example, assuming the clandestine network is adversarial, one
must first determine those individuals that are accessible. Among this set, those
with higher RBAP scores, and who are consequently more effective at reaching or
influencing others, would make attractive participants of collusion.
Although α has been specified as a scalar to this point, a possible extension
of this measure could incorporate a matrix of individual-specific attenuation fac-
tors. Therefore each individual i would be assigned an attenuation factor, αi. The
scalar α in Equation 4.2 would simply be replaced by the diagonal matrix A, where
A(i, i) = αi, zero otherwise. A possible means to estimate these values could be
derived via a decision analytic model using the five bases for power—attraction,
expert, reward, coercive, and legitimate—specified by [French, 1956, pg. 183-5] or
individual characteristics such as charisma, appearance, and so forth. This data
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could then be used to gain insight into the effort required to discredit (or support) a
specific individual, thereby diminishing (or increasing) their relative power or influ-
ence within the network. Holding all other individuals’ attenuation factors constant,
sensitivity analysis of the attenuation factor of the individual of interest would yield
the concomitant change in power structure based upon the RBAP scores.
From a counter-terrorism perspective, the RBAP measure offers another means
to gain insight into adversarial, clandestine networks such as Al Qaeda, Ansar al Is-
lam, and the many others that threaten peace. Due to the secretive nature inherent
to these organizations, methods that provide useful information despite limited or
uncertain data are of interest. From a social networks perspective, this measure is
not intended to be a direct competitor to the numerous, classical measures in exis-
tence, but a complement to enhance the structural study of network data. It should
be noted that the RBAP measure may also be applied to physical networks–layers of
interrelated infrastructure networks, for example. Identifying well-connected, crit-
ical nodes in such networks is a key operational consideration in today’s security
environment.
The MATLAB code developed to perform the RBAP measure, which accom-
modates either the scalar α or the matrix A, and a sensitivity analysis procedure
for α is provided in Appendices A and B, respectively.
Suppose now that sufficient information has been obtained on the network
of interest, accurately identifying the individuals of interest and the interpersonal
relationships among them. A next step could include the evaluation of targeting
options. Although targeting in the military traditionally refers to a process that
ultimately results in the physical disruption, or more often destruction, the focus
instead is upon the application of influence operations upon individuals within a
target network. Such operations seek to affect an adversary’s decisions through
various means of influence. An analysis methodology to ascertain which subset of
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Consider the objective of indirectly influencing an entire network of individuals
by directly influencing a subset of its actors. One possible means of achieving this
objective is the application of the second of the two key player problems. Recall from
Section 2.2.2, the key player problem (KPP) involves finding certain key individuals
within a given social network. How key these players are is dependent upon one of two
objectives. The first objective, denoted KPP-1, determines which set of individuals
that, once removed, would cause the most damage to network. In this context,
Borgatti [2006] defines damage as either increasing the number of components within
the graph or, if that is not possible, significantly increasing the distance between
all pairs of nodes. The second objective, denoted KPP-2, determines which set of
individuals that, if successfully convinced to do so, can reach out and influence the
majority or, if possible, the entirety, of the other members within the network.
Clearly, both of these problems have military applications. However, the focus
of this research is KPP-2 and its use in efficiently propagating influence via direct
or indirect contact among individuals within a target network, hence the key player
influence problem. From Definition 8, KPP-2 seeks a kp-set of order K that is
maximally connected to all other nodes [Borgatti, 2006].
As an example, KPP-2 could be used to select individuals that serve as the
optimal targets of influence operations [cf. Borgatti, 2003a, 2006]. In this context,
optimality is based upon minimizing both the cardinality of the set as well as the
distance the influence emanating from an individual must traverse to reach the as-
signed contact. An example of propagated influence could include the execution of
a psychological operation (PSYOP) or a more specific application of PSYOP, an
influence operation or campaign. PSYOP is formally defined as
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“. . . planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to
foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reason-
ing, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals” [DOD, 2003, pg. ix].
KPP-2 offers a means to select such a set of individuals in an efficient manner,
essentially supporting the target development and target value analysis processes.
The target development process, from the perspective of Joint Doctrine, “exam-
ines potential adversary military, political, or economic target systems to identify
subcomponents or elements and interrelationships” [DOD, 2002, pg. C-6]. Target
value analysis “establishes criticality of a target or target system in order to select
candidate aimpoints that should be attacked to achieve desired effects and accom-
plishes the defined objectives” [DOD, 2002, pg. C-6]. After a brief description of
the underlying motivations behind the KPP measures and the current solution ap-
proaches proposed by Borgatti [2006], several mathematical programming extensions
and examples are offered and discussed in detail.
5.2 Background
Borgatti [2006] and Everett and Borgatti [1999] note that the preponderance
of social network measures focus on the characterization of individual actors and
their role or position within the network. Consequently, when the role or position
of a group of actors is sought, the traditionally actor-specific measures fail to pro-
vide analysts with the proper insights for group-specific results. In particular, the
traditional social network analysis measures cannot account for the effects of redun-
dant and structurally equivalent actors in a group, a subset of the social network.
Therefore, the key player problem construct was devised.
Both maximal disruption and maximal connection are topics of military inter-
est. For example, application of KPP-1 could result in the disruption of terrorists’
social networks, thereby (potentially) impeding their ability to coordinate, plan, and
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execute future operations. It should be noted, however, that the fracturing of some
networks into components may actually reduce decision and reaction times if the
group members are no longer required or do not feel compelled to coordinate with
central authority. It is important to understand the groups’ operating doctrine prior
to pursuing any destructive efforts. Nonetheless, what is of primary interest in this
research is KPP-2, the application of which could include identifying a group of
actors, a subset of a larger target network, to serve as a conduit to the remaining
members.
Such an approach would seek to influence, via the spread of a message or
information operations product or campaign, the entirety of network membership in
an efficient manner. Of course, KPP-2 could also be viewed in an abstract fashion
with regard to the type of network under study by seeking to efficiently influence
networks beyond those strictly limited to interpersonal interaction. For example,
demographic strata within a population, cities within a country, countries within
a region, or components within physical infrastructure, could all be represented by
nodes within a network within which information or influence flows.
Similar approaches have been studied in the area of viral marketing, essentially
an electronic or Internet-based version of “word of mouth” advertising techniques.
The underlying premise of this approach is that
“. . . by initially targeting a few influential members of the network–say,
giving them free samples of the product–we can trigger a cascade of
influence by which friends will recommend the product to other friends,
and many individuals will ultimately try [the product]” [Kempe et al.,
2003, pg. 137].
Determining which individuals serve as ideal initial targets in the context of mar-
keting has been studied by Domingos and Richardson [2001], among others. For
example, comparing the marketing costs incurred to reach a given individual to “the
expected profit from the sales to other customers she may influence to buy, the cus-
tomers those may influence, and so on recursively” would facilitate the cost-effective
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selection of key individuals [Domingos and Richardson, 2001, pg. 57]. Extending
similar problem aspects within the setting of an influence campaign, such as cost
to access, surveil, or turn a specific individual to do another’s bidding, offers an
opportunity to further develop the key player problem paradigm.
Although these efforts share common themes, note that the specific definition
of efficiency may vary between applications and decision makers. Borgatti’s ap-
proach and concomitant assumptions, discussed next, serve as the initial basis for
comparison against the proposed mathematical programming formulations.
5.3 Heuristic Approach and Objective Function
The current options available within the published KPP software attempt to
satisfy KPP-2 from three approaches. The first two are derived from different ap-
proaches to the number of nodes reached criterion. The third option seeks to min-
imize the measure Borgatti refers to as reciprocal distance reach. For the number
of nodes reached criterion, the user specifies the maximum number of degrees of
separation allowed between a key player and its assigned member as well as either
a specific kp-set size or a maximum allowable size for the kp-set. The specific size
setting then seeks to reach as many of the other actors as possible, given the kp-set
and reach constraints. The maximum allowable size option selects members until
either the entire network is reached, given the conditions specified, or the maximum
allowable group size has been allocated. For the reciprocal distance reach approach,
the user specifies a kp-set size, and the software seeks to optimize the measure of









For each actor k in a given kp-set (K), the distance from all actors j to the
closest key player is denoted dKj. Distances between a key player and itself are
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assumed to be 1; the measure is normalized by dividing the summation by the total
number of actors in the network (n) [Borgatti, 2006]. Regarding the maximum dis-
tance between key players and other actors, Borgatti also recommends limiting this
distance to within two degrees of separation. This is not an unreasonable assumption
as it has been observed in a variety of communications literature that the farther
that information must travel, the more likely that the information content can be
misinterpreted, subject to errors or transmission failure, or a combination thereof
[cf. Katz, 1953; Stephenson and Zelen, 1989]. This restrictive assumption also limits
the possible solutions available; however, it may be relaxed up to a reach of (n − 1)
for all of the models presented in this chapter. For a more complete discussion on
the heuristic methodology, the reader is referred to Borgatti [2006].
Since Equation 5.1 normalized by N , Borgatti contends that DR ∈ [0, 1]. How-
ever, while the distance assumption of unity between key players and themselves
along with the assumption that dKj = ∞ for any actor unreachable by any key




= 0 for unreachable actors, the appropriate range is
actually DR ∈ [(K/N), 1]. Nonetheless, the overall objective is to maximize this
function.
For the number of nodes reached criterion, it is shown that equivalent integer
programs, specifically the minimum covering and fractional covering problems, can
be formulated and solved to optimality in reasonable amounts of time. For the re-
ciprocal distance reach criterion, variations of the p-median and the related facility
location problem can be applied to address various aspects of this problem, as well
as optimize the objective given in Equation 5.1. However, since it is assumed that
a decision maker seeks to influence a particular network, potential comparisons be-
tween different networks, and therefore the normalization of Equation 5.1 by N , is
no longer necessary. Additionally, DR meets the (applicable) assumptions of pro-
portionality and additivity required of linear programming [Hillier and Lieberman,
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1995, pg. 38-43]. Applying the information contained within the adjacency matrix
X towards a mathematical programming approach is discussed next.
5.4 Mathematical Formulations
Recall that, given a network of interest, the cells x(i, j) ∈ X are defined as
x(i, j) = 1 if there exists an arc or relationship between actors i and j, 0 otherwise,
constituting a simple adjacency matrix in operations research terms. Consequently,
each nonzero entry in X implies that i can reach j in one step. Similarly, the cells
of the square of the adjacency matrix, denoted X2, indicate the number of directed
edge sequences of length two from i to j. In this particular case, these sequences
are equivalent to paths. Therefore, for all i 	= j, x(i, j) > 0 ∈ X2 implies that there
exists a path from i through some intermediary node or actor, and then on to j [Deo,
1974].
The transpose of the matrices described above (denoted X′) does not change
the graph, but it does change the interpretation of the information contained within
X. Given the transpose, the columns (as opposed to the rows) of X′ correspond
to whom the individual can reach in one step (e.g., adjacent actors). Let R1 =
X′ + I denote the modified one-step reachability matrix. Note that the ith column
of R1 captures the nodes that are adjacent to actor i, including itself. Additionally,
taking the transpose is only necessary if the graph is asymmetric, which implies that
this approach can be readily extended to directed graphs–an improvement over the
current methods proposed by Borgatti [2003b].
This approach may also be applied when a reach of more than one step away
is allowed. For example, let R2 = δ[(X
′)2 + R1] denote the two-step or less reacha-
bility matrix, where in general δ(a) = 1 if a > 0, zero otherwise. Consequently, the
ith column of R2 captures the nodes that are at most two-steps away from actor i,






Figure 5.1: Notional Network and Coverings
the technique described in Wasserman and Faust [1994, pg. 160]. These matrices can
then be used to form the constraint matrices of the various mathematical programs
(MP) proposed in this study which address the two variants and extensions of KPP-
2 investigated by Borgatti [2006]: the number of nodes reached and the reciprocal
distance reach. The multitude of extensions via mathematical programming tech-
niques, several of which are presented here, enable a more comprehensive analysis
capability.
5.4.1 Number of Nodes Reached
Borgatti likens the number of nodes reached approach to the classical graph
theoretic vertex cover problem, which is “a subset of vertices that includes at least
one vertex incident on every edge of [the graph]” [Deo, 1974, pg. 193] However, KPP-
2 is actually more closely related to the edge covering problem, which is defined as
a set of edges to which every vertex in the graph is incident to at least one edge
[Deo, 1974, pg. 182]. Consequently, the edges induced from the kp-set and their
assignments to the remaining members generates the edge cover. To illustrate these
subtle differences, consider the graph in Figure 5.1.
A vertex cover for this graph is the set {b, c}; at least one of these two nodes
is incident to all edges within the graph. However, there are two optimal KPP-
2 solutions, from both the number of nodes reached and the reciprocal distance
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perspectives, comprised of either {b} or {c}. Node b, for example, can reach all
other actors within one step. Assuming that b is selected as the key player, note
that edges (a, c) and (c, d) are not incident to b, therefore the kp-set solution is
not a vertex cover. However, assume again that node b is selected as the kp-set
solution; the edges used to assign node b to the remaining individuals in the network
{(b, a), (b, c), (b, d)} form an edge cover, since all vertices are adjacent to at least one
of these edges.
Borgatti also relates dominating sets to KPP-2, but suggests that this method
fails due to . . .
“The focus of graph-theoretic research has been on finding the smallest
cover or dominating set that achieves the goal (reaching all nodes) per-
fectly. [The KPP-2] problem is the reverse: finding a set of fixed size
that achieves the goal as well as possible. In addition, we would prefer
to measure the extent to which a set reaches all nodes, so that we can
evaluate our success” [Borgatti, 2006].
Viewing the graph theoretic approach of dominating sets from a different per-
spective, however, may still yield valuable insight into KPP-2. First, recall that a
dominating set is “a set of vertices that dominates every vertex [in a graph] in the
following sense: Either [a vertex] is included in the dominating set or is adjacent to
one or more vertices included in the dominating set” [Deo, 1974, pg. 172]. Further,
a minimal dominating set is “a dominating set from which no vertex can be removed
without destroying its dominance property” [Deo, 1974, pg. 172]. Note that minimal
dominating sets can be of varying sizes, the smallest of which is generally referred to
the minimum dominating set whose cardinality represents the domination number
(or domatic number) of the graph [Deo, 1974, pg. 173]. An extension of the dominat-
ing set, and an accompanying distributed algorithm to solve it, is the k-dominating
set presented in Penso and Barbosa [2004]. Given an integer k ∈ [1, (N − 1)], all
nodes are either in the dominating set, or at most a distance of k steps away from the
nearest node within the dominating set [Penso and Barbosa, 2004, pg. 243]. Con-
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sequently, the k-dominating set is another means of describing the KPP-2 problem,
where a reach distance of more than one step is allowed.
Given that the KPP-2 problem seeks to maximally connect a kp-set to the
remaining network with as few key players as possible, the minimum dominating and
the minimum k-dominating sets are appropriate methodologies to analyze KPP-2.
Next, relations between the dominating set and the minimum set covering problem
(MCP) formulations are reviewed. Additionally, Borgatti’s concerns regarding a
‘perfect’ or ‘complete’ cover can be addressed by modifying the MCP to represent a
fractional covering problem (FCP), respectively.
The minimum covering problem seeks to select a minimum number of objects
that can cover a set of interest. Examples include the minimum number of personnel
required to meet shift requirements or the determination of facility locations in order
to meet certain demands (e.g., fire stations and minimum response times for various
sections of a city) [Nemhauser and Wolsey, 1999, pg. 6-7]. In this case, the decision
is to designate a portion of individuals within the network, the kp-set, to ‘cover’
themselves and as many of the other network members by having the ability to
communicate with them either directly or through at most one intermediary. The
general formulation for the minimum cover is
(MCP) Min {z = cx : Ax ≥ 1, xi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i} . (5.2)
When the constraint matrix A in Equation 5.2 is simply replaced with R1, the
MCP solution provides the minimum dominating set for the graph [Christofides,
1975]. Note that this approach also lends itself to k-dominating sets via the use of
Rm where m > 1, as well as directed graphs due to the incorporation of X
′ within
Rm.
For a majority of the formulations presented in this chapter, the main decision
variable is xim , which equals 1 if actor i is chosen as a key player and must reach its
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assigned members within m steps and 0 otherwise. For notational convenience, let
the vector xm represent xim for all i = 1 . . . N . Taking the number of nodes reached
approach, determining the kp-set that is no more than one step away from all other
actors is accomplished by the mathematical program in Equations 5.3 and 5.4. This
approach is denoted (NR1), the kp-set that satisfies the number reached approach,
for all actors, within one step. Note that the cost associated with selecting any given
actor is assumed to be 1, so that this approach seeks to minimize the cardinality of
the kp-set. Consequently, this approach also finds the minimum dominating set.
Since all of the formulations presented are essentially variants of the covering
problem, the cost coefficients are not required to be 1. As an example, the (DNR1)
formulation, shown later, distributes the workload among key players as evenly as
possible by taking into account a member’s adjacent nodes (see Equation 5.18).
Therefore, when trying to choose members as key players, all formulations presented
in this chapter are amenable to extensions that incorporate various costs that may
be associated with designating a key player or not being able to cover a particular
individual.
For the network shown in Figure 5.2, there are multiple optimal solutions to
the (NR1) problem, namely, {a, c, e}, {a, c, f}, {a, d, e}, {a, d, f}, {b, c, e}, {b, c, f},
{b, d, e}, and {b, d, f}. Although a majority of mathematical programming software
suites typically only output a single solution (among multiple optima), there are
straightforward techniques to identify the existence of and to enumerate multiple
optima. Additionally, a method for enumerating all minimal dominating sets using
Boolean arithmetic can be found in [Deo, 1974, pg. 173]. Since a key player is
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Subject To R1x1 ≥ 1 (5.4)
xi1 ∈ B ∀ i
If the requirement that the key players must be adjacent to the remainder of the
network can be relaxed, then a covering problem representation of the minimum k-
dominating set can be applied. Letting the vector x2 represent xi2 for all i = 1 . . .N
and incorporating the matrix R2 described earlier, this approach permits indirect
influence to occur between key players and other network members as long as all
members are two steps or less from a key player. This mathematical program,
denoted (NR2), also exhibits the same goal of minimizing the cardinality of the kp-
set and is shown in Equations 5.5 and 5.6. Applying this approach again to the
network shown in Figure 5.2, the (only) optimal kp-set is comprised of actor {d}.
The objective functions of (NR1) and (NR2) specify which actors should comprise
the kp-set and the extent of reach that is required of them in order to maximally
connect to the entire network. Applying techniques used to evaluate reachability in
dichotomous social networks, any distance m ∈ [1, (N−1)] could be used [Wasserman
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Subject To [R1 |R2 ] [x1 |x2 ] ≥ 1 (5.6)
xim ∈ B ∀ i, m
As suggested previously, a fractional covering problem approach may be used to
account for situations when the entire network cannot be reached within m steps or
less if the size of the kp-set is limited (e.g., constrained resources limit the number
of individuals that may be coopted). Borrowing from the work of Gandhi et al.
[2004], let yi = 1 if node i is covered, 0 otherwise. The resulting fractional covering
problem approach to (NR1), denoted (FNR1), Equations 5.7 through 5.9, where U
is the maximum number of actors that may be missed or not covered by at least one





Subject To R1x1 + y ≥ 1 (5.8)
N∑
i=1
yi ≤ U (5.9)
xi1 , yi ∈ B ∀ i
The primary difference between (NR1) and (FNR1) is the option to not cover
a given number of nodes U in the event that the size of the kp-set does not permit
full access to all actors within the network. Of course, this approach can be applied
to the number of nodes reached problem where more than one degree of separation
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Subject To [R1 |R2 ] [x1 |x2 ] + y ≥ 1 (5.11)
N∑
i=1
yi ≤ U (5.12)
xim , yi ∈ B ∀ i, m.
The objective functions of (FNR1) and (FNR2) specify the smallest set of
actors that should comprise the kp-set and the extent of reach that is required of
them in order to maximally connect a portion of the network. In this fractional
case, the kp-set can miss no more than U
N
% of the membership. Note that when
U = 0, both (FNR1) and (FNR2) reduce to (NR1) and (NR2), respectively. Further
insights may be gained from the optimization results, such as the search for multiple
optima, discussed earlier. Costs associated with designating an individual as a key
player, as well as those incurred due to missing an actor may also be included into
either (FNR1) or (FNR2). For example, using the (FNR1) formulation, suppose the
cost to co-opt an actor i is denoted ci and the cost to miss an actor i is denoted mi.




(cixi1 + miyi). (5.13)
Another formulation that leverages the fractional set covering problem, and
also closely mirrors the key player approach suggested by Borgatti [2003a], maximizes
the amount of network members covered via a kp-set of a specified size, K. Using
the 1-step assumption as an example, this problem, denoted (FNRK1), is shown
in Equations 5.14 through 5.16. The objective function minimizes the number of
actors missed or not covered given that the size of the kp-set restricted to exactly
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K members. It is assumed that K is less than the cardinality of the minimum
dominating set; therefore, the decision maker seeks to take as much advantage as
possible via limited resources. If K is greater than or equal to the cardinality of the
minimum dominating set, then the restriction imposed by specifying K no longer





Subject To R1x1 + y ≥ 1 (5.15)
N∑
i=1
xi1 = K (5.16)
xi1 , yi ∈ B ∀ i
With the exception of (FNRK1), the optimization focus thus far has primarily
been upon minimizing the cardinality of the kp-sets while covering as many of the
other network members as possible. Consequently, such solutions tend to heavily rely
upon a few, oftentimes well-connected, individuals to influence the remainder of the
network. There are potential drawbacks to these types of solutions; for example, they
do not take into account actor characteristics (e.g., known roles within a network,
shared or familial ties, and so forth) and the fact that a mathematical solution
may not always coincide with a practical and implementable one (e.g., the workload
expected of key players in order to disseminate influence or educate others may be
unreasonable). However, the flexibility of the mathematical programming techniques
offers ways to avoid these pitfalls.
For example, the models presented can incorporate limitations on the kp-sets
and/or actors available for selection. Assume that a decision maker wanted to limit
the number of individuals with redundant skills [Borgatti, 2003a, pg. 130]. Let
individuals 1, 2 and 3 be actors with redundant skills. The decision maker wants to
include at most one of these individuals in the kp-set and is relying upon the 1-step
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assumption. This restriction can be included as an additional constraint, within any
of the formulations presented thus far, in the form of x11 + x21 + x31 ≤ 1. Such
a constraint is a slight modification of a type 1 special ordered constraint, often
referred to as a multiple choice constraint because only one of the decision variables
may equal 1 for any given solution [Martin, 1999, pg. 329]. The general form of
allowing at most a individuals out of a specified group g, where the reach conditions
m are specified by the user or situation, is given by Equation 5.17. Such a constraint
is also related to those used in knapsack formulations. This type of constraint can be
applied to as many groups or conditions as necessary, each scenario represented by
an additional constraint. In fact, implementation of this type of constraint permits
the identification of multiple optima for the formulations presented in this chapter.
g∑
i=1
xim ≤ a (5.17)
As another example of the flexibility inherent within the MP approach, assume
that the decision maker wanted to ensure that two specific individuals i and j,
with m = 1, were either both included or both excluded within the kp-set. This
requirement could be modeled as xi1 = xj1 . Ensuring that a specific actor i is
included in or excluded from the kp-set merely requires the additional constraint
xi1 = 1 or xi1 = 0, respectively. Requiring i or j would be modeled as xi1 = 1− xj1.
This could also be used to intentionally forego subjecting an actor or actors to
an influence campaign, particularly if they are the ultimate target of a coup or
insurrection by the remaining group members. Along these lines, and in the case of
fractional coverings, the analysis of the solution and decision variables also permits
the investigation of individuals that may consistently be missed despite multiple
optima.
Clearly, the options are limited only by the analyst’s requirements and ingenu-
ity. To deal with key players that are overburdened simply due to their connectivity,
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cost coefficients (implicitly assumed to be 1 to this point) may be included in the ob-
jective function in order to ‘spread out’ the work required of the kp-set membership.
A means to accomplish this is discussed next.
5.4.1.1 Leveraging Key Player Costs
The covering approaches (NR1) and (NR2) could easily incorporate individual-
specific costs, represented by cim , which denotes the cost associated with selecting
actor i as a member of the kp-set and assigning them to all possible actors within
m steps or less. Such costs may account for the time, effort, or resources required to
successfully recruit the actor into the kp-set. Alternatively, the cost could represent
a function of the demand placed upon the individual once they are included in the
kp-set (e.g., the key player is required to distribute informational pamphlets to all
of its assigned members).
Continuing with the 1-step assumption, let ci1 = 1/d(i)out, where d(i)out is
the out-degree of actor i. With the objective of minimizing such costs, this may
initially appear as self-defeating, since greater out-degrees, and therefore the more
workload potentially imposed, result in smaller cost coefficients. However, introduc-
ing a constraint specifying the size of the kp-set results in more evenly distributed
expectations upon the set members.
For example, assuming that a decision maker wants to cover all N actors in
the network within 1-step, suppose a kp-set of size K = 2 were desired. Let a and b
represent the out-degrees of each actor of an arbitrary kp-set solution. An additional
constraint is added to the (NR1) formulation such that
∑
i
xi1 = K. This modified
formulation providing a kp-set of order K with an evenly distributed workload to
reach all other actors within one step is denoted (DNR1) and is shown in Equations
5.18 through 5.20. Note that formulations amenable to this approach must require
K to be at least as great as the domatic number of the graph being analyzed.
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The smallest possible objective function value for this problem occurs when
each actor covers an equal (or near equal in the case of an odd number of actors)
number of other actors. Assume that a perfect cover is possible such that a + b = N
(i.e., there is no overlap or redundancy among the key players’ assignments), with




. If a = b,
then this reduces to 2
a
. Suppose that a 	= b, such that a = a − ε and b = a + ε,












a2−ε2 implies that for all ε 	= 0, and therefore
any solution with a 	= b, is inferior to one with a = b. Therefore, this model seeks
to distribute, as evenly as possible, the influence or contact ‘workload’ among the
members of the kp-set. This is easily extended to kp-sets of any arbitrary size K








Subject To R1x1 ≥ 1 (5.19)
N∑
i=1
xi1 = K (5.20)
xi1 ∈ B ∀ i
In the case of overlapping covers such that a + b > N , the smallest possible
value for this function occurs similarly when a = b = N , which results in an objec-
tive function for (DNR1) that is bounded below by K/N . An illustrative example,
assuming that N = 10 and K = 2, with objective functions (z) based upon varying
set sizes of a and b, is depicted in Figure 5.3. The intersection of the lines a = b,
a+ b ≥ 10, and z = 0.4, emphasize the distributive effect underlying this approach.
The formulations presented thus far simply determine the key players required
to influence or cover by contact either all actors within the network, including them-
selves, at least once or as many as possible if the kp-set size is determined a priori.
These number of nodes reached approaches also take into account the cardinality of
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a + b > 10
a
Figure 5.3: Distribution of kp-set Effort
the kp-set, as well as the the influence workload amongst its members. The attention
is not turned to the ‘reciprocal distance reach’ approach described by Equation 5.1.
5.4.2 Reciprocal Distance Reach
Seeking to maximize Equation 5.1, the same result can be achieved by max-
imizing the non-normalized version, or minimizing the additive inverse of the non-



















If a given actor j cannot be reached by a key player K, the distance is assumed




= 0 implies that unreachable key player-actor
pairs are not considered as an option for the optimization problem. Note that this
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function is optimized when all remaining actors are adjacent to one or more key
players (smaller denominators are better). Therefore, this implies that, given a
specified kp-set of size K, selecting the set that immediately covers a majority of the
network is preferred.
The classical p-median formulation, which has been applied to a variety of
facility location and related problems, provides a MP equivalent to the reciprocal
distance reach methodology. The p-median problem (PMP) essentially minimizes the
sum of the distance between kp-set members and their assigned non-kp-set members
[Reese, 2005]. In this context, this model seeks to minimize the total distance be-
tween the actors and the closest of p key players. Let ki = 1 if node i is designated a
member of the kp-set, K, zero otherwise. The shortest path distance (dij) between
all nodes must be calculated. Let xij = 1 if actor i is covered by a key player j,
zero otherwise. Borrowing from [Handler and Mirchandani, 1979, pg. 58-60], the










ki = K (5.23)
N∑
j=1
xij = 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , N (5.24)
xij ≤ kj ∀ i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , N (5.25)
ki ∈ Z, xij ∈ B ∀ i, j.
Continuing with the assumption that distances between individuals are based
upon zero-one relations, the distances used in the objective function are simply the
path distance between individuals. Given a dichotomous network, a reach matrix
would be sufficient to ascertain the values for dij [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg.







dijxij) will identify the same KPP-2 solutions. However, the objective
function shown in Equation 5.22 easily permits a direct comparison of objective
function values between the mathematical programming approach and the heuristic
approach presented by Borgatti [2003b].
Analysis using the (PMED) formulation is not necessarily relegated to inter-
personal distances based upon dichotomous relationships. Suppose that, in addition
to the existence of a relationship, an estimate of the social distance between individ-
uals i and j, dij > 0 can be obtained [cf. Renfro, 2001]. If such values are available,
an all-pairs shortest paths algorithm may be applied to obtain the distance values
required for the objective function [Sedgewick, 1984, pg. 492-4]. Alternatively, dis-
tances between non-adjacent individuals, assuming valued relations as input, could
be developed via the procedure developed by Yang and Knoke [2001].
A weighted version of the the (PMED) problem has been extensively studied,
permitting the inclusion of actor-specific data within the objective function [Reese,
2005, pg. 2]. For example, assume that an appropriate method was devised to esti-
mate a value of ‘importance’ assigned to each actor, denoted vi ∈ R+, such that the
larger the value, the more important their inclusion into the kp-set. Such assignments
could be based upon access, desirability, or ease of coercing that particular individ-
ual, are easily incorporated into this model and requiring only a minor adjustment







By design, the (PMED) formulation seeks to cover all actors within the network
with a key player. Combining aspects of this model and the fractional models dis-
cussed in Section 5.4.1, (PMED) can be modified in a manner similar to that shown












ki = K (5.28)
N∑
j=1
xij + yi = 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , N (5.29)
xij ≤ kj ∀ i = 1, . . . , N ; j = 1, . . . , N (5.30)
N∑
i=1
yi ≤ U (5.31)
ki ∈ Z, yi, xij ∈ B ∀ i, j.
To this point, both the (PMED) and (FPMED) models assume that all actors
can, eventually, reach all others. This may not always be the case, particularly
when dealing with directed networks. Accommodating this phenomenon requires a
modification of the indices used to ensure the assignments and coverings are possible.
Let the set E represent all pairs of actors (i, j) that are reachable to each other within
the social network of interest. If it is desired to limit the actors by a given number
of m-steps in addition to distance, then the Rm matrices previously defined could
be used to develop the appropriate constraint matrix such that E ∈ Rm. The










ki = K (5.33)
∑
j∈E
xij = 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , N (5.34)
xij ≤ kj ∀ (i, j) ∈ E; j = 1, . . . , N (5.35)
ki ∈ Z, xij ∈ B ∀ i, j.
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A discussion of some advantages of applying mathematical programming tech-
niques to KPP-2 follows. The disadvantages, particularly when compared to the
heuristic approach proposed by Borgatti [2003b], lie within the computational re-
quirements of the large-scale integer programs required to model large social net-
works. Some preliminary assessments of this area are discussed within the context
of the example case studies.
5.5 Advantageous Properties of the MP Approach
There are a number of advantages to the mathematical programming ap-
proaches offered, key among these the flexibility offered to the analyst. For example,
given the formulations presented, KPP-2 analysis is not restricted to symmetric net-
works. This enables an assessment of organizations where information or influence
is directed by design (e.g., a strict chain of command) or where different individuals
have different effects upon one another (e.g., a leader may better serve as a key
player than an untrustworthy minion).
Through the use of additional constraints, certain target individuals or even
groups of individuals can be specified a priori for inclusion or exclusion of kp-set
membership as desired. Additionally, constraints similar to the one in Equation
5.17 can be added to facilitate enumeration of alternate optima, thereby providing
planners and decision makers with options regarding potential courses of action. As
an example, suppose all optimal solutions of size K were of interest. Let s denote
a particular optimal solution. Beginning with the initial optimal solution, let the




xim ≤ (k − 1), for each s (5.36)
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Table 5.1: Goal Formulations [Ignizio, 1982, pg. 377]
Goal Goal Programming Deviation Variables
Type Form to Be Minimized
fi(x) ≤ bi fi(x) + ηi − ρi = bi ρi
fi(x) ≥ bi fi(x) + ηi − ρi = bi ηi
fi(x) = bi fi(x) + ηi − ρi = bi ηi + ρi
in a cumulative manner for each optimal solution found forces the mathematical pro-
gram to find any remaining solutions. This procedure is repeated until the problem
becomes infeasible, or an appropriate number of solutions has been obtained.
External costs (e.g., operational risks endured to co-opt a particular member,
amount of money or goods needed for bribes, the expected time required to success-
fully co-opt an individual, and so forth) as well as internal costs incurred (e.g., the
workload endured by a given kp-set member) are all easily included into this analysis
by tailoring the objective functions. The (PMED) model, for example, can incorpo-
rate fixed costs associated with hiring or co-opting key players, essentially a social
network version of the classical facility location problem [Handler and Mirchandani,
1979, pg. 58-59].
Another potential extension involves a goal-programming approach to allow
trade-offs between, for example, the size of the kp-set and the desired number of
individuals reached or influenced. The relaxation of some of these constraints via
the use of deviational variables incorporated into the objective function is commonly
referred to as goal programming. “An aspiration level is a specific value associated
with a desired or acceptable level of achievement of an objective” [Ignizio, 1982,
pg. 376]. “An objective in conjunction with an aspiration level is termed a goal”
[Ignizio, 1982, pg. 376]. To transform an objective i into a corresponding goal, the
deviational variables ηi and ρi denote the amount under and over a specified goal,
respectively. The various transformations for each type of objective are shown in
Table 5.1.
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For example, consider the (FNRK1) formulation in Equations 5.14 through
5.16. Suppose that the problem is to evaluate the tradeoffs between kp-set size and
the number of actors that may be missed if the kp-set size must be some number




The second goal is denoted f2(y) =
N∑
i=1
yi = U . Using Table 5.1, the corresponding
transformations for goals 1 and 2 are
N∑
i=1
xi1 + η1 − ρ1 = K and
N∑
i=1
yi + η2 − ρ2 = U ,
respectively. The resulting goal programming formulation for (FNRK1) is denoted
(GPFNRK1):
(GPFNRK1) Min η1 + ρ1 + η2 + ρ2 (5.37)
Subject To R1x1 + y ≥ 1 (5.38)
N∑
i=1
xi1 + η1 − ρ1 = K (5.39)
N∑
i=1
yi + η2 − ρ2 = U (5.40)
xi1 , yi ∈ B ∀ i
ηj, ρj ∈ Z ∀ j.
Due to the equally weighted deviational variables, the (GPFNRK1) formulation
implicitly assumes that meeting either goal is equally desirable. To investigate the
impact of changing these weights, θ ∈ [0, 1], may be incorporated into the objective
function as
Min θ(η1 + ρ1) + (1 − θ)(η2 + ρ2). (5.41)
The problem may then be solved for various values for θ, providing solutions (as-
suming feasibility) that trade off deviations between the two goals.
Upon review of the solution output of a mathematical program, there may be
indications of surplus conditions for the model constraints. Surplus, in the context
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of this problem formulation, shows where actors are reached (or can be reached) by
more than one key player, that is, more than 1 covering. This is an indication of
redundancy in key players and actors targeted, which may or may not be desirable.
Suppose that a terrorist network is of interest, and the decision maker wants to avoid
or minimize the chance that an actor will be contacted by more than one key player
in order to avoid suspicion of an ‘external’ influence. The most straightforward ap-
proach to model this situation would be to change all of the covering constraints (≥ 1)
to matching constraints (= 1). However, depending upon the network topology, and
other problem aspects that may be incorporated, this may result in infeasibility. Of
course, the analyst can mix and match these conditions for each specific individual,
thus meeting the requisite assumptions regarding the sophistication of various target
individuals.
On the other hand, redundancy may be required, perhaps to ensure a PSYOP
message gets communicated, to include a backup plan should one of the key players
change their mind or become unavailable, or to leverage multiple sources to increase
the likelihood of a shift in attitudes. To accomplish this, changing the appropriate
constraints to (≥ 2), for example, ensures that the corresponding actors are reached
by at least 2 distinct key players, or they are themselves a key player and a target of
another kp-set member. Of course, increasing the right-hand side value further in-
creases the sources of external influence, which may be required for some individuals.
Lastly, each of the coverings (by a key player) can be tailored to meet the influence
requirements for specific individuals, implying that the right-hand sides need not be
identical.
To demonstrate the approach and possible analytical avenues, these mathe-




































Figure 5.4: Methods Camp Dataset (symmetric) [Borgatti, 2003b]
5.6 Exemplar Case Study
In order to compare results between the heuristic and mathematical program-
ming approaches, one of the data sets provided with the KPP software (‘method-
scamp’) is examined. The network is illustrated in Figure 5.4. As aforementioned,
the MP approach is immediately applicable to asymmetric network data. Borgatti’s
KPP program has not yet been extended to study asymmetric relationships; there-
fore, the data was made symmetric prior to incorporation into the MP formulations.
5.6.1 Number of Nodes Reached Results
Beginning with the objective of reaching as many actors as possible, given a
specified kp-set size. Assuming that actors must be within one step from a key
player, the minimum number of key players meeting these criteria is 4, the domatic
number of this particular graph. There are 18 optimal solutions for (NR1), which
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Table 5.2: NR1 Solutions (FNRK1, with K = 4)
{5, 7, 12, 16} {5, 7, 10, 16} {5, 7, 9, 16}
{5, 7, 14, 16} {5, 7, 9, 17} {6, 7, 12, 16}
{7, 8, 12, 16} {4, 7, 12, 16} {7, 8, 9, 16}
{6, 7, 9, 16} {4, 7, 10, 16} {4,7,9,16}
{4, 7, 14, 16} {6, 7, 14, 16} {6, 7, 9, 17}
{7, 8, 14, 16} {7, 8, 9, 17} {4, 7, 9, 17}
is equivalent to (FNRK1) with K = 4. The results are shown in Table 5.2. The
solutions highlighted in bold in each of tables indicate the single solution generated by
the key player software [Borgatti, 2003b]. In some cases, with repeated executions
of the heuristic multiple solutions were found for the same problem setting. The
mathematical programs developed here (provided in the corresponding appendices)
find all optimal solutions if desired.
Multiple optimal solutions not only offer options regarding potential kp-sets,
but also provide insight into the nature of the solutions. For example, Figure 5.5
depicts a histogram of the number of times a particular player appears within one
of the 18 kp-set solutions. Actor 7 appears in all 18 optimal solution sets, indicating
that if the goal was to reach all actors within one step, actor 7 must be available
as a key player. Otherwise, some sacrifices in either the distance assumption or the
percentage of population influenced must be considered. Actor 16 appears in 14
of the 18 optimal solutions. When dealing with larger networks, and potentially a
much larger number of multiple optima, this approach lends itself to ascertaining
the criticality of a given actor and their potential role within a kp-set. Combining
this technique with other screening criteria facilitates kp-set selection.
If the one-step assumption could not be traded off and four actors could not
be accessed due to other resource constraints, then the application of the (FNRK1)
problem, with reduced values of k is the next logical approach.
From Table 5.3, several interesting observations may be made. As expected
from the initial set of results, actors 7 and 16 still play a vital role within a number
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Figure 5.5: Key Player Solution Occurrence
Table 5.3: FNRK1 Solutions (with varying k)
K = 3 (17 Actors Reached)
{7, 12, 16} {7, 14, 16} {7,9,16} {7, 9, 17}
K = 2 (12 Actors Reached)
{1, 16} {4,16} {7, 16} {7, 9}
K = 1 (6 Actors Reached)
{16} {9} {7} {1} {4}
of the alternate optima. Additionally, for K = 3 the one actor that is missed by
all possible solutions is actor 6 (Jennie). This suggests another area of opportunity
regarding the tradeoffs that may be offered, based upon data and insights directly
gained from examining the MP solutions. If influencing Jennie was not a primary
concern, then little solution (and course of action) value is lost due to reducing the
kp-set size from 4 (reaching everybody) to any one of the kp-sets comprised of 3 key
players (reaching everybody but Jennie).
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Table 5.4: NR2 Solutions (FNRK2, with K = 2)
{1,15} {3, 15} {4, 15} {5, 15} {6, 15}
{7, 15} {8, 15} {1, 16} {1, 17} {1, 18}
Assuming that the reach between a key player and its assigned actor could
extend to two steps, the NR2 program may be applied. The multiple optima are
given in Table 5.4. Note that, due to the small size and topology of the given network,
(NR2) results are equivalent to (FNRK2) with K = 2. Hence, the 2-dominating
number for this graph is 2. If only one player could be accessed (K = 1), then the
only key player under these assumptions is actor 15 (Gery), who can reach 14 other
actors within two steps or fewer.
5.6.2 Reciprocal Distance Reach
Turning now to selecting a key player set that maximizes the reciprocal distance
reach objective, the (PMED) formulation is initially applied. Note that when K =
4, all possible kp-sets correspond to the minimum dominating sets of the graph,
shown in Table 5.2. This results in a kp-set that can reach all other actors within
one step (m = 1) and therefore provides an objective function that, given these
particular assumptions, cannot be improved. Consequently, if an analyst were to
explore tradeoffs, it should be in the area of smaller kp-set sizes and allowable reach
distance. All optimal solutions for (PMED) with m = 2 and varying k are provided
in Table 5.5. Observe that for K = 2, although there are multiple optima from an
(NR2) perspective (see Table 5.4), there is only one set {1, 16} that optimizes the
DR objective. Of course, the objective function values could be calculated for each
of the (NR2) with K = 2 solutions to explore second best options. Alternatively,
the objective functions for each of these could simply serve as one of several inputs
regarding the efficacy or desirability of a given kp-set, permitting a multi-objective
analysis of the options available.
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Table 5.5: PMED Solutions (m = 2)
K = 2 (DR = 0.8333)
{1,16}
K = 3 (DR = 0.9722)
{7,12,16} {7, 14, 16} {7, 9, 16} {7, 9, 17}
The (PMEDm) formulation, which permits the analyst to restrict the solu-
tion space via reach limitations, essentially only offers a potential means to reduce
computational requirements. This is due to decision variables that are (or are not)
defined in the math program as a result of i − j, m-reach pairs possible. However,
if the reach specified, m, does not correspond to any m-dominating set, the mathe-
matical program will be infeasible. In general, the objective function of the (PMED)
formulation always selects the shortest path assignment between a key player and its
assigned actor(s). Therefore, either solve (PMED) with m = (N − 1), or determine
the domatic number in advance for use as input to (PMEDm).
5.7 KPP and Layered Networks
When dealing with the layered network construct, application of the various
KPP-2 models may be accomplished in a fashion similar to that discussed for RBAP.
That is, each layer could be analyzed independently, with the results across layers
compared against one another, or a simple aggregation of all the layers as discussed
for RBAP could be performed prior to KPP-2 model implementation. However, the
dominating set of a layered graph aggregated by the application of Equations 4.5 or
4.6 is not equivalent to the dominating set of all layers simultaneously.
For example, consider the notional network of three actors in Figure 5.6. If
Equation 4.5 is applied to combine the three layers, the aggregated network would
take the form shown in Figure 5.7. Clearly, any one of the actors in Figure 5.7 could












Figure 5.7: Notional Aggregation
However, any single actor cannot dominate all layers simultaneously in Figure
5.6; in fact, any two actors must be included in the minimum dominating set in
order for each layer to be dominated. This suggests a new class of problems to
address this particular research question. This class is defined as a multi-layer or
multi-graph dominating set, which corresponds to the KPP-2 concept when influence
across multiple layers simultaneously is required.
Given a multi-graph comprised of L layers, let Gl, l = 1, . . . , L, represent a
given layer l of a graph G such that G = {G1, G2, . . . , GL}. Let the corresponding
vertices within each layer l be represented by V (Gl), which comprise the superset
of vertices V = {V (G1), V (G2), . . . , V (GL)}. Edges are defined in a similar fashion
such that E = {E(G1), E(G2), . . . , E(GL)}. Extending the definitions of the domi-
nating and k-dominating sets offered by Deo [1974] and Penso and Barbosa [2004],
respectively, the multi-graph k-dominating set Dm is formally defined as follows.
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Definition 10. Given a dichotomous multi-graph, G = {G1, G2, . . . , GL}, with ver-
tices V = {V (G1), V (G2), . . . , V (GL)}, the multi-graph k-dominating set is the set of
vertices Dm ⊆ V such that V (Gl) ∈ Dm or is at most k steps away from the nearest
vertex in Dm, ∀ l.
A minimal multi-graph k-dominating set is one that satisfies Definition 10
with the minimum number of vertices, the cardinality of which is denoted δm. As an
initial solution approach, mathematical programming is applied once again. Let Rml
represent the transpose of the m-reach matrix for layer l. Building upon the original
(NRm) formulation as an example, in order to consider all layers simultaneously, the
constraint matrix is now comprised of vertical concatenation of Rml for each l. This





Subject To Rm1xm ≥ 1 (5.43)
Rm2xm ≥ 1 (5.44)
...
RmLxm ≥ 1 (5.45)
xim ∈ B ∀ i.
For any given layer, if any particular individual is isolated within that partic-
ular context and therefore cannot be reached by any other individual–the potential
key players–the result is that column i in the m-reach matrix will be all 0, with
the exception of row i, the actor reaching itself. Taking the transpose to form Rml,
which serves as the constraint matrix for problem (NRmL), results in a constraint in
the form of ximl  1. This condition consequently requires the inclusion of isolated
actors within the dominating, and key player, set.
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The other number reached formulations could be extended in a similar fashion.
For example, if the dominating conditions were not required for all actors over all
possible layers, the (FNRK1) formulation may be extended to accommodate not only
L layers, but a reach of m steps or fewer between key players and the other actors.
Let yil = 1 if actor i on layer l does not meet the domination criteria, 0 otherwise;








Subject To Rm1xm + y1 ≥ 1 (5.47)
...
RmLxm + yL ≥ 1 (5.48)
N∑
i=1
xim = K (5.49)
xim , yil ∈ B ∀ i.
As an additional analysis approach, if one layer was perceived as more im-
portant than another with respect to ensuring the dominating criteria are met, a
corresponding cost coefficient could be associated with each actor-level combination,
yil. Therefore, assuming that K < δm, such an objective function would minimize
the weighted sum of actors missed at each level. Another aspect of this formulation
that could represent the criticality or fragility of a given layer is the incorporation
of different values of m for each layer. Currently, the formulation in (FNRKmL)
assumes a constant m for each layer. This assumption is easily changed based upon
analysis assumptions or requirements.
190
Table 5.6: MP Summary
Problem Objective Constraints
Number of Nodes Reached Approach
NRm Minimize K Actors must be within m steps
of assigned key player
FNRKm Minimize actors missed Actors must be within m steps
of assigned key player; K
FNRm Minimize K Actors must be within m steps
of assigned key player; Can miss
at most U actors
DNRm Distribute workload Actors must be within m steps
of assigned key player; K
Reciprocal Distance Reach Approach
PMEDm Minimize −DR K; Reach of key players is al-
lowed up to a specified m ∈
[1, (n − 1)]
FPMED Minimize −DR K; Can miss at most U actors
Number of Nodes Reached Approach - Multigraph
NRmL Minimize K Actors must be within m steps
of assigned key player for all lay-
ers
FNRKmL Minimize actors missed over
all layers
Actors must be within m steps
of assigned key player within a
given layer; K
5.8 Summary
The mathematical programming approaches offered, summarized in Table 5.6,
provide several analytic benefits. These include, but are not necessarily limited to:
a guaranteed optimal solution, the incorporation of directed networks, the ability
to accommodate valued relations, the ability to discount actors not reachable by
external influences, and, in some cases, the ability to encompass multiple dimensions
of relationships.
Further modifications permit the fine tuning of MP approaches, incorporating
decision maker objectives or other operational requirements and limitations as pro-
gram constraints. As such, individuals can be designated a key player in advance or
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not allowed to be selected at all. Costs to access the various individuals (e.g., mili-
tary operations, risk, and intelligence resources required) may also be incorporated
within any of these formulations. Inclusion of these costs could be accomplished
either by a multiple objective linear program or by a modification of the objective
functions already discussed.
Multiple optimal solutions may be revealed by post-optimality analysis; iden-
tifying these solutions means more viable and effective alternatives for the decision
maker. Taking advantage of special constraints, such as the one provided in Equation
5.36, facilitates the enumeration of these alternatives.
Dominating sets and the p-median problem are traditionally difficult prob-
lems to solve when the networks are large. Algorithmic improvements, as well as
specialized heuristics, for both problems pervade the current literature [cf. Reese,
2005; Grandoni, 2006]. Such efforts offer potentially more computationally efficient
alternatives to perform the KPP-2 analyses described in this chapter.
Finally, application of these techniques are not necessarily limited to social
networks comprised entirely of individuals and their known relations. Abstraction
of this concept to more general networks offers other analytic opportunities. For
example, assume the given objective is to influence the citizens within a number
of cities of a specified country. Modeling this problem at the citizen level is likely
infeasible, due to numerous political and resource limitations. However, modeling
the cities themselves as nodes, and perhaps even communities therein, circumvents
a number of the computational and data requirements imposed upon such an effort.
Consequently, candidates for key players could include media sources, religious or
political leaders, or potentially a PSYOP product that can be delivered as influ-
ence to a subset of the country’s populous. Layered applications are just as flexible.
For example, suppose each graph layer represents physical infrastructure. Vertices
occurring in multiple layers could represent bridges that facilitate transportation,
telecommunications, electric power, and petroleum distribution across a river. Ver-
192
tices could also represent a mix of people, facilities or processes, mapping two or
more social and physical infrastructures together. Considering that KPP-2 seeks to
find a minimum set that, in effect, could touch and ‘influence’ all of these layers, use
of this analysis technique could also facilitate vulnerability analysis.
Overall, the conceptual underpinnings of KPP can be found in a number of re-
lated operations research problems, as demonstrated by the relationships to existing
operations research literature. Developing the linkage of the KPP problem to math-
ematical programming also lends this problem to the array of heuristic approaches
developed for these specific combinatorial problems [cf. Kreher and Stinson, 1999].
These may be particularly useful when analyzing very large social networks in a
limited amount of time. However, this particular application, that of influencing a
target network from within, is certainly of interest in the current geopolitical climate.
MATLAB code for the (NRm), (FNRKm), (FNRm), and (DNRm) are in Ap-
pendices C, D, E and F, respectively. Due to the inherent limitations of the MAT-
LAB solver, as well as the problem difficulty, a more efficient optimization program
was required for the (PMEDm) formulation. Appendix G outlines the process used
to implement LINGO for this formulation, and presents a small example with data
and corresponding solutions.
To this point, the measures and methods described have attempted to analyze
the topological structure of networks. The next chapter transitions from a topological
focus to one that examines the ties that make up this topology. Hence, the required
level of detail in intelligence data is increasing. This data is assumed to capture the
nature of the ties between individuals. The questions to be investigated are, ‘How




The content of relationships is a problem for network analysis. The prob-
lem is nicely illustrated in the distinction between naturally occurring
relations and analytical relations–the first being the relations in which
people are actually involved, the second being the recreation of relations
for a network analysis [Burt and Schøtt, 1985]
As Burt and Schøtt point out, there has existed a gap between models of social
interaction and reality; to a large extent, this observation remains accurate today.
The measures and methods described thus far focus primarily upon analysis of net-
work topology alone. This focus is mirrored by the greater majority of social network
measures and sociological studies found within the literature. It is often implicitly
assumed that the context of interest within sociological studies is the predominant
relation from which the observable network structure has developed. Additionally,
links between individuals discovered within these oftentimes specific but still poten-
tially wide-ranging contexts under examination are viewed as homogenous relations,
lacking varying degrees of importance or significance when considering interpersonal
interactions. Simply reflecting upon our own acquaintances, even within the same
context such as work associates or family members, it is likely found that interper-
sonal relationships vary in many ways.
Consequently, the sociometric representation of those links indicates that either
the particular relationship does or does not exist between two individuals, and the
dichotomous representation ensues. Therefore, differentiation between “lifelong,”
“good,” and “casual” friends, or other general levels of relationship strengths either
cannot be analyzed or are relegated to ad hoc, ordinal measures.
Quantifying how these relationships vary, capturing the very nature of an or-
ganization’s interpersonal ties, is the objective of this chapter. The questions to be
investigated are: How do we effectively quantify these ties, and why would we want
194
to? Several means to answer the first part of this question are posed. The rationale
for attempting such a measurement is to both improve upon previous network flow
methodologies and to provide a more accurate representation of the nature of the
relations. Previous works have merely posited the existence and attainment of such
values [e.g., Stephenson and Zelen, 1989; Freeman et al., 1991; Yang and Knoke,
2001], while others [e.g., Renfro, 2001; Clark, 2005] have presented new means to
estimate what may be viewed as tie strength.
The next sections first clarify the concept of tie strength, as several meanings
and definitions have been previously offered within the literature. Previous works
that have suggested means to measure this phenomenon are reviewed; and, new
methods are offered that are both based upon predominant sociological theory re-
lated to the concept of tie strength and amenable to implementation despite limited
available information. One such method implements a decision theoretic model of
tie strength. This last approach permits extensions of several weighting concepts
(discussed earlier in Section 2.5.5.1) that offer a means to capture the effects of
structural change upon a network’s ties.
6.2 Tie Strength
In the sociological literature at least two definitions of strength of a personal
tie may be found. Granovetter defined the strength of a tie as “a (probably linear)
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” [Granovetter, 1973,
pg. 1361].
Interestingly, the converse of strong ties, weak ties, are composed of casual
or intermittent relationships and are potentially strong themselves. The strength
of a weak tie lies in its ability to bridge communication or influence between two
or more distinct groups, or promote diffusion of influence and ideas between them
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[Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1363-7]. In this latter case, the strength lies within po-
tential opportunity for the exchange of information, services, or influence that is
otherwise non-existent within one’s own immediate sphere of influence or stronger
acquaintances.
Although weak ties may be of interest with regards to identifying individuals
that offer critical and highly-skilled services, an ability to craft explosives or biological
weapons, for example, for the purposes of this research, reference to a strong tie
implies the former definition. Hence, it is assumed that relationships sharing multiple
contexts result in the significant bonds of trust required of a non-cooperative, and
particularly a terrorist, network. Interaction within multiple, and not necessarily
just social contexts, is a phenomenon referred to a multiplicity, which recognizes
that virtually all “naturally occurring [relations are] a bundle of different interaction
elements” [Burt and Schøtt, 1985, pg, 288]. As shown by Levin et al. [2002], “strong
ties promote effective knowledge because they tend to be trusting ones” [Levin et al.,
2002, pg. D2]. Trust–“that quality of the trusted party that makes the trustor willing
to be vulnerable”–is assumed to play a key role in binding the network membership
together [Mayer et al., 1995, pg. 712].
A recent survey by Hite investigated a number of sociological studies that
characterized interpersonal ties. Note the conceptual variety illustrated within Ta-
ble 6.1 and that none of these deal with non-cooperative networks. The specific
contexts that significantly contribute to the strength of an interpersonal tie between
two members of a non-cooperative network remains an open research question. This
is primarily due to the lack of previous, unclassified, investigations of terrorist or-
ganizations (other than Renfro [2001] and Clark [2005]), as well as the multitude of
underlying motivations and cultural phenomena that result in the formation of these
organizations. For example, the Islamic basis for action and overall intentions and
organizational objectives of Al Qaeda are presumably much different than those of
the Columbian narcoterrorism organizations National Liberation Army (ELN) and
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Table 6.1: Tie Characteristics [Hite, 2003, pg. 14]
Concepts (Source)
Affect; philos; passions
(Granovetter, 1985; Krackhardt, 1992; Uzzi, 1999)
Frequency or frequent contact
(De Burca et al., 2001; Granovetter, 1985)
Reciprocity
(Granovetter, 1985; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Powell, 1990;
Uzzi, 1999)
Trust; enforceable trust
(Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Powell, 1990; Uzzi, 1996)
Complementarity; accommodation and adaptation; indebtedness or im-
balance; collaboration; transaction investments; strong history; fungi-
ble skills (Powell, 1990)
Expectations; social capital; bounded solidarity (Portes and Sensen-
brenner, 1993)
Lower opportunistic behavior (Provan, 1993)
Density (Staber, 1994)
Maximize relationships over organization
(Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994)
Fine-grained information transfer; problem solving (Uzzi, 1996)
Duration; multiplexity (De Burca et al., 2001; Uzzi, 1999)
Diffusion; facilitation (MacLean, 2001)
Personal involvement; low formality (few contacts); connectedness
(De Burca et al., 2001)
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) [Berry et al., 2002]. Different
world-views and goals correspondingly result in different opinions, from the perspec-
tive of the organization’s members, of what is or is not important with regards to
interpersonal ties.
Previous efforts that have attempted to identify the significant components of
tie strength are discussed in Marsden and Campbell [1984] and Carroll [2006]. Both
used canonical correlation analysis to identify general relationships between multiple
tie characteristics and multiple aspects of the resulting strength. Carroll investigated
the types of alliances formed among financial and commercial institutions as a result
of multiplex relationships. Although Carroll’s concept and findings may be of interest
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with regards to inferring strength between geographically separated terrorist cells
that have little or no direct contact (other than through the Internet), the exact
methodology used by the authors is not immediately transferrable due to the survey
nature of the data. The specific findings of Marsden and Campbell [1984], however,
offer some insight that may be leveraged in a decision theoretic model of tie strength.
The next sections discuss the interrelated concepts of tie strength, social distance,
and social closeness, as well as previous efforts attempting to measure them.
6.2.1 Distance, Closeness, & Strength
Perhaps the first sociological attempt to measure or quantify interpersonal
relationships was due to Bogardus [1925], who defined social distance as “the degrees
and grades of understanding and feeling that persons experience regarding each
other” [Bogardus, 1925, pg. 299]. Bogardus’s intentions were to “chart the character
of social relations” between various ethnicities [Bogardus, 1925, pg. 299]; his work
continues to be studied and used to monitor the longitudinal trends in race relations
[cf. Parrillo and Donoghue, 2005].
Conceptually, social distance is effectively inversely proportional to tie strength.
Bogardus attempted to measure social distance by asking individuals about their
propensity to include other races in their social circles, at varying degrees of inti-
macy. As seen in Table 6.2, social distance as measured by Bogardus is predicated
upon a Guttman scale, where, for example, responding affirmatively to condition
1 implies the same response for conditions 2 through 6. This corresponds to the
smallest social distance, and therefore the strongest potential contact strength. Al-
ternatively, responding affirmatively to condition 2 implies the same response for
conditions 3 through 6, and so forth. An affirmative response to condition 7 implies
that no tie is sought, in this setting, to another race, therefore resulting in significant
social distance.
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Table 6.2: Social Distance Measurement [Bogardus, 1925, pg. 301-3]
Social
Contact Contact
Willingly admit. . . Distance Strength
1. To close kinship by marriage 0 Strong
2. To my club as personal chums 1
3. To my street as neighbors 2
4. To employment in my occupation in my country 3 ↓
5. Citizenship in my country 4
6. As visitors only to my country 5 Weak
7. Would exclude from my country 6 Non-existent
The Guttman scale approach attempts to incorporate the perception that “dif-
ferent interpersonal processes occur at different stages of a relationship’s develop-
ment” [Friedkin, 1990, pg. 240]. However, Bogardus’s work is not only clearly
uniplex, but is reliant upon survey data collected by open and seemingly honest
participants. Friedkin’s application of this concept does involve multiplexity to an
extent, incorporating claims of “friendship,” “help seeking,” and “frequent discus-
sion” among participants [Friedkin, 1990, pg. 240-1]. Unfortunately, this too is
reliant upon truthful survey responses and is primarily qualitative in nature. In
fact, due to the difficulty of mapping a measure to the strength of an interpersonal
tie, the literature is dominated by qualitative analysis in the subject [cf. Jack, 2005;
Granovetter, 1973; Pabjan, 2005, among others].
Recalling the relationship between social distance and tie strength, Renfro’s
concept of social closeness is based upon (psychological) distance. Closer individuals
had less distance between them, and therefore shared stronger interpersonal ties.
Given a decision theoretic measurement of an individual’s current psychological state,
Renfro’s measure of strength was derived by taking the difference of two individuals’
scores [Renfro, 2001, pg. 178-81]. Although the decision theoretic model proposed
by Renfro is well founded in psychological and sociological theory, the data collection
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efforts and cultural expertise required may prove overwhelming when dealing with
large networks of individuals engaged in surreptitious activities.
More recently, Clark utilized the information centrality measure developed
by Stephenson and Zelen [1989] to formulate a matrix of pair-wise (interpersonal)
influence measurements, defined by
W = w1I1 + w2I2 + . . . + wnIn :
n∑
i
wi = 1. (6.1)
This measurement is based upon a weighted sum of the matrices that would nor-
mally be used to calculate information centrality for the network’s actors within
the respective layers. Instead, the linear combination of matrices, one matrix for
each contextual layer, are combined and multiplied again by a coefficient that serves
as a proxy for individual-specific influence, denoted e. Inclusion of the influence
attributed to specific individuals, based upon actor attributes, essentially induces
asymmetry in the matrix hij ∈ H = Wijei. The elements hij ∈ H are then used for
a variety of analyses, including network flow formulations [Clark, 2005, pg. 3-34].
Clark’s measure essentially attempts to capture the potential amount of in-
fluence that one person may impose upon another. This is analogous to Renfro’s
application of social closeness to arc capacity within a network flow formulation of
the social network. There are, however, potential issues associated with this ap-
proach, depending upon the inherent structure of the data. For example, for a
given layer l, the (i, j)th entry within the Il matrix captures the “information in the
combined path” between individuals i and j [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 12].
Consequently, despite the lack of an existing, direct relationship between any two
individuals in l, the (i, j)th entry, i 	= j, may be non-zero. The weighted combination
approach ultimately separates the contextual layers; thus, despite indirect connec-
tions between actors through inter-layer connections, the relationships between those
















Figure 6.1: Notional Network Layers
Consider the network shown in Figure 6.1, which is comprised of 13 individuals
within 3 different layers. The fact that information centrality attempts to measure
the information flowing along all possible paths within a network suggests that glob-
ally there should be some information exchange, albeit indirectly, between actors 1
and 13, for example. Since actors 1 and 13 do not communicate within the same
layer, applying information centrality to each layer as a stand-alone network and then
aggregating the results via Equation 6.1 is mathematically contrary to the premise
of the measure proposed by Stephenson and Zelen [1989].
This issue does not discredit the approach entirely, even though the information
centrality measure due to Stephenson and Zelen [1989] is potentially flawed in itself
(See Appendix H). A remedy could include using a weighted combination of layers
as input to the information centrality calculations. For example, given the layers
in Figure 6.1 and assuming the weights were 0.5, 0.3, and 0.2 for layers 1, 2, and
3, respectively, the network shown in Figure 6.2 would serve as the input to this
measure.
Assuming that this approach yields a connected graph and that the resulting
weight values are substituted for the traditionally dichotomous representation of the
graph, the necessary conditions for the information centrality measure calculations
are met. Larger weights subsequently induce a corresponding bias toward relation-






















Figure 6.2: Weighted Combination of Layers
the information centrality measure to the entire, connected graph also ensures that
potential information between indirectly connected actors is measured.
Distance, closeness, and strength are similar, if not identical constructs of
interpersonal relationships. The closer two individuals are, the smaller the social
distance and the stronger the interpersonal tie. For this research, the nomenclature
of tie strength was chosen simply for its conceptual clarity–the direct relationship
between tie strength and the value for its measure. For the purposes of this research,
tie strength is formally defined as follows.
Definition 11. The strength of an interpersonal tie between individuals i and j,
denoted sij ∈ [0, R+], measures the degree of trust and shared understandings between
two people, relative to all other contacts within the appropriate social contexts shared
among the network of interest. The stronger (weaker) the interpersonal tie, the
greater (smaller) the value of sij. Actors i and j who have no direct, interpersonal
relationship have a strength of zero.
This is very similar to Renfro’s definition of social closeness, and formalizes the
topological aspect of Clark’s holistic interpersonal influence measure, as well as the
notional concept of value placed upon a tie in Freeman et al. [1991]. Consequently,
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the models proposed in the next section could also serve as arc capacities in a network
flow model of a social network.
However, another option could entail viewing the strength of a tie as the cost
associated with interpersonal communications. As Jack observed, information and
support gained from strong ties has several benefits, it is “more trustworthy because
it is richer, more detailed and accurate; it is usually from a continuing relationship
and so in economic terms it is more reliable” [Jack, 2005, pg. 1236]. Strong ties, then,
may permit more efficient or less costly communication paths, particularly when the
information may be counter to the organization’s objectives or potentially detrimen-
tal to those who promulgate the information to others. If relating tie strength to cost
vis-a-vis Jack [2005] was of interest, the cost for individual i to communicate with
individual j, cij would be inversely proportional to sij. Stronger ties would have
smaller costs. Non-existent ties would effectively have an infinite cost, as shown
by Equation 6.2, and would therefore not contribute to the objective function of a






Several methods to ascertain interpersonal tie strength are proposed, all of
which assume that limited information regarding the nature of the ties exists, and
expert opinion is able to determine which social contexts significantly contribute to
the cohesion and continuation of the organization under study.
6.3 Models of Tie Strength
The objective of this chapter is to quantitatively characterize the strength
of interpersonal ties. This characterization must be possible with limited informa-
tion regarding the social interactions of the individuals, primarily due to their own
requirements of secrecy, deception, and detection avoidance. Making the mathemat-
203
ical connections between these individuals, however, is predicated upon the contexts
within which they operate, train, and build cohesive and trusting relationships [Mars-
den and Campbell, 1984, pg. 488]. Such contexts could comprise the layers depicted
in Figure 1.1.
As Renfro noted, the simplest method of “counting the number of arcs incident
to the individuals involved, . . . or the number of times pairs of individuals commu-
nicate in a fixed time period” [Renfro, 2001, pg. 22]. Frequent interactions, and
the time required to achieve them, have been suggested to contribute to tie strength
[Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1362]. However, Marsden and Campbell found that
the use of frequency as a measure of strength will tend systematically to
overestimate the strength of ties between persons who are neighbors or
co-workers, while the use of duration as a measure of strength will over-
estimate the strength of ties between relatives [Marsden and Campbell,
1984, pg. 499].
Within the next sections, methods for dealing with multiple layers and using
them to estimate interpersonal tie strength are proposed. Although the first method
is computationally attractive, a few inherent conceptual disadvantages are discussed.
A means to deal with such challenges is addressed by a decision theoretic model of tie
strength. This model is mathematically similar to the simple aggregation methods
discussed in both Chapter II and the following section; however, it incorporates
the relative importance–from the individual’s perspective–of the various layers or
contexts that comprise the ‘bundle of associations’ forming the relationship.
6.3.1 Simple Aggregation
There is a general agreement within the literature that actor similarity directly
correlates to tie strength [Granovetter, 1973, pg. 1362]. Although this phenomenon
is traditionally associated with similarity among individuals’ attributes, referred to
as homophily, one could extend this concept to similarity of contexts, assuming that
similar interests and attributes contributed to the shared contexts. Therefore, ex-
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tending the shared similarities among attributes, a the Jaccard similarity coefficient
may be applied to a network’s multiple contexts. This results in a single network with
arc values representing the interpersonal tie strength relative to all other individuals
within the network.
Given two sample sets A and B, the Jaccard similarity coefficient Yin and
Yasuda [2005, pg. 474], J (A, B) ∈ [0, 1], is given by
J (A, B) =
|A ∩ B|
|A ∪ B| . (6.3)
This measure is 0 (1) if the two sets are completely dissimilar (similar). Assuming
that relationship strength is enforced by sharing not only by common contexts that
comprise the interpersonal relationship between A and B, but by shared contacts
within those contexts, a proxy for strength can be derived by applying the Jaccard
measure.
Let El denote the set of all edges in layer l ∈ L. Further, let El(i) = 1 if actor
i is adjacent to a given edge ∈ El, 0 otherwise. The edge set for a given actor A is
then defined as {E1(A)|E2(A)| . . . |EL(A)}. The edge set for actor B is defined in
the same manner. Note that for a given actor i, these sets correspond to the ith row
of a node-edge adjacency matrix. Let SJ denote the Jaccardian similarity matrix
where SJ(A, B) ∈ SJ = J(A, B), A 	= B. The values within this matrix then serve
as a proxy for the strength of interpersonal ties. (See Appendix I for the MATLAB
code that calculates this measure.)
Consider the complete graph of 5 individuals in Figure 6.3 and its correspond-
ing node-edge adjacency matrix, E, in Equation 6.4, representing a notional layer
or terrorist cell. Since all individuals have the same number of connections, shared
among all others, the tie strengths are all equivalent. Interestingly, for complete
graphs, larger networks result in smaller values for the similarity coefficients. In





Figure 6.3: Five-Actor Complete Graph
is shown by Equation 6.5. The resulting tie strength matrix corresponding to Figure




1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1








0 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
0.1429 0 0.1429 0.1429 0.1429
0.1429 0.1429 0 0.1429 0.1429
0.1429 0.1429 0.1429 0 0.1429





Larger complete networks would yield similar results but with smaller values for
tie strength. Thus, as an individual’s time, cognitive demand, and attention becomes
more dispersed, the more detrimental the effect upon tie strength. This can change,
however, when a bias between one or more individuals is introduced. Such a bias,
while using this approach, may be accomplished by incorporating multiple layers. For
example, suppose the initial graph in Figure 6.3 represented operational ties of some
sort. Consider another context or layer capturing the familial relationships among
the five members. Suppose that members 1, 2 and 3 are all related in a meaningful
positive familial way. All other individuals have no common, familial ties. The E
matrix is shown in Equation 6.7. Note that the first 10 columns correspond to the




1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0







0 0.2000 0.2000 0.1111 0.1111
0.2000 0 0.2000 0.1111 0.1111
0.2000 0.2000 0 0.1111 0.1111
0.1111 0.1111 0.1111 0 0.1429




The results in Equation 6.8 depict the shift of tie strengths due to increased
similarity (or elements in common) among actors 1, 2, and 3. Accordingly, the tie
strengths between these actors and the others not as well connected decreased; such
phenomena is mathematically due to the changes in similarity and practically due





Figure 6.4: Strength Example s12 with Five-Actor Multigraph
This effect is also illustrated graphically in Figure 6.4, which shows the two layers
superimposed upon each other to form a hypergraph. As an example, consider the
tie strength between actors 1 and 2, highlighted by the dashed circle. The Jaccardian
measure is essentially the total number of links shared between actors 1 and 2, divided
by the total number of links emanating from both actors, or s12 = 2/10 = 0.2000.
Along this line of thought, the measure values also correspond to ties generally
described as weak, connecting separate subgroups [Granovetter, 1983], or as bridges
[Brass, 1995]. For example, consider the notional network having two apparent
subgroups with two links between them in Figure 6.5. The ties between actors 2 and
6, and 4 and 10 are among the lowest values for tie strength. In general, the more
opportunity two individuals have to focus on each other, instead of their other social
contacts, the stronger the resultant tie.
Of course, this approach implicitly assumes that each layer or context con-
tributes equally to the strength of a tie. In reality, some contexts may be more
meaningful than others, as perceived by the individuals’ culture, organizational his-








Figure 6.5: Notional Network with Connected Subgroups
what extent the significant components of an organizations ties are, as well as their
relative contribution to tie strength, a weighted approach similar to that suggested
by Clark may be more appropriate. This approach is discussed next.
6.3.2 Decision Theoretic Approach
The decision theoretic model proposed here requires the following underlying
assumptions: (1) information characterizing non-cooperative networks is available;
(2) this information is comprised of, or can be broken down into, multiple layers or
contexts that are perceived to significantly contribute to tie strength; and, (3) the
degree to which each layer contributes to the trust and understanding between two
people as defined in Definition 11 is known or can be effectively estimated.
The model is based upon the construct of tie strength due to Granovetter [1973,
pg. 1361], which suggests that time, intensity of emotions invoked by the relation-
ship, level of intimacy among the two individuals, and the exchange of or reliance
upon another’s services may potentially capture the strength of a tie [Granovetter,
1973, 1361]. The corresponding model is shown in Figure 6.6.
“Reciprocal Services” are currently not incorporated within the value model
for tie strength. This component could be included, assuming a formal definition and
corresponding measure is developed. However, this particular aspect of tie strength







Significant Event(s) Friendship Familial
Figure 6.6: Value Model of Tie Strength
of tie strength, especially when considering the relationship of strength to either arc
capacity or cost within a network flow formulation, is hypothesized to be a function of
individual characteristics, rather than the underlying composition of an interpersonal
tie. As such, asymmetry arising from differences between individuals is discussed in
Chapter VII. Negative ties are assumed beyond the scope of this research but are
certainly of future interest within the context of applying information operations
against a target network.
The evaluation measures for this model are summarized in Table 6.3. Of the
two potential indicators of tie strength, frequency of interaction and time spent
within a relationship, Marsden and Campbell found that the correlation between
the (self-assessed) tie strength and time spent was the most appropriate, as the
frequency of interaction tends to be confounded or conditional upon the nature of
the relationship. Consequently, the first component of this model captures this
temporal aspect. The measure is specifically defined as “the time elapsed since the
initial observation of active participation in any significant event.” This data for a
given pair of individuals is essentially captured when that relationship is discovered–
using either that specific point in time as the basis of the measure or information
about the tie that explicitly states when the tie was formed. The amount of time
is then compared to the maximum amount of time elapsed for the oldest known tie
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Table 6.3: Evaluation Measures for Tie Strength
Measure Lower Upper
Title Measure Unit Type bound bound
Time Time elapsed since the initial
observation of active participa-







Have the individuals actively
participated in one or more
events or are associated with
each other within a given con-
text, either of which is believed
by domain experts to signifi-
cantly contribute to the trust




Friendship Have the individuals self con-
firmed a level of friendship?
Binary 0 1
Familial Are the individuals family
members?
Binary 0 1
within the network, over all layers. This allows the comparison between the most
senior and new members of the group.
This approach measures the time spent within a tie and assumes that increased
time within a relationship correlates to increased tie strength [Marsden and Camp-
bell, 1984]. Although the measure currently assumes a simple linear relationship
between time spent and tie strength, other forms of value functions could be used.
For example, an s-curve as shown in Figure 6.7 could be used to represent probation-
ary or indoctrination periods enforced by the target network, or some other period
of time generally required by the organization of interest regarding who they may
trust and how much.
The domain of this function is bounded above by the length of the oldest known
relationship. In addition, given a specific pair of individuals, if multiple contexts are
shared among their relationship within the Emotional Intensity or the Intimacy
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Trust-Building Period
















Figure 6.7: Time and Tie Strength
objectives, it is currently assumed that the contribution of time to tie strength is
based upon the oldest context–the one within which the relationship began.
Recalling that the objectives and their corresponding measures must be inde-
pendent for an additive value model, the connection inherent between time spent
within a relationship and its existence has the potential to be problematic. How-
ever, given two pairs of individuals A−B and C−D with relationships composed of
identical contexts, variation of tie strength among them is assumed to be explained
by the amount of time those pairs of individuals have had to develop the relation-
ship and concomitant levels of trust [Marsden and Campbell, 1984; Granovetter,
1973, 1983; Levin et al., 2002]. In this sense, the objectives may then be viewed as
mathematically independent.
The Emotional Intensity and Intimacy objectives attempt to ascertain tie
strength due to one or more significant, bonding events and friendship or familial
ties, respectively. These types of contexts that may comprise an interpersonal rela-
tionship essentially form the different layers within the layered-network paradigm.
Significant bonding events are those that not only bring individuals together, but
induce trust via the knowingly joint involvement in a stressful situation, either physi-
cally or in the form of cognitive dissonance [Downs, 2006, pg. 3-6]. Examples of such
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events could include indoctrination, training, attending and actively participating in
educational forums exploring activist or extremist ideologies contrary or significantly
different from generally accepted practices, and so forth.
Determining which contexts play the most significant role in tie strength is not
a straightforward task, as they are likely dependent upon the network of interest. The
network’s goals and objectives, methods of recruitment and training, and any other
potential layer of contributing relations must also be viewed from their perspective
rather than our own. The secretive nature of the organizations of interest may
indirectly determine which contexts are important, based upon the contexts and
connections inherent within the observational data.
Overall, the value model approach is similar to a simple weighted summation of
multiplex relations, further moderated by the age of the relation. This is amenable to
situations where very limited data exists, in both quantity and quality. In addition,
assuming that the presence of an additional context increases tie strength, then
according to Sarle [1995], the binary variables connoting the presence or absence
of layers between individuals are at least ratio [Sarle, 1995]. Considering that the
contribution of time to the strength of a tie is also ratio, the weighted combination
required to ascertain a single value is ratio as well. Consequently, this measurement
approach is mathematically appropriate for use as either an arc capacity or a cost
per unit flow within a network flow model of the social network. The next logical
task is how to weight each of these measures.
6.4 Weighting & Tie Strength
As discussed in Section 2.5.5.1, a variety of weighting techniques exist. Al-
though indifference measurement appears to be the most theoretically sound ap-
proach to weighting value models over that of numerical estimation methods, both
methods continue to be applied and debated within the current literature.
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Note that the overall purpose of the decision theoretic model presented in
this chapter is to estimate the strength of interpersonal ties from the individuals’
perspectives, not our own. Consequently, eliciting weights from members of a non-
cooperative network is assumed to be problematic and unreliable. What can be
done, however, is to examine the underlying structures and contexts that have led to
the network data discovered to date. Based upon such a review, further hypotheses
may be offered regarding which context or contexts actually resulted in the observed
topology, and therefore play significant roles in how the members initiate and sustain
their clandestine relationships.
For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that subject matter experts,
cognizant of the cultural, sociological, and operational aspects of the target network,
are able to provide at least initial estimates of the model weights. This may be
accomplished via the numerical estimation techniques shown in Table 2.14. As an
alternative, if one also assumes that tie strength derived from multiple contexts is
also a function of the number of ties existing within that context, dynamic weighting
approaches may be applied. The following definitions explain the overall model,
shown in Equation 6.9.
sij = Estimated strength of interpersonal tie between i and j
Tij = Time elapsed of the first context shared by i and j
wT = Weight for the Time component, Tij , of the model
SElij = 1 if ∃ a relationship between i and j within context l; 0 otherwise
wSEl = Weight for SElij
wEI = Weight for the Emotional Intensity component of the model
FRij = 1 if ∃ an acknowledged friendship between i and j; 0 otherwise
wFR = Weight for FRij
FAij = 1 if ∃ a familial relationship between i and j; 0 otherwise
wFA = Weight for FAij
wI = Weight for the Intimacy component of the model
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+ wI (wFRFRij + wFAFAij) (6.9)
If dynamic weighting was of interest for the weights associated with network
layers (wSEl, wFR, wFA), at least two approaches are available. The first, and most
straightforward approach, is to assume that the propensity of relations in a given
layer l is directly proportional to that layer’s contribution to tie strength. For ex-
ample, suppose El is the number of edges (relations) in a given layer l ∈ L and EL is
the sum of all edges in the network. The relative weight for a given layer l is given
by wl = El/EL, or the percent of all ties attributed specifically to the lth layer. As
the network evolves and changes over time, so would the weights; since these are
percentages, this approach also maintains a normalized weight set.
A second approach first requires initial estimates of relative weights for each
layer wl. Next, define ρl(t) as the ratio of the number of edges in a given layer l to





Let δl denote the relative change in in the network due to the edges within
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The weights at time t + 1, adjusted for relative changes in the composition of the








Note that combination of Equations 6.11 and 6.12 have several desirable prop-
erties. First, if no changes are evident within the layers, the original weights specified
by the subject matter experts are still applicable and remain constant. Second, if a
layer, and its associated edges is eliminated for some reason, the weight for that layer
goes to zero; this matches the intuitive result with regards to the now non-existent
layer’s contribution to tie strength. Finally, relative allocations among weights that
remain unchanged over time also remain constant; this preserves the tradeoffs origi-
nally estimated by the subject matter experts and is . For example, suppose the origi-
nal weight matrix is given by w = [ 0.5 0.3 0.2 ]. If the edges associated with layer
two are all removed, the adjusted weight vector is ω = [ 0.71429 0 0.28571 ]. Note
that the ratios between the first and third weights (0.5/0.2 = 0.71429/0.28571 = 2.5)
remain constant. This holds true for any pair of weights that correspond to unchang-
ing layers over time.
6.5 Summary
This chapter reviewed some of the details, advantages, and disadvantages of
previous efforts seeking to measure interpersonal relations. A formal definition of
interpersonal tie strength is offered to provide some conceptual clarity, and two mod-
els were proposed to facilitate its measurement. Both models assume that limited
information is available due to the clandestine and adversarial nature of the networks
of interest to the U.S. Government.
The first model applied the Jaccardian similarity coefficient to estimate the
strength of a tie between two individuals. This coefficient takes into account both
the context(s) between two individuals, as well as the cognitive demand upon them
due to the other ties they currently maintain. The second model takes a decision
theoretic approach to tie strength, leveraging the findings within sociological liter-
ature describing the components of interpersonal tie strength. Due to the inherent
nature of the target network and its associated data, direct and dynamic weight-
216
ing techniques using classical numerical estimation techniques are suggested. The
mathematical properties, either in a static or dynamic sense, are attractive for use in
mathematical programs due to their ratio scale. As seen in previous research efforts,
the measures of tie strength could be used as arc capacities within a network flow
formulation. However, the potential relationship between tie strength and the ‘cost’
of social interaction also suggests that the inverse of tie strength could serve as the
cost per unit flow along an arc within a similar network model. The next chapter
continues the development of translating observational data for use within mathe-
matical programming applications, focusing upon the concepts and applications of
gains, losses, and thresholds.
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VII. Gains, Losses, and Thresholds
7.1 Chapter Overview
In light of the complex and elusive terrorist networks that have become of more
prominent interest in U. S. since the September 11th attack, it is not only important
to know the enemy but also to know the individuals with whom they interact: their
friends, enemies, confidants, relatives, classmates and collaborators. The information
garnered by uncovering and analyzing such networks offers a potential means to
generate, and possibly evaluate, courses of action that shape the intentions of the
network’s actors.
The concept of shaping intentions is particularly of interest in order to achieve
a given political or military goal. Influence campaigns seek to achieve political ob-
jectives through the conveyance of information and indicators with an intent to
“influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior
[of others]”[DOD, 2003, pg. ix]. Focusing upon the important actor(s) and attempt-
ing to influence their behavior within a given environmental and situational context
proves useful in a variety of applications including social, corporate and govern-
mental (including non-military) endeavors [Renfro and Deckro]. Unfortunately, the
most important actor, leader, or decision maker within a group is not always easily
accessible, Osama bin Laden of Al Qaeda, for example.
This chapter continues the development of translating data observed and char-
acterizing non-cooperative networks for use within mathematical programming ap-
plications, focusing primarily upon the concepts, measurement, and application of
gains, losses, and thresholds of influence. These items serve as a continuation of the
social network flow paradigm offered by Freeman et al. [1991], Renfro [2001], and
Clark [2005]. Conceptual development of gains, losses, and thresholds of influence
are discussed, and two potential means to measure this phenomenon are presented.
A logical extension of the network flow based centrality measure offered by Freeman
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et al. [1991] is explored. Finally, a demonstrative example illustrates the application
of mathematical programming, while accounting for gains, losses, and thresholds of
influence within a social network, to explore course of action analyses is demon-
strated.
7.2 Social Network Flows
Influence campaigns seek to achieve political objectives through the conveyance
of information and indicators to affect behavior. The social science literature is
replete with descriptive theory capturing the nature and transfer of influence at
an interpersonal level. Building upon these previous efforts, this chapter develops
connections between social science’s assessment of interpersonal communication and
operations research’s network flow formulation. Nuances of influence, specifically
gains, losses, and thresholds, from a sociological perspective are described and then
discussed within the context of a generalized network flow problem. Analysis of a
notional social network is presented, including applications of classical sensitivity
analysis to deal with uncertain data–an inevitability when dealing with clandestine
organizations. The resulting methodology explores courses of action that seek to
influence a potentially inaccessible target audience using their own indigenous social
network as a conduit.
Throughout the field of sociology, the endeavor of identifying actor importance
has been accomplished via a number of measures, relying primarily upon the appli-
cation of graph theory to social networks [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 169].
The majority of these measures focus on characterizing actor importance using var-
ious properties of location with respect to all other actors within a network. The
underlying assumption is that the most important, or most prominent, actors are
usually strategically located within the network [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg.
169]. The values derived for these measures are often related to the flow or transfer
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Table 7.1: SNA and Network Flow Relationships [Renfro and Deckro, 2003]
SNA Terms Flow Model Properties
People Nodes (sinks, sources, or transshipment)
Connectivity or affinity Capacitated arcs between nodes
Social Closeness Capacity
Influence Commodity
Potential Influence Magnitude of flow
Initiators of influence Source(s)
Targets to be influenced Sink(s)
Intermediaries involved Transshipment node(s)
of information or the flow of influence among actors within a network [Freeman et al.,
1991; Lopez et al., 2002; Renfro, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994].
From the sociological perspective, the most important actors either control or
have the ability to receive a greater amount of information relative to the other
individuals within a social network. This chapter approaches actor importance from
a slightly different perspective in that the most important actors will comprise the
target audience of psychological operations. This could include an organization’s
decision makers or possibly a target population that is a subset of the overall network.
The representation of influence as a transferrable commodity, however, carries over
and serves as the basis of the methodology presented. Recall the mapping between
SNA and OR, presented again in Table 7.1.
Renfro suggested that gains and losses of information or influence in the con-
text of SNA are analogous to “. . . preconceived opinions or influence from outside
the network being modeled . . . predispositions of individuals favoring (or opposed
to) the influence represented by the flow . . . or communication problems such as
misunderstanding the message” [Renfro, 2001, pg. 88]. These suppositions actually
incorporate several areas within persuasion theory.
For example, “preconceived opinions” invokes the concepts of knowledge and
reporting bias. The former “is the presumption that a communicator has a biased
view of an issue” [Perloff, 2003, pg. 164]. Reporting bias is “the perception that
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the communicator has opted not to report or disclose certain facts or points of view
[Perloff, 2003, pg. 167]. Therefore, considering these types of biases, and minimizing
their effects, is important when imposing an influence upon the access points to a
target network.
The “predispositions” of individuals and the acceptance or denial of influence
relates to the how successful the persuasion will tend to be. Perloff defines persuasion
as “a symbolic process in which communicators try to convince other people to
change their attitudes or behavior regarding an issue through the transmission of a
message, in an atmosphere of free choice” [Perloff, 2003, pg. 9]. The reinforcement
or change of a predisposition is, in effect, the influence. It is important to note that
successfully influencing an individual could be a the result of persuasion or power,
both of which contribute to the model development discussed in the next section.
Lastly, “communication problems” such as misunderstanding the message could
simply be due to inter-media transfers (e.g., voice to transcript), inter-language trans-
fers (e.g, translations and transliterations), or inter-personal communication media
(e.g., errors or failures of communication devices or the users that implement them).
This last area reinforces the fact that influence is a phenomenon that is specific to
the actor and sender involved in the communication. Thus, the measurement of the
forces that may modify the flow of influence within a social network is problematic.
Even more complicating is the fact that a desired change in attitude or behavior is
also dependent upon the setting within which the inter-personal exchange is made.
7.2.1 The Flow of Influence
The seminal work of French describes the formative theory of social power and
analyzed and addressed some of its limitations. In the course of his work, French
defined “the basis of interpersonal power. . . as the more or less enduring relationship
between (two individuals) A and B which gives rise to power” [French, 1956, pg.
183]. He then described five bases for power: attraction, expert, reward, coercive,
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and legitimate [French, 1956, pg. 183-4]. In examining the impact of peer group
influence upon opinion formation, a now prevalent interpretation of French’s work is
that “[French] first proposed that social influence was a finite distributed resource”
[Friedkin and Cook, 1990, pg. 130].
Friedkin and Cook discuss social influence in the context of interpersonal re-
lations within a network and their subsequent role in the exchanges of influence
required to enable opinion formation [Friedkin and Cook, 1990]. The resulting mod-
els essentially attempt to describe the personal interactions that transform a network
of individuals with discrepant opinions into a network whose members’ opinions have
coalesced, at least to some degree. Similar concepts in social network literature that
are based upon an exchange of influence between individuals include contagion (of
behavior) [Leenders, 2002; Scherer and Cho, 2003], diffusion (the rate of acceptance
of innovative and possibly risky ideas or behavior) [Valente, 1996], and the “infec-
tious movement of desires and ideas from mind to mind” in the context of permission
marketing [Buchanan, 2002, pg. 160-1].
Beginning with French’s work, it is clear that the social science research and
theory liken the interaction between two individuals and the resultant exchange of
information, opinion, or influence to that of a commodity that flows between them.
When utilizing social network analysis concepts such as tie strength (or social close-
ness) to serve as arc capacities in a flow of influence analysis, there are some instances
where this measure alone may be insufficient to accurately determine the influence
one individual has over the other. The next sections elaborate upon modeling such
concepts–gains, losses and thresholds of social influence.
7.2.2 Gains and Losses
To frame the context of gains and losses of influence, it is critical to begin
with a set of working definitions, as influence, persuasion, and power are frequently
interchanged within the literature, despite their subtle differences. In a more recent
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theoretical look at these concepts, Lovaglia et al. [2003] define influence “to occur
when a person’s opinion or behavior changes to conform to the suggestion of another
without the threat of punishment or the promise of reward” [Lovaglia et al., 2003,
pg. 109]. Persuasion, then, is a tool used to influence others. On the other hand,
the concept of power implies the use of force, coercion, sanctions, or is derived from
opposing interests and the availability of resources to those opposing parties [Lovaglia
et al., 2003, pg. 109-10]. However, Goldhamer and Shils defines a powerful person
as one who “influences the behavior of others in accordance with his own intentions”
[Goldhamer and Shils, 1939, pg. 171]. Ultimately, applications of both power and
persuasion seek to change or modify another’s behavior or attitude; the difference
between them lies in the method chosen to induce this change. Therefore, taking a
more general approach, let influence be defined as follows.
Definition 12. Influence: to induce a change in behavior of another that conforms
to the influencing actor’s desires, either cooperatively or otherwise
Elements of both persuasion and power theory may now be used to explain,
and serve as a basis for a mathematical model of, gains and losses of influence.
The resulting measurements are associated with specific i-j pairs of actors. As
expected, some individuals in a social network can be more (or less) influential,
despite the strength, or closeness, of their relationships. Many situations may exist
where influence is not necessarily equitable between the two actors, resulting in an
interaction-dependent effect upon the information or influence exchange between two
actors. For example, a father and son may have a strong bond between them, and
therefore a relatively high value for tie strength. However, regarding the influence
one has over the other, the father and son are likely unequal.
This approach differentiates this methodology from the one suggested by Clark
[2005] regarding the effects of tie strength and influence differentials due to the
sending actor’s characteristics. Clark developed a combined measure of potential




Figure 7.1: Arc with Multiplier
[Clark, 2005, pg. 3-34]. The method presented here contends that, as illustrated
by the father-son example, tie strength between two individuals serves as an upper
bound for the potential flow of influence between them–a true arc capacity. How
easily an individual can promulgate influence to fill the arc to capacity is dependent
upon the receiving actor’s perception of power or persuasive ability inherent within
the sending actor. Effectively, less (more) effort must be exerted by influential or
powerful (less influential or powerful) people in order to promulgate the same amount
of influence.
This suggests the information or influence flow through a network may require a
multiplier to improve the requisite representation of network behavior in network flow
models. This technique is borrowed from the generalized network flow formulation,
which has been applied to physical systems exhibiting similar traits (e.g., spoilage
of fruit during shipment, evaporation or collection of water during its movement
through open irrigation canals, exchanges rates, and so forth).
Suppose that individual j has great respect for individual i such that individual
i always has a tremendous impact (i.e., influence) upon individual j (e.g., actor i may
be referred to as an opinion leader). This gain in influence on arc (i, j), illustrated
in Figure 7.1, consequently requires that g(i,j) > 1, and has the corresponding GNF
constraint for node j: x(j,k) − g(i,j)x(i,j) ≥ 0. Subsequently, for every x(i,j) unit of
flow pushed through arc (i, j), g(i,j)x(i,j) units of flow arrive at node j.
Alternatively, suppose that individual j has never been impressed with indi-
vidual i, possibly due to individual i demonstrating poor performance or untrustwor-
thiness in past interactions; for example, the loyalty or honesty of actor i has been
previously questioned. The corresponding GNF constraint for an influence loss on arc
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(i, j) is identical to the gains constraint with the exception that 0 < g(i,j) < 1. Ulti-
mately, the influence that actor i has over others is reduced from the level of influence
that originally flowed out of individual i. The degradation could easily be attributed
to personality conflicts, miscommunication, disrupted communication, and even the
network structure itself [Friedkin and Johnsen, 2002; Lopez et al., 2002]. Degra-
dation of flow through a network is also a common phenomenon observed within
physical networks such as communications, energy, shipping, and irrigation [Ahuja
et al., 1993, pg. 8].
Of course, there may exist any combination of the multipliers g(i,j) on the
arcs within the given network. Potential means to place a number on a gain or
loss of influence between two individuals could include evaluating individuals in the
context of the bases of power, attraction, expert, reward, coercive, and legitimate,
discussed in French [1956, pg. 183-4]. In addition, the work of Lopez et al. [2002],
originally intended to explore the efficiencies, or more specifically the lack thereof,
of information flow within the “traditional hierarchical topologies commonly used
by organizations,” developed an information dominance measure that could serve
as a proxy for the gain multiplier [Lopez et al., 2002]. An approach, similar to the
one taken by Clark [2005] to account for individual-specific effects of interpersonal
influence, is described next.
7.2.3 Measurement of Gains
Since influence, as defined in Definition 12, essentially contains elements of
power and/or persuasion theory, a model of influence gain should be able to ac-
count for either or both phenomenon. Such a concept exists: charisma. Charismatic
leaders often share the fundamental communicator characteristics of authority, cred-
ibility, and social attractiveness [Perloff, 2003, pg. 152]. As seen in Figure 7.2, the
characteristics contributing to charisma may involve elements of power, persuasion,
or both. Mathematically modeling the charisma of a communicator is clearly prob-
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Figure 7.2: Charisma [Kelman, 1961; Perloff, 2003]
lematic, as not only are these concepts subjective, but the measurement and roles
of each characteristic are dependent upon the situation within which the communi-
cation occurs [Perloff, 2003, pg. 159, 161-3]. In addition, “just as there is not one
type of charismatic leader, there is not one defining characteristic of effective com-
municators” [Perloff, 2003, pg. 152]. The literature is replete with efforts attempting
determine what factors or attributes significantly contribute to leadership, charisma,
power, and persuasive ability [cf. Kelman, 1961; Anderson et al., 2001; Perloff, 2003,
Chp. 6, among others]. The answer seems to be a resounding ‘It depends’.
Nonetheless, a multiple logistic regression model offers an opportunity to mea-
sure the gain (or loss) between two individuals based upon their attributes that may
contribute to, or serve as a proxy for, a certain qualitative level of charisma as il-
lustrated in Figure 7.2. With regard to multiple logistic regression, “the response
variable of interest has only two possible qualitative outcomes, and therefore can be
represented by a binary indicator variable taking on values 0 and 1” [Neter et al.,
1996, pg. 567]. For this model, let Yi = 1 indicate that the ith individual is per-
ceived as charismatic or a member of the organization’s leadership structure, zero
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otherwise. Further, let X denote p attributes hypothesized to contribute to charisma
(or lack thereof); these predictor variables may be “quantitative or qualitative and
represented by indicator variables” [Neter et al., 1996, pg. 581]. Examples could
include time spent in a group, age, education levels, reputation, and so forth. With
Equation 7.1, the multiple logistic regression model is given by Equation 7.2 [Neter
et al., 1996, pg. 581-3].
β ′Xi = β0 + β1Xi,1 + . . . + βp−1Xi,p−1 (7.1)
E {Yi} = πi = [1 + exp (−β ′Xi)]−1 (7.2)
With b denoting the maximum likelihood estimate of β, the fitted logistic response
values are
π̂i = [1 + exp (−b′Xi)]−1 . (7.3)
The estimated logistic response function, or fitted value, for actor i, denoted π̂i,
is interpreted as the estimated probability that actor i, with the given characteristics
Xi is charismatic, a leader, or to whatever the a priori definition of Yi = 1 has been
set [Neter et al., 1996, pg. 577]. The probabilities π̂i serve as inputs to
gij = 1 + π̂i − π̂j. (7.4)
When the transmission of influence is being sent from a less charismatic indi-
vidual i (low π̂i) to a higher or more likely charismatic individual j (higher π̂j) then
the gain multiplier tends to be less than 1, indicating a loss or degradation of influ-
ence. Ultimately, given an identical amount of influence required to pass between
two individuals, less influential (or charismatic) individuals must exert more energy
than those who are more charismatic.
Since π̂i ∈ [0, 1], gij ∈ [0, 2]. Recall that gij = 1 implies neither a loss nor
a gain of the commodity as it flows along the arc. A multiplier of gij < 1 implies
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Figure 7.3: Gain Domain Based on π̂i
a loss, and gij > 1 implies a gain. Suppose Yi = 1 if individual i is designated to
be charismatic–and therefore influential–or 0 otherwise. If two actors i and j are
peers with similar traits or characteristics that contribute to charisma, then it is
assumed that they will have an equitable exchange of influence, or gij ≈ 1. Note
that this also applies to peers that are both non-charismatic. Consequently, small
differences between individuals having similar charismatic or influential scores π̂i and
π̂j will tend toward a gain multiplier of 1. Values of gij between peers not equal to
one is to be expected, as Shamir noted that several theories regarding charismatic
leadership “share the assumption that such leadership can be found at all levels
of the organization” [Shamir, 1995, pg. 20]. The different possible scenarios are
summarized in Figure 7.3.
The special case where π̂i = 0 and π̂j = 1, resulting in gij = 0 could be the
mathematical equivalent of “Chicken Little,” who is so uninfluential, so unpersuasive,
so uncharismatic that the receiver j will ignore the influence emanated from actor
i. It is also important to recognize the upper bound is 2 when applying this model.
If such a multiplier is deemed insufficient (in magnitude), subject matter expertise
will be required to differentiate these cases from those determined by Equation 7.4.
Additionally, the specific components of Equation 7.1 are unlikely to be completely
determined a priori; therefore, the definitive list of traits that mathematically charac-
terize an influential individual are more likely to be predicated upon the, presumably
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limited, data available. Fortunately, techniques exist to test hypotheses regarding
the statistical significance of such traits, means to deal with missing data, and other
methods to gain new insight into the data and the organization [cf. Little and Rubin,
1987].
Finally, the incorporation of gains into a generalized network flow model of a
social network is a logical and relatively straightforward extension of the centrality
measure developed by Freeman et al. [1991] (which is also similar to the one devel-
oped by Brandes and Fleischer [2005]). The measure developed by Freeman et al.
evaluated various maximum flow characteristics of the network using hypothesized
arc values representing the strength of a relationship. These arc capacities were
simply assumed to be available. With the measures of tie strength developed in
Chapter VI supplementing the previous methods developed by Renfro [2001] and
Clark [2005] along with the inclusion of gains and losses due to persuasion presented
in this chapter, a generalized and assumed more representative network flow model
may be analyzed. MATLAB functions to perform network flow and generalized
network flow centrality are provided in Appendices K and L, respectively. Both
measures are applied to the data set discussed in Chapter VIII. The next section
explores the use of right-hand side values in GNF to model influence thresholds.
7.2.4 Thresholds
Numerous social science researchers allude to the existence of what could be
referred to as a threshold–a point at which an individual decides between two or
more competing alternatives that is dependent upon both external influences and
internal principles [cf., Buchanan, 2002, pg. 158]. The right-hand side values (bi)
can be used to model thresholds.
When the right-hand side coefficient (bi) is less than 0 it signifies that node i
seeks a demand of the commodity, in this case influence, of the absolute value of that
amount. This notion of demand is one way to model thresholds of influence required
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for an individual to pass, or fail to pass, influence further through the network.
Again, the bases of attraction, or lack thereof, proposed by French [1956] may serve
as a foundation for threshold measurement. Social position (e.g., a gatekeeper)
may also serve as an indicator that some threshold of influence, passed from one
or more other individuals, exists. Freeman describes the gatekeeper as one who is
“not conceived as being in a general sort of position of control like a position high
in centrality based on betweenness. Instead, he or she is the keeper of the gate
controlling communication to and from a particular other person vis-à-vis the rest
of the network” [Freeman, 1980, pg. 586].
Another view of thresholds is due to Granovetter, who suggests that “an actor
has two distinct and mutually exclusive behavioral alternatives” [Granovetter, 1978,
pg. 1422]. The alternative ultimately chosen is dependent upon the costs and benefits
of that choice, the values of which are derived by the number of others observed
making the same choice [Granovetter, 1978, pg. 1422]. Using the predilection to
join a riot as an example, Buchanan observed that “The level of someone’s threshold
(to join a riot) would depend on their personality, and on how seriously they take
threats of punishment, for example” [Buchanan, 2002, pg. 107] [cf., Granovetter and
Soong, 1983, pg. 166].
In the context of this methodology, once the threshold is met, that is, once
a certain amount of external influence has flowed to, and is absorbed by, that in-
dividual from his or her networked peers, that individual will accept the influence
as beneficial enough to propagate further. All of these aspects essentially comprise
the data elements required for model input: a value for the threshold, the potential
interactions, and the levels of influence given an interaction has occurred.
A number of interesting network behaviors can be captured via thresholds.
Consider the GNF analogy, where actor j requires some amount of influence (bj < 0)




Figure 7.4: Node Demand (Threshold)
actor k. The general concept is illustrated in Figure 7.4; the corresponding constraint
is x(j,k) − x(i,j) ≥ bj .
An extreme variation of this case may include an absorbing node. For such a
node, the demand for influence must be at least as great as the sum of the capacities





From Figure 7.4, if bj = −Uj , the individual j would prevent influence from passing
on to actor k. The mathematical formulation for this constraint in the GNF for
any given node j is x(j,k) − x(i,j) ≥ −Uj . Such an individual may be likened to an
overzealous gatekeeper or someone who is isolating actor k from other influences.
Demand at any given node i (bi) is also analogous to the threshold of an
individual’s vulnerability to be influenced by others within the network. For example,
some individuals, due to position within the organization, psychosocial tendency, and
so forth, will readily accept influence and immediately promulgate it to others with
whom they are connected. Essentially, these individuals simply serve as a pass-
through where bi = 0, also known as a transshipment node. The GNF formulation
for this case is simply the conservation of flow, x(j,k) − x(i,j) = 0. Most individuals
are unlikely to behave as an overzealous gatekeeper; others are more savvy regarding
the likelihood of an influence campaign against their organization. Therefore, the
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Figure 7.5: Conditional Gatekeeper
An alternative approach to thresholds that permits a m-out-of-n reporting
scheme may also be accomplished via the use of right-hand-side values. For exam-
ple, suppose that an individual must receive m independent reports out of n possible
sources. In this setting, “reports” could comprise a flow of influence via a message.
Based upon organizational procedures, individual j uses independent sources to con-
firm the authenticity or importance of the influence prior to forwarding the message
deeper into the organization. The actor essentially serves as a conditional gatekeeper;
influence is passed on if a specified condition is met. This approach is illustrated
in Figure 7.5. Suppose that no gains or losses are evident in the arcs between 1,
2, 3, j, and k. Further, assume that flow on these arcs is either 0 or 1. The net-
work structure in Figure 7.5 essentially depicts the m-out-of-n situation. The first
unit of influence sent to actor j is consumed by the demand bj = −1. Therefore,
actor j must get information or influence from at least 2 of the 3 individuals before
information or influence is passed on to actor k.
7.2.5 Costs
The final variable within the GNF formulation to review is cost per unit flow
along the arcs c(i,j). Developing the cost per unit flow along the arcs requires a local
perspective from each actor. If influence is to pass between two individuals (i, j),
then actor i must internally consider the various costs and benefits of transmitting
the message or influence, and actor j must internally decide his or her own costs and
232
benefits of forwarding the influence further. These concepts are reflected in social
action theory.
In studying the impact of social network structures upon their internal infor-
mation flow, Yamaguchi [1994] emphasizes the importance of social action in the
diffusion of information within a social network. He states two main reasons for this
concept’s relevance from both a receiving and transmitting viewpoint. When receiv-
ing information or influence, “actors evaluate information and act according to the
results of their evaluations” [Yamaguchi, 1994, pg. 59]. This evaluation may include
consideration of who transmitted the information, in what fashion, in what context,
at what level of emphasis, or any number of situation-dependent perspectives. When
transmitting influence, a more relevant concept when trying to ascertain the poten-
tial costs for the GNF model, the action “will depend not simply on the presence of
communication between them, but on the rational assessment of costs and benefits
regarding the exchange of information [Yamaguchi, 1994, pg. 59].
Therefore, the mere existence of a communication path does not necessarily
guarantee that information or influence will flow freely. Although the specific concept
of ‘costs and benefits’ was not further elaborated upon by Yamaguchi [1994], this
concept appears to accommodate important aspects regarding costs in the GNF
formulation. Such costs would include each actor’s own assessment of the risks
associated with enacting a communique, the actual cost to transmit the influence
(e.g., email, long-distance call, satellite call, travel via donkey through a treacherous
mountain pass, and so forth), and other factors (e.g., the possible ‘penalty’ for passing
on rumors or propaganda in a given environment) as necessary. The costs stemming
from a perspective external to the network are similar in nature, but are assessed as
those costs as perceived by the organization trying to pass influence into the network.
These may also incorporate likelihood of mission success from either perspective.
Measurement of influence in the context of SNA is “based upon the importance
of relationships among interacting (individuals)” [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg.
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4]. One of the underlying principles of SNA is that “. . . individuals view the network
structural environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual
action” [Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pg. 4]. This implies that when an individual
within a network comes upon a decision point, they tend to take certain individual’s
opinions (e.g., those socially close) or authority into account. There are a variety of
examples in SNA literature that investigate and attempt to measure this influence
[cf., Frank and Yasumoto, 1988; Friedkin and Cook, 1990, among others].
7.2.6 Solution Procedures
When studying social networks as generalized network flow problems there are
a range of choices of solution approaches. First, the problem may be formulated
and solved as a linear program (LP). Alternatively, the problem may be solved
via the network simplex algorithm. Although the two approaches share the same
underlying requirements for feasibility and optimality, the latter is “200-300 times
faster” [Bazaraa et al., 1990, pg. 419]. Due to relatively simple nature of the notional
example in the next section, the analysis is conducted via a LP formulation and
solution. Use of a LP approach facilitates conducting post-optimality analyses that
provide a means to deal with the underlying uncertainty in input data.
7.2.7 Network Flow
Two mathematical formulations of the network flow problem, both character-
izing influence as the commodity, are of interest: the maximum flow (MF) and the
generalized network flow (GNF) problems. MF, a special case of GNF, determines
the maximum flow that can pass from one or more source nodes to one or more sink
nodes. MF is useful in determining whether or not any flow between two individuals
or groups of interest through the network is feasible. MF has also been used as a
basis for a social network analysis measure using valued social networks as an input
[Freeman et al., 1991]. The work of Freeman et al. [1991] represents one of the early
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departures in SNA from binary representations of relationships (they either do or
do not exist) to one that accounts for the strength of interpersonal relationships
when trying to estimate actor importance. For their SNA measure, Freeman et al.
[1991] used a value representing the strength of a relationship as an arc capacity in
a social network; they then applied MF to each actor, using the actor as a source
and all other actors as sinks, in order to ascertain actor importance. While Freeman
et al. [1991] simply assumed these values would be made available, Renfro [2001]
devised a means to estimate the strength of a relationship and then applied various
approaches, including MF, to gain insight into clandestine social networks. An addi-
tional application of MF to clandestine social networks is found in Clark [2005], who
combined a topology-based SNA measure with information derived from individual
characteristics to estimate relationship strengths.
The mathematical model of primary interest in this chapter is GNF, which
satisfies a predetermined amount of flow between one or more source nodes to one or
more sink nodes in an oftentimes least-cost manner. The GNF provides a means to
model a variety of real-world networks with commodities that undergo degradation or
improvement over time or distance. In the context of interpersonal communication,
one such degradation process could include the content and context of a rumor spread
throughout a social network, where the message received by the second person could
be significantly garbled when received by the twentieth person in a chain or path.
The inherently flexible nature of GNF, particularly the ability to model changes in
commodity levels during its travel through a network, lends itself to capturing the
phenomena of gains, losses, and thresholds of influence within a social network.
Building on the work of [Freeman et al., 1991; Renfro, 2001; Renfro and
Deckro], this research continues the development of the parallels between the flow of
commodities in the physical world and the flow of influence in the behavioral realm.
To begin, the generalized network flow problem formulation first presented in Section
2.6.3 is repeated [Ahuja et al., 1993, pg. 567-8].
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Table 7.2: GFP Variable Definition
Variable Definition
c(i,j) ≡ the cost per unit flow induced from node i to node j
x(i,j) ≡ number of units of flow from node i to node j on arc




bi ≡ 0 if node i is a transshipment, or ‘pass-through,’ node;
< 0 if demand is required by node i; and, > 0 if supply
is provided from node i
g(i,j) ≡ a rational value > (<)1 that indicates if arc (i, j) is gainy
(lossy); if g(i,j) = 1, then the arc (i, j) is neither one
N ≡ the set of nodes (individuals) within the network
A ≡ the set of arcs (i, j) (connections between individuals)










g(j,i)x(j,i) ≥ bi ∀ i ∈ N (7.7)
0 ≤ x(i,j) ≤ u(i,j) ∀ (i, j) ∈ A (7.8)
The objective function, Equation 7.6, seeks to minimize the total cost of flow
through the network, subject to the mass balance and arc capacity constraints–
Equations 7.7 and 7.8, respectively. Note that the constraints 7.7, which replace
the equality (=) with (≥) from the traditional mass balance constraint, allows for
potential violations of traditional conservation of flow assumptions. This extension,
a relaxation of the original formulation, facilitates feasibility, particularly when gains
and losses affect flow (e.g., 1 unit enters and, due to gains, say 2 or more must exit)
and when arcs are capacitated (e.g., there exists a maximum amount of flow that
may traverse the arc, social closeness serving as an upper bound in this case).
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7.2.8 Underlying Assumptions
This approach equates influence to the commodity that flows through the net-
work; the amount of influence traveling from actor i to actor j is denoted by x(i,j).
The greater the magnitude of x(i,j), the greater the relative influence exerted upon
individual j by individual i.
In addition, social closeness is defined as a positive, real-valued estimate of the
“maximum potential influence one person i has upon another person j in a set of
N people in a given scenario;” this serves as the capacities of potential influence,
denoted u(i,j) in the GNF formulation [Renfro, 2001, pg. 89].
The remaining parameters, g(i,j), bi, and c(i,j) are the focus of this chapter.
The arc multiplier g(i,j) provides a means to model gains and losses of influence. The
demand variables bi, when associated with a transhipment node (i.e., an individual
that is neither a source nor a sink) may be used to model individual thresholds.
Relationships between the cost coefficient c(i,j) and operational risks associated with
interpersonal communication are suggested. Such costs could represent one of two
types of risk: either internally among the organization’s members, or externally as
an aspect of initiating or determining the efficacy of an influence operation course
of action, for example. Other costs are possible as warranted.
A course of action is defined as a psychological operation that attempts to
influence an accessible subset of actors within a social network of interest in order
to influence the behavior of any number of actors. The targeted individual(s) are
perhaps the most important or respected leader(s), or a disgruntled element that
may not be directly accessible. The course of action essentially determines which
accessible actors serve as conduits (sources) and which oftentimes inaccessible actors
serve as targets (sinks). The sources facilitate the insertion of an external influence
into an adversarial social network. The sinks comprise the ultimate targets of in-
fluence; they could be senior leaders, decision makers, specific subgroups, or anyone
who has the ability to affect the overall behavior, actions, and objectives of the entire
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network. All other actors that may be used to promulgate the influence from the
sources to the sinks are considered as transshipment nodes. The overall goal is to
influence the target population such that they alter their behavior as desired.
Obviously, obtaining accurate and complete intelligence detailing such nuances
of a non-cooperative (and likely covert) network is a formidable task, especially when
the nature of the adversary as well as the nature of compartmentalized intelligence
agencies is considered. Examples of these challenges are (painfully) described in
detail in the recent 9/11 Commission Report [National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks Upon the United States, 2004, pg. 71-102]. Over a decade earlier, Sparrow
explored “the opportunities for the application of (social) network analytic tech-
niques to the problems of criminal intelligence analysis, paying particular attention
to the identification of (organizational) vulnerabilities. . . ” [Sparrow, 1991, pg. 251].
He conceded that missing data (for any number of reasons), fuzzy and ambiguous
boundaries of inclusion or exclusion of individuals, and the inherently dynamic nature
of human interaction (and therefore social network composition) add a high level of
complexity to this problem [Sparrow, 1991, pg. 261-2]. Related works investigating
the impact of missing information have concluded mixed, but oftentimes detrimen-
tal, effects upon the analyses [Bolland, 1988; Borgatti et al., 2006; Costenbader and
Valente, 2003; Sterling, 2004; Thomason et al., 2004].
Despite these findings, this research assumes that the measures, or at least
estimates of the measures, involved in characterizing networks of interest are indeed
obtainable due to the increasing interest in, and consequential approaches to, this
problem as suggested by Dombroski and Carley [2002]. An advantage to applying the
network flow models from operations research to those characterizing social networks
is that a number of techniques are available to evaluate the sensitivity of essentially
all model inputs. As in traditional mathematical programming applications, this




The overarching objective of this type of analysis seeks the development and es-
timating the efficacy of various courses of action that attempt to influence accessible
individuals in order to indirectly influence potentially inaccessible decision makers.
Advantages inherent within the linear programming approach, the ability to perform
post-optimality analyses for example, facilitate the investigation of uncertainty and
its effects upon the results.
The situations and parameters discussed in this example are entirely notional
and are only for demonstrative purposes. Assume that information has been gathered
on a network of 11 individuals, with the communication or interaction between them
indicated by the arcs (i, j). For this example it is assumed without loss of generality
that the information will be one-way, with the direction indicated by the arrow. The
flow of influence or information along a given arc (i, j) is bounded by 0 ≤ x(i,j) ≤
u(i,j), where u(i,j) are determined by an assessment of social closeness. All costs
incurred per unit of influence flow along an arc are also assumed available.
The network of interest is illustrated in Figure 7.6. For each arc, the capacity
upper bound and cost are denoted by (u(i,j), c(i,j)), respectively, and are shown near
their corresponding arc. Gains and losses are indicated by values within a triangle
adjacent to the applicable arc. The only threshold modeled in this example is the
one for individual 4 (b4 = −1). Further assume that direction of communication is
known, which is indicated by the directed arrows.
The next step is to determine sources and sinks for the flow of influence through
this network. As opposed to the evolution of attitudes through the dyadic interaction
of individuals over time (the focus of the majority of social sciences network models),
the intention in this illustration is to force an influence through the network. This
approach is well suited to gaining a better understanding of how an organization,





uij upper bound of flow on arc (i, j)
cij: cost per unit flow on arc (i, j)



































Figure 7.6: Notional Social Network
manner consistent with an external organization’s interests, in essence, political force
or influence. The ultimate goal, in this example, is to influence a number of target
individuals to at least a minimum level and, through modeling, understand what
actions may be required to do so in terms of cost and influence campaign activities.
If the target individuals comprise the network leadership, they may not be directly
accessible and therefore not immediately vulnerable to these operations. However,
subordinates that report to these leaders may not only be vulnerable, but more
easily accessible, and (much more importantly) trusted by those already within the
network. Therefore, the overall strategy is to influence the more vulnerable (and
accessible) actors in such a manner that the target individuals eventually receive the
message (influence) in such a way that their opinions are changed to meet the overall
political goals intended by the initiator of the influence campaign.
Assume that an initial assessment of the organization revealed that the set
of individuals {9, 10} were the leaders or the most influential members (opinion
leaders) of the group having the ability to influence in this context. Influencing
them would ultimately provide favorable results. However, by the very nature of











































Figure 7.7: Notional Network with Target Sets
social network. Further, assume that the set of individuals {1, 2, 3} are accessible
and there exists a possible path of influence between them and the desired target
audience. Therefore, a course of action (a) is devised to (1) identify accessible
individuals that can be influenced and the the concomitant operational risks involved
in doing so; (2) estimate the amount of influence to be pushed to these individuals
(ba = a); (3) identify the inaccessible individuals that comprise the ultimate target
set (tgt); and, (4) develop a means to determine the efficacy of the operation through
observation of target behavior (btgt = −t). This results in the network representation
shown in Figure 7.7.
A variety of issues may be explored via this modeling and analysis approach.
For example, course of action (a) is not necessarily limited to using the set of individ-
uals {1, 2, 3} to initiate an influence operation, but merely those that are accessible
by another party external to the social network of interest. The amount of influence
for this course of action is currently capacitated at unity for each arc emanating
from node a. Again, this is not a general requirement. Two or more messages or
attempts to influence an individual (e.g., repeated threats, emails, reminders, etc.)
may be required or desired; this may correspond to a capacity of 2 or more. Similar
arguments may be made for the individuals that comprise the target audience. Note
that the super sink node (tgt) is a means to assess the overall effectiveness of the
course of action. For this example, flow into this node (tgt) implies that at least one
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of the actors {9, 10} has demonstrated (verbally, physically, politically or otherwise)
that they have received and responded in some manner to the influence initiated by
the course of action.
Formulations that are infeasible directly translate to undesirable courses of
action for any number of reasons; these might include insufficient external influence
to obtain desired overall effects, insufficient connectivity within the network, poor
choice of vulnerable nodes, unrealistic or unobtainable levels of effect required on the
target audience, and so forth. Maximum flow formulations provide a means to verify
the potential success of a given course of action. Note that due to the possibility of
thresholds and multiple sources or sinks, the classic maximum flow formulation no
longer applies. However, such problem aspects have been addressed in the maximum
flow literature. For example, Megiddo [1974] generalized the maximum flow problem
to optimal and fairly distributed flow among multiple sources and sinks; Miller and
Naor [1995] developed a maximum flow algorithm for a network with known supplies
and demands. With this in mind, references to a maximum flow formulation in this
chapter are assumed to accommodate such extensions.
Given the chosen sets a and tgt and any appropriate thresholds, if the maxi-
mum flow is infeasible then the GNF formulation of the same network will also be
infeasible. Using the same network shown in Figure 7.7 while focusing on the con-
nectivity aspects of the target network results in the network shown in Figure 7.8;
the upper bounds for arc capacities are denoted as [u(i,j)] and v denotes the value of
flow to be maximized.
The optimal solution for the maximum flow problem of Figure 7.8 is v = 3;
the resulting flow is shown in Figure 7.9, where the bold arrows indicate arcs with
flow of 1, zero otherwise. This result establishes the feasibility of the current course
of action, showing that it is possible to pass influence to both nodes 9 and 10, but it




btgt = - v














































b4 = - 1
Figure 7.9: Maximum Flow Solution
Using the information from the maximum flow results, the incorporation of
costs is likely to provide a more realistic flow pattern [Yamaguchi, 1994]. The solution
to the minimum cost maximum flow problem of our notional network using ba = 3
and btgt = −2, has an objective value (total cost incurred due to flow of influence
through the network) of 93.33 units. The solution is shown in Figure 7.10, where
highlighted arcs indicate flow; the specific amounts of flow are shown in braces,
{x(i,j)}, alongside the respective arc (i, j).
As suspected, the flow through the network accounting for costs is different
from that of the maximum flow formulation. Note that conservation of flow is main-
tained for both the threshold and gains and losses effects. Interestingly, contacting,
or influencing, all three susceptible nodes {1, 2, 3} does not fully meet the target





− 2 < 0). This is primarily due to the relaxation of





























btgt = - 2
ba = 3
b4 = - 1
Figure 7.10: Minimum Cost Maximum Flow Solution
in a minimum cost manner, the current course of action to influence all susceptible
actors may not result in meeting the overall objectives. Changing the constraint for
the tgt node from ‘>’ to ‘=’ would remedy this effect but at a greater cost, assuming
the problem remained feasible.
The solution basis plays a major role in post-optimality analyses. A change
in basis often results in a different objective function value, except in the case of
multiple optimal solutions. Degeneracy, indicated by a basic variable with a value
of 0, is a common occurrence in network problems due to the balance constraints,
particularly when bi = 0 [Gal, 1979, pg. 314]. This situation is observed in this
example, with arcs (6, 11) and (7, 8) in the basis, yet x(6,11) = x(7,8) = 0. Under
these conditions, caution must be used in interpreting the shadow prices–an aspect
of the information available for post-optimality analyses [Bazaraa et al., 1990, pg.
258] and [Martin, 1999, pg. 99].
Another important aspect of the current solution to address is the non-tree
arcs at capacity. For example, flow along arc (3, 4) is at capacity, yet x(3,4) is not in
the basis. Consequently, changes in the arc capacities as part of the post-optimality
analysis must first discern whether it is a tree- or non-tree arc, that is, one must
identify whether the arc is or is not in the current basis, respectively.
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7.4 Post-Optimality Analysis
Post-optimality analysis allows the investigation of changes in input data and
is useful when uncertainty exists in the input parameters. Considering the intrinsic
nature of the input data characterizing clandestine social networks, answers to some
of the “what if” questions regarding gains, losses, thresholds, risks (both internal
and external to the network members), estimates of the strengths of interpersonal
relationships (social closeness), potential courses of action, and the impact of network
connectivity, it is desirable to investigate the consequences due to changes among
these parameters via post-optimality analysis.
Ahuja et al. highlight that there are primarily two approaches to network post-
optimality analysis: combinatorial methods that re-solve a number of problems, and
simplex-based methods that exploit information resulting from the linear program-
ming algorithms [Ahuja et al., 1993, pg. 337]. Since the solution procedure chosen
is LP-based, the simplex-based method is applied to the notional network solution.
Specific examples of consequences due a change in inputs may include no
change to the current solution, a change in the objective value, a change in the
basis (i.e., the influence may potentially take a different path through the network),
a combination of change in objective value and change of basis, or overall infeasibil-
ity. It is also important to note that unless a parametric programming approach is
specified, any allowable ranges are assumed to be applicable only as one-at-a-time
variations to the original problem.
7.4.1 Changes in Gains and Losses
Unfortunately, post-optimality analysis of technological coefficients–the values
that represent gains and losses of influence in this application–is not automatically
provided by many optimization software packages. However, Bazaraa et al. provide
a straight-forward approach to evaluating the excursions of a change to a single
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column vector ai, which is applicable to both basic and non-basic variables [Bazaraa
et al., 1990, pg. 282-3]. Nonetheless, their approach assumes that the new value is
known a priori. Since that is likely not the case when dealing with uncertainty in
intelligence data, analysts may take advantage of the parametric approach described
in Gal [1979, Chp. 8] to ascertain the range of values that would satisfy the condition
of interest, in this case a change of basis.
As observed in Figure 7.10, arc (1, 6) may be interpreted as a work-around for
the gatekeeper, individual 4. Suppose it is of interest to investigate the implications
of a gain for arc (1, 6) such that g(1,6) = 1 + g, where g > 0 implies the current arc
from actor 1 to actor 6 becomes gainy and g < 0 implies the arc becomes lossy.
From this, the new column vector a′(1,6) is formed:
a′(1,6) = [0 1 0 0 0 0 −(1 + g) 0 0 0 0 0 0].
To find the revised column vector y′(1,6) given the current basis inverse B
−1,
the formula y′(1,6) = B
−1a′(1,6), is applied, yielding y(1,6) =
[ 0 0 1 0 0 (1 + g) −(13 + g) −(1 + g) 1 0 43 −(13 + g) −(13 + g)].
Now check to see if this change would result in x(1,6) entering the basis (i.e., a
different solution is required). Define cB as the cost coefficients of the current basic
variables. The non-basic variable x(1,6) must enter the basis if the condition
cBB
−1a′(1,6) − c(1,6) = cBy′(1,6) − c(1,6) > 0 (7.9)
holds.
The calculations result in g < −0.0185. Therefore, if even the slightest loss is
imposed upon the arc (1, 6), the variable x(1,6) enters the basis, and a new optimal
solution results, all other values remaining constant. As an example, suppose g(1,6) =
0.97; the new objective function value is 93.075, x(1,6) enters the basis, and the
total flow to the tgt node is improved to 1.64. The improved objective function
is essentially due to cost savings resulting from a diminished amount of flow along
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arc (6, 10), as well as a more direct path to target actor 10. The improved amount
of flow is due primarily to the fact that not all of the flow must pass through the
gatekeeper (actor 4) and then incur the loss between actors 5 and 7. Note also that
imposing a gain on this arc such that g(1,6) = 1 + g, (g > −0.0185) will not result in
arc (1, 6) entering the basis, ceteris paribus. Therefore, this suggests that a change
in the underlying model assumptions, and their associated parameters, may assist
in achieving the overall mission.
Using this information and technique, ranges may be developed for all columns,
or variables, of interest. Unfortunately, if the problems are of reasonable (i.e., practi-
cal) size, this type of analysis may actually lend itself to re-solving a modified problem
rather than implementing this approach, particularly if the ranges suggest further
exploration and a new solution is desired. Methods dealing with other conditions,
such as non-binding constraints, to determine one-at-a-time sensitivity ranges for
the technological coefficients are described in detail within [Hartley, 1976; Bazaraa
et al., 1990, pg. 281-3].
7.4.2 Changes in Thresholds
The right-hand sides (RHS) represented by bi capture one of three phenomena:
thresholds, sources, and sinks. The caution underlying this aspect of post-optimality
analysis, in the presence of primal degeneracy, is the possibility that a right-hand
side value may actually be increased or decreased beyond the range reported by
optimization software and still maintain the current basis as optimal [cf., Sounder-
pandian, 2001]. Although degeneracy may adversely affect the sensitivity analysis
in this manner, optimization packages typically mitigate this by simply providing
a conservative window of allowable ranges. For the notional problem, these conser-
vative RHS ranges are presented in Table 7.3. For node a the amount of influence
pushed to the network can be reduced by at most 0.5 units before the current ba-
sis may change. Additionally, the amount of influence provided at node a cannot
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Table 7.3: RHS Analysis
Row Current Allowable Allowable
(Node) Value Increase Decrease
a 3 0 0.5
1 0 1 0.5
2 0 1 0.5
3 0 0 0.5
4 -1 1 0.5
5 0 1.33 0.67
6 0 0 0.5
7 0 0.67 0.33
8 0 0 0.33
9 0 0.67 0.33
10 0 0.67 0.33
11 0 0 0.5
tgt - 2 0.67 ∞
increase, otherwise the problem becomes infeasible due to the current capacities on
the arcs from a to (1, 2, 3), all other things remaining equal.
Suppose ba = 2, implying that the course of action can only affect two of the
three initial target individuals. The new objective function value is 50, using as
expected a different basis; only 1 unit of flow makes it to individual 10. If the course
of action is only able to influence one of the three individuals (i.e., letting ba = 1),
both the objective function value and the basis change. The objective function value
is 9 and neither one of the target individuals {9, 10} are reached. This implies that
another plan should be crafted, possibly seeking other individuals with more direct
access to the target individuals, or ensuring that it is indeed possible to influence
the initial set of individuals. The potential effects due to uncertainty in thresholds
is worth considering. As indicated in Table 7.3, the threshold for individual 4, rep-
resented by b4, may be increased (decreased) by no more than 1 (0.5) in order to
maintain the current basis. Suppose the individual’s threshold was actually more
restrictive, thereby requiring more information, additional confirmation, or a signifi-
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cant amount of persuasion by others before individual 4 would decide to promulgate
the influence further into to network.
For example, letting b4 = −2, the new objective function value is 64, with
only one unit of flow reaching actor 10. Such a change suggests a more conservative
response to influence from those reporting information to him. However, despite
the change in this example, the course of action still provides enough influence to
convince actor 4 to promulgate influence through the network and ultimately to one
of the two target individuals. From here, it is up to the decision maker to decide
if this potential result, influencing one of the two target nodes, is sufficient for the
action’s requirements and needs. If the value of this threshold were to change such
that b4 = −3, the problem still remains feasible, a change of basis occurs, and actor
4 prevents the propagation of influence to the target individuals. If the value of this
threshold were such that b4 = 0, the problem remains feasible, and both target nodes
are fully influenced with btgt = −2.
All of the solutions presented thus far push at least some amount of influence
through actor 4. An alternative path exists via arc (1, 6) that can reach individual
10 and avoid actor 4. However, given the objective to minimize cost, this path tends
to be avoided. This observation, as well as indications of uncertainty in the cost
data, necessitates the investigation of the cost coefficient associated with this arc
and any others that may be in question.
7.4.3 Changes in Risks
Recall that the cost coefficients c(i,j) may account for the perceived operation
or personal risks of communication, actual costs of communication, and so forth.
If the overall objective seeks to minimize cost, as in the example, these estimates
play a major role in how much and along which paths influence flows through the
social network. To assess the implications of changes in costs, an approach similar
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Table 7.4: Cost Coefficient Analysis
Allowable Allowable
c(i,j) Current Increase Decrease
c(1,4) 8 0 3
c(1,6) 20 3 0.33
c(2,4) 6 ∞ 0
c(3,4) 2 5 31.67
c(4,5) 9 0.33 12.67
c(4,6) 15 ∞ 3
c(4,7) 24 ∞ 13.33
c(5,6) 10 ∞ 29.83
c(5,7) 6 0.25 9.50
c(6,10) 6 ∞ 0.33
c(6,11) 5 12.66 3.33
c(7,8) 4 15 3
c(7,9) 9 3 1.00
c(7,10) 7 0.33 ∞
c(8,9) 8 ∞ 3
c(9,tgt) 10 ∞ 1.00
c(10,tgt) 9 3 ∞
c(11,10) 4 ∞ 3.33
c(a,1) 6 0 ∞
c(a,2) 8 ∞ 0
c(a,3) 7 5.00 ∞
to varying the right-hand sides is taken. Given the current solution, the ranges of
allowable change for cost coefficients are provided in Table 7.4.
Considering the cost estimate for c(1,6), the data in Table 7.4 suggests that a
relatively small change (a reduction of ∼ 0.33) in c(1,6) may result in a change in
basis. Replacing this value with c(1,6) = 19, the new solution (i.e., new basis) has an
objective value of 92.66, with total flow to the tgt node improved to 1.64.
For some of the cost coefficients, such as c(1,6), a relatively small change may
result in a new basis and therefore a new solution. This type of sensitivity suggests
that multiple outcomes regarding flow within the network are possible, given even
the slightest uncertainty in input data. Therefore, careful consideration in determin-
ing the course of action and its possible consequences should be made, particularly
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with respect to the costs associated with interpersonal communication within the
social network of interest. Since these costs are based upon the individuals’ own
perspectives, estimates of this particular parameter are potentially the most difficult
to obtain via simple observation or surveillance. Consequently, courses of action
that are robust or insensitive to changes in these coefficients would be preferred over
those that are not. It may also suggest that an approach that lowers an individual’s
perceived cost may prove effective in directing the flow of influence.
The last remaining model input considered for post-optimality analysis is that
of the arc capacities, which serve as estimates of social closeness. The closer two
individuals are the stronger the relationship, resulting in a potentially greater degree
of influence exchange between them. These values are also subject to uncertainty.
7.4.4 Changes in Social Closeness
The problem formulation that was optimized initially took advantage of a fea-
ture that accounts for the upper bounds associated with the arc capacities. This is
given as simple upper bound (SUB) for any variable x(i,j). This facilitates perfor-
mance (time to solution) by implementing the generalized upper bounding technique,
but also eliminates the ability to use post-optimality information often provided by
the software [Ahuja et al., 1993, pg. 666-7]. Specifically of interest is the evaluation
of changes in the upper (or lower if applicable) bounds for the arc capacities. An
easy way to remedy this is through the inclusion of this capacity constraint within
the constraint set, as opposed to using the SUB function. Adding the constraint
x(i,j) ≤ u(i,j) provides an opportunity to then investigate the implications of uncer-
tain data regarding the estimates of social closeness used within the social network
in a manner identical to that of changes in the thresholds, sources, and sinks, with-
out changing the solution results. Accounting for all current arc capacities in the
constraint set of the original GNF formulation for the network in Figure 7.7, the
post-optimality results for all arcs with non-zero flow are shown in Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5: Arc Capacity Analysis
Current Allowable Allowable
Variable Flow Capacity Increase Decrease
x(1,4) 1 2 ∞ 1
x(2,4) 1 3 ∞ 2
x(3,4) 1 1 0 0
x(4,5) 2 7 ∞ 5
x(5,7) 2.66 5 ∞ 2.33
x(7,9) 0.33 6 ∞ 5.67
x(7,10) 1 6 ∞ 5
x(9,tgt) 0.33 1 ∞ 0.67
x(10,tgt) 1 1 0.33 0.67
x(a,1) 1 1 ∞ 0
x(a,2) 1 1 1 0
x(a,3) 1 1 ∞ 0
The allowable ranges indicate the change in the arc capacity that can be tol-
erated and still maintain the current basis. This type of analysis offers a means to
assess whether or not the current estimate of social closeness between two individuals
plays an important role in the current solution. The smaller the allowable range,
the more important an accurate assessment of social closeness is required. Note that
the variables or arcs that comprise the social network, as opposed to those emanat-
ing from node a or going to node tgt, are the main concern in this setting. Arcs
exhibiting relatively small ranges, and therefore sensitivity, should be of particular
interest, the values of which should be verified by additional intelligence information
as necessary.
Once expressed in a network flow context, influence flowing through a social
network lends itself to an array of post-optimality analyses. Given the likely impre-
cise nature of the inputs, particularly in a military or political setting, the ability
to conduct post-optimality analysis is critical in attempting to model influence and
behavior. Knowing the range of applicability of a solution or a parameter provides
the decision maker with an estimate of the robustness of a course of action.
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7.5 Summary
Social science literature has developed numerous theories and measures in order
to better understand human interaction and its consequences. Numerous explicit and
implicit connections have been suggested between social and physical networks; using
the analogy of influence as a pseudo-physical commodity, these connections facilitate
the study social networks via the generalized network flow problem.
While improvements are desirable in order to improve the quantification of so-
cial phenomena serving as inputs to this methodology, the operations research tools,
in this case the simplex method, provides an advantageous byproduct of a variety
of post-optimality analyses. As several aspects of the notional network appeared to
be sensitive to changes, the example reiterates the need for accurate, objective esti-
mates of network dynamics. It is posited that all of these capabilities will culminate
into a methodology to evaluate and develop courses of action for influencing social
networks.
Of course, the ultimate decision will remain with the decision maker. This ap-
proach provides the information campaign planner a means to investigate alternative
courses of action, and perhaps to aid in developing intelligence requirements where
the sensitivity and parametric analysis suggests. Given this base, a number of other




The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate, compare, and contrast analysis
techniques developed during the course of this research. Consequently, this chapter
demonstrates some of the steps involved in the processes when applying these con-
cepts, as well as highlighting the need to carefully consider the associated underlying
assumptions. The data used, drawn from a dated open-source study, are merely for
illustrative purposes. The data are subjected to RBAP, KPP-2, network flow cen-
trality, and generalized network flow centrality analysis. The analysis is notional in
nature and is intended to be illustrative rather than being interpreted as an actual
operational study.
8.2 Data Description
The data analyzed within this chapter comprise a network of 48 individuals
with known or alleged ties to the Jemaah Islamiya terrorist network, commonly
referred to as JI. These members are a subset of the open source Al Qaeda network
data developed and analyzed by Sageman [2004], and were selected by subject matter
experts due to their affiliation with JI [Clark, 2005, pg. 5-1]. It is assumed that
link information within this data set are associated with symmetric ties between
two given individuals. With the exception of RBAP analysis, the assumption of
symmetry could easily be relaxed. While the existence of negative ties are certainly
of interest due to their potentially detrimental effects upon the strength of personal
ties, as well as their susceptibility to exploitation, the mathematical characterization
of this case study assumes existing ties are always positive in nature. The member
names and corresponding identification numbers are provided in Appendix O.
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JI terrorist cells predominantly span Southeast Asia, generally operating within
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines [U. S. Department of State, 2005, pg. 33,
101]. Membership estimates vary between the hundreds and the thousands; the orga-
nization has been confirmed to be “responsible for numerous high-profile bombings”
such as the hotel bombings in Bali (2002) and Jakarta (2003) [U. S. Department
of State, 2005, pg. 101]. Al Qaeda and JI are directly linked through Riduan bin
Isomoddin (also known as Hambali), who was the leader of JI and the Southeast
Asia operations chief of Al Qaeda until his capture in 2003 [U. S. Department of
State, 2005, pg. 101].
If the different contexts contributing to the relationships of the 48 case study
members were ignored and simply characterized as “a tie exists or not,” the resulting
social network is shown in Figure 8.1. Note, however, that these ties have evolved
from one or more contexts or situations. Specifically, these relationships have resulted
from at least one of six relations discernable by (open source) intelligence informa-
tion. Although there are a variety of relations that could be discerned, such as those
offered by Hite, or possibly geophysical location networks, the relations extracted
by Sageman include discipleship, worship, familial, relative, friend, and acquaintance
networks. For the purposes of this example, it is assumed that all members under
study remain at large and actively involved within the terrorist organization. While
this is not the actual case, it does not reduce the illustrative nature of the case study.
Clearly there are temporal aspects that must eventually be addressed, as they may
offer some insight into how the network may be evolving, growing, shrinking, and so
forth. The approach described here does not preclude including temporal effects as
changing snapshots in time. The various contexts comprising these relationships are
depicted in Figures 8.2 through 8.7 and were developed using the visualization tool
within the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) [Carley, 2006]. Nodes displayed on
the left-hand side of each graph have no known relationships among other individ-
uals within that context. Technically, they do not qualify as isolates within that
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Figure 8.1: JI Combined Network for 48 Core Members
context’s graph. Their appearance is only meant to highlight the separated individ-
uals and maintain the intent of the layered concept that considers all actors within
the organization of interest.
The network shown in Figure 8.2 illustrates the affiliation of discipleship, which
clearly shows the prominence of Baasyir (1) and Sungkar (2). Due to limited descrip-
tive information associated with the data, it is unclear as to the significance of cluster
of actors Zulkarnaen (24), Dulmatin (32), Yunos (16), Syawal (7), Hambali (3), Iqbal
(5), and Sufaat (13). However, Hambali (3) and Zulkarnaen (24) have served high-
level leadership roles, leader and military chief, respectively [Abuza, 2006, pg. 4]. In
addition, all of the individuals within this cluster have known friendship ties, and
some share familial ones. Bassyir (1) and Sungkar (2) are the founders of the Is-
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Figure 8.2: JI Discipleship Network
lamic boarding schools that ultimately resulted in the initial JI membership analyzed
within this case study [Sageman, 2004, pg. 113].
The worship network in Figure 8.3 illustrates some overlap between the two
primary teachers, Baasyir (1) and Sungkar (2), as well as indirect contacts. If pos-
sible, a multigraph depicting which individuals attended the mosques purported to
recruit members for the Jihad would be valuable information to supplement the over-
all network structure. The social practice of worship, sharing, or learning extremist
interpretations of Islam plays a significant role in the “the process of affiliation to
the Jihad” [Sageman, 2004, pg. 114].
Figures 8.4 and 8.5 shows the kinship relations among the selected individuals,
where the relation is either through marriage (the relative network) or familial (the
family network), respectively [Sageman, 2004, pg. 112]. The last two networks in
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 essentially capture two different types of social interaction. The
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Figure 8.3: JI Worship Network
first, friendship, suggests a stronger type of social bond than the latter, acquaintance.
These could correspond to the strong and weak ties discussed by Granovetter [1973],
respectively.
Note that each of these contexts could be perceived as the layers defining the
interpersonal relationships of these individuals, contributing, in varying amounts, to
the strength of ties among them. Exactly how these layers are combined to ascertain
the strength values are likely dependent upon the organization of interest. Both the
similarity and decision theoretic approaches are illustrated in Section 8.5.
In addition, data capturing individual characteristics were also provided in the
sample data; the categories of data are shown in Table 8.1. This information serves
as inputs to the gain multiplier methodology described in Chapter VII, which is
demonstrated in Section 8.5.2.
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Figure 8.4: JI Relative Network
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Figure 8.5: JI Familial Network
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Figure 8.6: JI Friendship Network
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Figure 8.7: JI Acquaintance Network
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Considering that very limited data is available at the initial phases of analysis
and network discovery, the RBAP centrality measure is first applied in order to
demonstrate the screening process. Recall that the RBAP measure offers a means
to do a preliminary screening of individuals, determining which individuals have an
advantageous position based upon network topology uncovered to this point. Since
the relations of interest are assumed to be symmetric, the application of RBAP
yields a centrality measure of actor position. Note that α represents the attenuation
of influence or information as a function of path distance. Therefore, RBAP with
α = 0 is equivalent to degree centrality, offering a local perspective on centrality.
RBAP with α = 1 measures the number of other actors that can be effectively
reached, offering a global perspective of centrality.
Both sets of results are of interest, but for different reasons. The locally cen-
tral individuals are able to potentially directly influence the greatest number of other
individuals, whereas the globally central individuals may serve as either advisors to
the locally central members or perhaps as liaisons to other organizations or regions
of operation. The relation between RBAP scores and actor position in these rela-
tively small networks may appear obvious. However, when dealing with new data,
characterizing networks of hundreds to thousands of individuals, a screening tool of
this nature would facilitate further analytic efforts.
Using the RBAP sensitivity analysis procedure provided in Appendix B, com-
parisons can be made as α is varied between 0 and 1 for a given network. Note
that, due to the path-based nature of RBAP, it is recommended that the measure
be applied only to connected networks such as the combined, discipleship, worship,
relative, and acquaintance networks.
Comparisons between the top five high-scoring individuals at both α = 0 and
α = 1 were made for the worship, discipleship, and combined networks. The former
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two were selected due to the significant role that worship and discipleship activities
play in indoctrinating individuals and building trust among members [Sageman,
2004, pg. 114]. The latter network was selected because a conglomerate type of
network is likely, assuming that the type of data immediately available for analysis
is derived from an automated intelligence process that must assess relationships from
a distance.
Applying RBAP to the worship network (Figure 8.3), the results for α =
0 and α = 1 are shown in Table 8.2. With this in mind, Baasyir (1), Sungkar
(2), and Maidin (30) have the highest local RBAP scores due to their central and
well-connected position within the worship context. This result for the first two
actors is not surprising, given this context; no descriptive information is available
on Maidin (30) in this data set. These results suggest that increased investigative
efforts focusing on Maidin (30) would be warranted.
With α = 1, the measure ranks Zulkarnaen (24), Thomas (48), and Faiz (18)
highest, respectively, all of whom joined the organization after Baasyir (1), Sungkar
(2), and Maidin (30). Zulkarnaen (24) has the lowest closeness centrality among
all others, due to his peripheral location; however, his relatively close access, as
measured by distance in links, to the most central members results in the highest
global RBAP score when attenuation of information or influence as a function of
path distance in links is assumed to be non-existent (i.e., α = 1). This suggests
that, despite his peripheral location, Zulkarnaen (24) may be an influential member
of the group, a potential connection to another, entirely separate organization, or
perhaps a promising access point to the network. These conditions are indeed the
case, as Zulkarnaen (24), purportedly the chief of military operations, has assumed
the overall leadership responsibilities of Baasyir (1).
Turning to the discipleship network (Figure 8.2), it is evident that Baasyir (1)
is a central actor, likely due to his role in originating the group. Interestingly, Sufaat
(13) scores the highest with α = 1. Sufaat (13), joining about 9 years after the group
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Table 8.2: RBAP (Worship Network)
α = 0 α = 1
Actor Score Actor Score
Baasyir (1) 16 Zulkarnaen (24) 19.14
Sungkar (2) 16 Thomas (48) 17.64
Maidin (30) 6 Faiz (18) 17.58
Iqbal (5) 4 Hafidh (40) 17.58
Syawal (7) 3 Rusdan (43) 17.58
Table 8.3: RBAP (Discipleship Network)
α = 0 α = 1
Actor Score Actor Score
Baasyir (1) 14 Sufaat (13) 20.5
Sungkar (2) 13 Marzuki (38) 15.36
Syawal (7) 4 Baasyir (1) 15.26
Zulkarnaen (24) 4 Mukhlas (4) 14.96
Hambali (3) 2 Ghozi (8) 14.96
was purportedly formed, became increasingly religious throughout his tenure in JI,
studying with senior members and “was the host for the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda
conference leading to the USS Cole bombing and the 9/11 operations” [Sageman,
2004, pg. 112].
Applying RBAP to the combined network, formed by taking a Boolean sum
across all network layers, the top 5 ranked individual scores are shown in Table 8.4.
As one may expect, Baasyir (1) and Sungkar (2) are the most central from a local
(degree) perspective. Marzuki (38) is ranked highest due to his peripheral location
and direct connection to Baasyir (1). Marzuki (38) is purportedly the chief financier
for JI and remains at large [Meng, 2004].
Using the combined network shown in Figure 8.1, the correlations between
RBAP, at α = 0 and α = 1, and all other standard centrality measures are provided
in Table 8.5. As expected, degree centrality and RBAP at α = 0 are perfectly
correlated. RBAP at α = 1, as would also be expected, does not correlate well with
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Table 8.4: RBAP (Combined Network)
α = 0 α = 1
Actor Score Actor Score
Baasyir (1) 32 Marzuki (38) 33.39
Sungkar (2) 30 Baasyir (1) 33.34
Hambali (3) 16 M. Yunos (35) 31.94
Mukhlas (4) 15 Naharudin (36) 31.94
Zulkarnaen (24) 15 Roche (47) 31.94
Table 8.5: RBAP Correlations to Other Measures
RBAP
Degree Closeness Betweenness Eigenvector (α = 0)
Closeness 0.92 – – – –
Betweenness 0.87 0.77 – – –
Eigenvector 0.95 0.95 0.72 – –
RBAP (α = 0) 1 0.92 0.87 0.95 –
RBAP (α = 1) 0.28 0.4 0.4 0.32 0.28
the other measures, since it is capturing a process significantly different from those
assumed in traditional measures.
Since none of the network layers share exactly the same set of actors, only
qualitative assessments may be made across network layers. For example, Baasyir
(1) is in the top 5 most central actors from both a local and global perspective in all
three of the network layers analyzed, with the exception of the worship network at
α = 1, where he scores sixth. Although he is now known to be one of the co-founders
of JI, the screening approach offered by RBAP, used early in the investigative process,
clearly signals him as a potential actor of interest.
8.4 Key Player Analysis
All of the network layers within this case study are relatively small, which often
results in relatively small domatic numbers. For example, examining the combined


























Figure 8.8: NR2 (Combined Network)
The only solution to this problem is Baasyir (1). Consequently, if a maximum reach
of 2 is permitted, Baasyir is the key player from the NR2 problem perspective.
If key players were limited to influencing only those actors adjacent to them
(NR1), the domatic number increases to δ1 = 7. All 80 optimal solutions were gener-
ated. Recall that Borgatti’s heuristic generates only a single solution. Developing all
the optimal solutions provides a wider set of targeting options. Figure 8.8 provides
the histogram of the number of times a particular actor comprised an NR1 solution.
Actors Baasyir (1) and Maidin (30) appear in every optimal solution. Iqbal (5) and
Syawal (7) appear in 72 of the 80 optimal solutions. Hambali (3), one of the leaders
of JI, appeared in 54 of the 80 optimal solutions [Sageman, 2004, pg. 44, 138].
Another effect due to small size and connectivity of this network is that the
key players are, in this case, primarily comprised of the leadership. Considering the
general concept of the KPP-2 concept, to influence a network in an efficient manner,
this coincides with such a theoretical goal. The practical goal, however, must consider
the fact that convincing the adversarial leadership to promulgate influence to our own
Nation’s benefit is unlikely to occur. Therefore, it may be of interest to designate
individuals not eligible to serve as a key player. As discussed in the key player
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methodologies developed in Chapter V, this is easily accomplished via additional
constraints in the mathematical program. For example, suppose that the decision
maker still wanted to influence the entire network, relying upon a reach of no more
than two steps away from a key player. In addition, the solutions must require
that Baasyir (1), Maidin (30), Iqbal (5), and Syawal (7) are not selected. Given that
xi = 1 if actor i is selected as a key player, 0 otherwise, the addition of the constraint
[x1 + x30 + x5 + x7 = 0] achieves the desired effect. With this constraint in place,
the domatic number increases to δ2 = 9, and there are only six optimal solutions.
The histogram of key player occurrences within the solution is provided in Figure
8.9. Hence, tradeoffs exist that can be explored via the proposed methodology.
Similar constraints could be incorporated within the other variations of KPP-2
shown in Table 5.6. Note that seven of the nine individuals required to satisfy the
NR2 problem in this setting appear in all six solutions; these include Sungkar (2),
Hambali (3), Dwikarna (14), Azahari (24), Marzuki (38), Kastari (39), and Khalim
(46). The next step would be to assess the likelihood of successfully co-opting all
of these actors simultaneously. If this is not possible, then the fractional key player
problems could be used to assess further tradeoffs between access to potential players
and the effectiveness of the planned information operation.
If the key players were required to influence or contact all others within all
contexts, the key player algorithms cannot (and should not) simply be performed
on an aggregate network, as any given player may not be connected to the same
actors in all layers. An example of such a requirement could include the assignment
of key players to convey influence within the given contexts that form their personal
relationships. If this requirement is levied upon all layers, a reinforcing effect results,
ensuring that each actor is influenced by a key player in all contexts. The domatic
number for this multi-graph is 16 actors. Figure 8.10 depicts the histogram of player
occurrence within the 20 optimal solutions. There are 10 players that occur in every
























Figure 8.9: NR2 without Leaders (Combined Network)
operational tradeoffs if all of these actors cannot be convinced to serve as a key player
simultaneously. Note that the constraint matrix must be generated in a slightly
different manner due to varying isolates among the layers. Appendix M describes the
steps required to perform this type of analysis and provides accompanying MATLAB
code.
8.5 Network Flow Analysis
To demonstrate some of the main methodologies developed within this re-
search, application of the network flow centrality measure by Freeman et al. [1991]
to variants of the aggregated network are compared. Three cases are explored: (1) in-
telligence information is strictly limited to knowledge of existing ties; (2) intelligence
information has knowledge of the existence and composition (layers) of interpersonal
ties; and, (3) intelligence information consists of the composition of known ties, indi-
vidual attributes, and subject matter expert opinion regarding the relative influence
each individual may exert over others.
To investigate the first case, the network flow centrality procedure outlined in




























Figure 8.10: NR1 for all layers simultaneously
in Figure 8.1. The results are shown in column 1 of Table 8.6. To investigate the
remaining cases, several assumptions and data must be considered.
8.5.1 Arcs
In order to take advantage of all possible information, estimates of interper-
sonal tie strength serve as arc capacities, similar to the approaches described by
Renfro [2001] and Clark [2005]. Assuming that this information is derived from the
contexts comprising the known relationships, recall the two methods of measurement
developed in Chapter VI: the similarity-based and decision-theoretic approaches.
The similarity approach begins with combining the node-edge adjacency ma-
trices for each layer into one, conceptually shown in Equation 8.1, which then serves
as input to the Jaccardian similarity measure provided in Appendix I.
NEall = [NEfamily |NEfriend |. . .| NEdiscipleship] (8.1)
The interpersonal tie strength between actors i and j derived from this Jaccardian
similarity approach is denoted sJS(i, j). The strongest tie strength observed given
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this data set is 0.33. The network flow centrality results are provided in column 2 of
Table 8.6.
The decision-theoretic approach as applied to the case study data is based upon
the model shown in Figure 6.6. For the purposes of this example, it is assumed that
the discipleship and worship relations can be classified as significant events contribut-
ing to tie strength, as these are often contributing factors to the recruitment and
assimilation into JI [Sageman, 2004, pg. 114]. Consequently, the familial, relative,
friendship, and acquaintance networks are classified as relationships contributing to
the intimacy aspect of tie strength. For the time component, data capturing when
each pair-wise relationship was confirmed was not available; a proxy was developed.
The year each member joined the organization was available for most (44 of the 48)
members. For missing data, the average value for year joined (1991) was arbitrarily
selected. Let tlastobservation denote the year of the last observation or tie discovery
(2001). Let tjoin(i) denote the time that a given actor i joined the organization.
Given two individuals i and j, if a tie between them was known to exist in any one
of the layers, the estimated amount of time the tie was assumed to correspond to
t(i, j) = tlastobservation − max[tjoin(i), tjoin(j)] + 1. (8.2)
This approach serves as a proxy to estimate the possible length of time a tie existed,
based upon limited information. The scores range from 0 to 13. In order to derive
a value for the decision model, a linear function was assumed, and each score was
simply normalized by dividing by the time of the longest established tie (13 years).
Any appropriate form may be used, however.
Again, this ignores the fact that some individuals left the organization for one
reason or another throughout the period between 1989 and 2001. In addition, al-
though the original measure capturing the time data pertinent to a specific tie is pre-
ferred, this example is for illustrative purposes only. Finally, for illustrative purposes
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the model weights were evenly distributed; for example, let wtime = wSE = wI = 1/3,
wd = ww = 1/2, and so forth. Then, using the conceptual model presented in Equa-
tion 6.9, the decision-theoretic measure of tie strength, denoted sDA, is derived by
sDA (i, j) = wtimev [t (i, j)] + wSE [wdXd + wwXw] + wI [wfrXfr + wfaXfa + wrXr] .
(8.3)
Standard weight elicitation approaches would be used in a specific analysis, tem-
pered by available time and experts. Using the evenly distributed weights, available
network data, and the proxy for the amount of time spent within the relationships,
the strongest tie strength observed given this data set, assumptions, and approach
is 0.583.
From Table 8.6, Baasyir (1), Sungkar (2), and Hambali (3) all share the top
three positions in all variants of flow centrality: using only the adjacency matrix
X as input to the network capacity, topologically accounting for similarity sJS, and
topologically accounting for how the different contexts theoretically contribute to
the strength of interpersonal ties (sDA). Individuals Iqbal (5), Syawal (7), Zulkar-
naen(24) and Mukhlas (4) all vie for the next highest centrality scores. Given that
similar results were found for these men using the RBAP and KPP-2 techniques,
this suggests that placing increased investigative efforts upon them could be ben-
eficial. The next section repeats the network flow centrality, but also accounts for
sender-receiver specific effects upon the amount of information or influence traveling
among individuals.
8.5.2 Gains and Losses
To estimate the gain or loss of influence or information due to the sender-
receiver effects, the actor-specific data elements shown in Table 8.1 were reviewed
for their relevance to a logistic regression model as discussed in Section 7.2.3. All
but the names, fate, and year the individual left the organization were considered
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Table 8.6: Network Flow Centrality (Top 10 Individuals, Without Gains)
X Jaccardian Decision Analysis
ID Centrality ID Centrality ID Centrality
1 0.176 1 0.112 1 0.176
2 0.136 3 0.095 2 0.146
3 0.096 2 0.091 3 0.083
5 0.056 19 0.073 7 0.057
7 0.053 5 0.06 5 0.056
24 0.041 7 0.058 24 0.047
4 0.041 30 0.056 4 0.042
19 0.035 22 0.05 30 0.037
30 0.031 15 0.043 19 0.036
44 0.029 45 0.04 44 0.031
Table 8.7: Categories of Leadership [Clark, 2005, pg. 5-4]
Leadership Level Description of Members
1 Emir Types (Senior Leaders/Founders)
2 Trusted Second Tier/ Key Counselors and Facilitators /
Leadership Council
3 Regional/District Leaders / Key Operatives / Unit Com-
manders / Liaisons
4 Operatives who provide support or followers who often
risk arrest, physical injury or death (i.e., execute mis-
sions) / foot soldiers
as potential candidates for inclusion as predictor variables. The binary response
variable indicated the charisma of an individual.
For the purposes of this research, charisma represents the influential nature of
an individual based upon either their authoritative roles, their personal character-
istics, or both. The response was based upon an initial classification of individuals
by subject matter experts, shown in Table 8.7. To provide a demonstration of the
methodologies, it was assumed that if an individual i was in classified as 1 or 2, then
yi = 1, and 0 otherwise.
The initial list of predictor variables was pared down for a variety of reasons.
For example, the Age Joined and Date of Birth were highly negatively correlated
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(-0.716); as a result, only one of these, Age Joined, was selected as a possible pre-
dictor variable. The Clump characteristic was the same value for all actors within
the sample set, thereby providing little or no explanatory power. Ultimately, the
predictor variables Year Joined and Age Joined were selected due to their ability to
predict the response variable while dealing with missing data.
Operationally, each of these personal attributes could represent the authorita-
tive and personality aspects of source-dependent influence. For example, the longer
an individual has been a member, the more likely he has participated in operations,
built trust among members, and risen to leadership positions. The age at which
an individual joins, and the effect of this attribute upon that individual’s ability to
persuade others is likely culturally specific. For this case study, it is assumed that
elders, particularly religious ones, are well respected and revered due to their per-
ceived wisdom and experience. Consequently, if two members join at the same time,
the older one will be more influential and vice versa. Alternatively, if two members
had joined JI at the same age in their lifetime, the one who has more time in the
organization will be more influential, and vice versa. The process used to develop
pair-wise gains is documented in Appendix N.
Let X0 denote the intercept, X1 denote the year a given individual joined JI,
and X2 denote the age when membership began. Using the results in Table 8.8,
the estimated probability that a given individual i with characteristics X1 and X2





Once the estimated probabilities are calculated for each actor, Equation 7.4
is used to determine the gain multipliers gij for all actor pairs with a link in the
contexts or layers of interest. This information can then be used as input to the
generalized network flow centrality measure developed in Chapter VII. Table 8.9
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Table 8.8: Logistic Regression Results
Standard
Variable Coefficient Error χ2 p-value
Intercept 1087.8 626.7 3.013 0.083
Year Joined -0.548 0.313 3.033 0.082
Age Joined 0.099 0.059 2.733 0.098
Table 8.9: Network Flow Centrality (Top 10 Individuals, With Gains)
X Jaccardian Decision Analysis
ID Centrality ID Centrality ID Centrality
1 0.17 3 0.14 1 0.16
3 0.13 1 0.11 2 0.12
2 0.12 30 0.09 3 0.11
5 0.09 2 0.08 5 0.08
30 0.07 5 0.08 30 0.08
4 0.06 15 0.07 4 0.06
7 0.05 19 0.07 7 0.05
15 0.05 7 0.06 15 0.05
24 0.05 22 0.06 24 0.05
19 0.04 4 0.05 19 0.04
compares the top 10 highest ranked individuals with respect to generalized network
flow centrality. Baasyir (1), Sungkar (2), and Hambali (3) continue to rank highly
due to their network location. However, the inclusion of personal attributes and
their effect upon interpersonal influence brought Maidin (30) into the top three
when the Jaccardian approach to tie strength is used. Interestingly, Maidin (30)
was the leader of the JI members within Singapore, suggesting that looking at these
networks from various perspectives may provide insight into organizational strengths,
vulnerabilities, and individuals that should be subjected to either further intelligence
scrutiny or military action [Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 2002]
This new generalized network flow approach to centrality not only accounts for
network topology, but also includes the effects upon information or influence due to
the interaction of different individuals, no longer viewing the nodes as homogenous
entities. Therefore, this is another option towards better models of social networks.
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8.6 Summary
The measures related to arc capacity and gain factors are amenable for use in
influence course of action analysis as presented in detail within Section 7.3. Overall,
these techniques serve as flexible tools to process and evaluate new information (via
RBAP), account for detailed information regarding the interpersonal relationships
(via the information garnered from layers and individual characteristics), and explore
potential influence courses of action and their efficacy. All of these methods are
designed to serve the intelligence community in the process of knowing the adversary,
and eliminating them.
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IX. Conclusions and Recommendations
9.1 Overview
Recalling the Colonel Mathieu quote, “To know them means to eliminate
them,” this research sought to develop new theory and means of investigating non-
cooperative networks, facilitating increased insight into network arrangement and
evolution, with the goal of identifying potential opportunities for influence opera-
tions. Such opportunities lie within the ability to disrupt the effective operation and
growth of these networks, or destroy them entirely. Although these adversaries can
be affected in a number of ways, this research focuses upon either removing or mit-
igating an organization’s most influential individuals, or finding susceptible points
of entry and conveying information or influence that contributes to winning this
war of ideas. This chapter provides a summary of the methodological and practical
contributions of this dissertation, as well as recommendations for areas of future
research.
9.2 Dissertation Contributions
This research examined non-cooperative networks from a number of perspec-
tives, with data requirements ranging from single-layered (or simply aggregated)
topological data to complex, multi-layered network data also requiring information
characterizing the individuals themselves.
The study begins with the assumption that limited information that captured
the dyadic interactions between individuals was available. The methodology offers
a screening tool that lends itself to the data-sparse environment initially confronted
by analysts. The reach-based assessment of position centrality measure is founded
upon an extension of previously existing graph theoretic and social network analysis
methods. To model the surreptitious communications among clandestine networks,
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this new measure focuses upon the flow of information or influence along geodesics.
Implementation of the attenuation concept, shared among several other centrality
measures, is improved upon, yielding a capability to analyze the full range of possible
options. This measure incorporates these theoretical aspects such that the technique
is amenable to non-cooperative networks, is computationally attractive, and is freed
from the analytic constraints inherent to similar social network analysis measures.
The next area of research improved upon the key-player problem (KPP-2) de-
scribed by Borgatti [2003a]. This concept is generally viewed as a group centrality
problem, which attempts to identify the most central group of people within a net-
work rather than its most central actor. Applying mathematical programming tech-
niques to this relatively new sociological problem yielded not only models equivalent
to Borgatti’s original problems and concomitant heuristic procedures, but techniques
to investigate new aspects of the key-player problem as well. These extensions ac-
commodate specific analysis requirements as well as other methodological constructs
presented in other areas of this research. Examples of these extensions include the
use of interpersonal tie strength values as input into the p-median variant of KPP-2.
As evidenced by the variety of applications to which the mathematical program-
ming models were originally applied, the methodology developed in this research
may be easily extended to networks other than simply social networks. For exam-
ple, multi-graphs capturing the interactions among individuals and Internet sites,
layered networks, key components of layered infrastructure, and key “cities, regions,
or tribes” within an influence structure can be investigated using this approach.
Although the latter examples are not limited to non-cooperative networks, they do
offer opportunities to influence the environments within which such networks thrive.
Assuming that data availability improves as analysis efforts progress, two meth-
ods to take advantage of information characterizing the nature of interpersonal ties
are developed. This ultimately yields a new, theoretical approach measuring the
strength of interpersonal relationships. This approach is similar to that offered by
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Renfro [2001] and Clark [2005], but is not as data intensive as the former, and less
reliant upon other sociometric methods than the latter. The first of two methods
proposed in this area focuses primarily upon the relationships between similarity and
tie strength, along the lines of homophily. The second method builds upon the con-
ceptual relationships between multiplexity and tie strength [Granovetter, 1973]. The
primary benefit of the similarity technique is that the multiplex data is most likely
readily available within existing data. The primary detriment of the similarity tech-
nique is that all dimensions of a relationship are treated equally, an assumption that
may not sufficiently represent reality. The second method obviates this assumption,
although at the expense of increased analytic effort. The resulting decision theoretic
model builds upon the sociological construct of the factors that may contribute to
tie strength.
With this model of tie strength, different layers (or relationship dimensions)
can be weighted, preferably from the perspective of the members within the target
organization. Such measurements can and should be debated, since an inherent bias
towards ones own world view is only human and the purpose of the approaches is
to deal with networks that are intentionally obscuring their activities. Traditional
sensitivity analysis techniques and new, dynamic weighting schemes are proposed
to investigate these types of questions. Tie strength then serves as an input into
classic network flow models as an arc capacity, representing the maximum amount of
influence one actor may impose upon another [cf. Freeman et al., 1991; Renfro, 2001;
Clark, 2005]. However, it is also proposed that tie strength is inversely proportional
to the cost, or at least a component therein, of interpersonal communication. Either
option offers a means to improve the network flow representation of social networks.
An additional improvement related to the application of network flow models
to analyze social networks is the pair-wise valued measure of influence gains and
losses. This measurement approach mathematically develops the relationships be-
tween an individual’s personal characteristics and the power or persuasive capability
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that results. Since a gain of influence could be garnered from a social position of
power, the persuasive nature of the individual, or both, the overarching concept of
charisma is considered. Logistic regression using individual characteristics and ex-
pert opinion regarding who is or is not persuasive relative to the others within the
network yields a fitted logistic response value. This value can be interpreted as the
estimated probability that an actor with certain characteristics is charismatic (i.e.,
can invoke influence via either their power or persuasive characteristics, or both).
These values can then be compared on a pair-wise basis, for all pairs of individu-
als that are known to have at least one dimension of relationship. This ultimately
yields a gain (or loss) multiplier which is incorporated into a generalized network
flow formulation.
The value of tie-strength is essentially inferred from the multiplex relationships.
The proposed methods to measure tie strength allow the aggregation of multiple so-
cial networks into a single, weighted network. Combining these techniques with the
gains and losses concept, a logical extension of the network flow centrality mea-
sure proposed by Freeman et al. [1991], is offered. Although Freeman et al. merely
speculated arc weights, this dissertation provides a means to determining a meaning-
ful value, in addition to the methods developed by Renfro [2001] and Clark [2005].
The inclusion of individual-specific attributes, similar to the work by Clark [2005],
potentially improves the fidelity of the social network model. Consequently, the in-
clusion of both topological and individual specific components of influence yield a
generalized network flow centrality measure; this measure estimates the centrality
of an individual based upon not only their connections, but the strength of their
connections, as well as how their degree of influence is perceived by others.
The mathematical programming model of the generalized network flow social
model may also be used to investigate potential courses of action levied against a
non-cooperative network. As demonstrated in the case study in Chapter VII, the
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efficacy of influence operations impinging upon susceptible individuals in order to
influence inaccessible decision makers or opinion-leaders may be examined.
All of the methods presented in this dissertation include some form of sensitiv-
ity analysis. Although the general assumption of deterministic data is maintained
in this research, it is clear that relationships, networks, and social roles are likely
changing over time. Sensitivity analysis techniques offer a means to deal with this
phenomenon in the interim. Snapshots in time, consistent with the deterministic as-
sumptions of the approaches developed here, provide a means to represent dynamic
change over time.
To supplement the theoretical contributions of measurement and methodologi-
cal approaches as applied to layered social networks, practical contributions comprise
the demonstration of the overall methodology in Chapter VIII and the associated
suite of algorithms developed within the MATLAB environment. This documented
code is available for immediate use, either for intelligence analysis or for future re-
search efforts.
9.3 Recommendations for Future Research
Within the intersection of operations research and the sociological sciences,
there remain a number of research opportunities. Refinements in existing social
network analysis measures, such as those recommended in Appendix H regarding in-
formation centrality [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989], as well as the methods developed
in this dissertation, are still needed.
Regarding the genre of network flow models, as discussed in Borgatti [2005]
for example, different SNA measures are typically accompanied by underlying, of-
ten implicit, assumptions regarding the traversal mechanism of the entity of interest
(influence, power, prestige, disease, rumors, etc.). Consequently, applying an in-
appropriate measure to a network phenomenon may give misleading or erroneous
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results. It is suggested that applying certain mathematical programming techniques
may also suffer this same weakness. Simply stated, different commodities of interper-
sonal interaction (communication of influence, rumors, packages, and so forth) have
the potential to traverse a network in different ways, not all of which are amenable
to the classic network flow problem. To bolster the research dealing with mappings
between SNA and OR, particularly in the area of network flow models, the implica-
tions of flow typology should be considered in detail. Such a future analysis should
include appropriate assumptions or improve network flow models via additional con-
straints. For example, for each possible combination of trajectories and method of
transfer discussed in Borgatti [2005], a mapping between the network commodity,
its behavior, and one of the following options could include: (1) a standard network
flow formulation; (2) a network flow formulation with appropriate side constraints;
(3) a network flow-like formulation; or (3) a recommendation for either another
mathematical program, a simulation, or a heuristic.
Regarding the measure of interpersonal tie-strength based upon (topological)
similarity, it may be of interest to investigate the theoretical and practical feasibility
of the application of 19 other similarity measures as described in Yin and Yasuda
[2005]. Simple, robust, and accurate measures of tie strength that are quick to
calculate and grounded in sociological theory and intelligence needs are paramount
to investigating these types of networks. Again, this method is advantageous in that
it is predicated upon discovered layers of relationships; therefore, the need for a cross-
cultural methodology is not a primary concern as existing connections themselves
contain the elements important to that organization. Of course, determining what
those exact elements are may be challenging based upon the nature of the data
collected. Unfortunately, most, if not all, current similarity approaches assume each
layer is equally important with regard to its contribution to tie strength.
Since one of the objectives of this research includes disrupting the operation
or efficiency of a target network, accounting for negative ties may also be of interest.
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How to explain, model, and exploit negative ties is critical, because destroying these
networks will inevitably involve some element of turning the members against one
another. The cohesion research offered by Downs [2006] may prove a useful start in
finding methods to disrupt networks via negative ties, and measuring their efficacy.
The network disruption objective also suggests that the key player (KPP-1)
problem is of interest. Recall that KPP-1 finds a subset of actors within a network
that, if removed, will maximally disrupt communication among the remaining ac-
tors. To date, no mathematical program equivalent to the heuristic procedure (and
objective function) has been successfully developed. However, such a program would
benefit the analysis process in ways similar to those explored for KPP-2. For ex-
ample, disruption could be tailored to meet specific decision maker requirements, as
opposed to adhering strictly to the objective function defined by Borgatti [2003a].
Additionally, multiple optimal solutions, if they exist, would offer alternative plans
and insights into the structural roles of individuals within the context of KPP-1.
Finally, the exploration and development of heuristic techniques to address both
KPP problems is of interest due to the computational complexity involved. This
would facilitate KPP solutions for larger networks, either social, physical, or any
network-like system.
Visualization and data continue to be a limiting factor when exploring so-
ciometric methods. Data, particularly unclassified data for use in open, academic
research, is often difficult to obtain. Although ongoing efforts to improve both areas
exist, there does not appear to be any visualization techniques or software applica-
tions that lend themselves specifically to viewing layered networks. Data generation
of networks exhibiting properties similar to those of the target networks may be
accomplished using the Organizational Risk Analyzer tool Carley [2006] or by ex-
tending the initial network generation work of Sterling [2004]. One possible means to
visualize layered networks could start with plotting the entire, aggregated network
as a single layer, with the initial layout determined by the analyst. Assuming the
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network nodes are at a given (x, y) location and the network resides within the plane
z = 0, any subsequent layers l will reside within the planes z = l,l ∈ Z+, with each
node using the same corresponding (x, y) coordinate in z = 0.
A host of challenges remain. Social network modeling will remain a fertile area
of research for the the operations researcher.
9.3.1 Conclusion
The war on terrorism is going to be a long one; it is “. . . both a battle of
arms and a battle of ideas–a fight against terrorist networks and against
their murderous ideology” [DOD, 2006b, pg. v,22].
Considering the nature of this war, understanding the enemy is paramount. No
longer fitting the traditional paradigm of combat between great armies, this war in-
volves not only defeating the individuals actively threatening our National Security,
but also mitigating the environments that nurture the development and continuity of
such groups. In order to accomplish this, the appropriate communities must at a min-
imum (1) improve the understanding of why people would undertake such activities;
(2) identify limitations or vulnerabilities existing within non-cooperative networks
and how to exploit them; and, (3) determine what repercussions may follow an op-
eration to minimize the likelihood that actions executed inadvertently contribute to
the environments that promote extremism.
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Appendix A. Code: rbap.m
This code performs the reach-based assessment of position (RBAP) measure
developed in Chapter IV.
function [rbapR] = rbap(X, alpha)
% Usage rbap(X, alpha)
% This is the fast(er) version
% - X is the sociomatrix (adjacency matrix) of a network (graph);
% alpha is an attenuation factor, between 0 and 1, that is
% specified by the user to indicate the importance or expected
% degradation of influence associated with longer-distance
% paths between individuals. An alpha = 0 causes this measure
% to revert to simple out-degree centrality.
% An alpha = 1 causes this measure to be bounded above by the
% number of other actors that can be reached/influenced by a
% given actor.
%
% This procedure provides the reach centrality/influence
% measure developed by Hamill, Deckro, Chrissis, and Mills
%
% - X may be a symmetric (asymmetric) graph (digraph).
% - The output (rbapR) is a non-normalized index of each actor’s
% influence through reachability (or radiality), based upon
% the number (and distance) of shortest paths to all other
% actors.
%
% - jth / last modified on 8 FEB 06
tic
% Get dimensions of input
[n, m] = size(X);
% Reachability matrix is used to track shortest paths between
% actors
% First step, reach of one, is derived from the input (X)
rmatrix = X;
% vector used to zero out diagonals
zdiag = [1:(n+1):(n*n)]’;
% initialize reach normalization matrix
% number of other actors reached... at step p
nAR = sum(X,2);
% first element in power sum is the adjacency matrix
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tRBAP = X;
% temporary power matrix used to speed up calculations
txPow = X;
% for shortest paths of length 2 to the maximum (n-1)
for i = 2:(n-1);
% find non-zero entries in previous power of X
lastStep = find(rmatrix==0);




% find non-zero entries in the next power of X
nextStep = find((xPow)>0);
% find entries that become non-zero for the first time
reach = intersect(nextStep, lastStep);
% update the reachability matrix
rmatrix(reach) = i;
% initialize a temporary matrix of zeros to capture
% number of paths
tmpR = zeros(n,n);
% temporary matrix captures the number of (shortest)
% paths of length i
tmpR(reach) = xPow(reach);




% need to divide next iterate by product of nAR
% (if it is not zero)





% update measure results
tRBAP = tRBAP + (alpha^(i-1))*tmpR;
% update for next iteration the temporary matrix and







% Find row sum for each actor over all other actors, over all





Appendix B. Code: rbapsa.m
This code performs the sensitivity analysis of the attenuation factor α within
the reach-based assessment of position (RBAP) measure.
function [pdata] = rbapsa(X)
% Usage rbapsa(X)
%
% - X is the sociomatrix (adjacency matrix) of a network (graph);
% - The attenuation factor, alpha, is set to values in [0, 1] and
% the RBAP measure is calculated for each.
% - The results are then plotted to facilitate sensitivity analysis
% of alpha, and its impact upon the ranking between individuals
% based upon the assumption of how much (or little) indirect
% communication is distance-attenuated.
% Last revised 12 JAN 06 - jth
% ***** Begin Function *****
[n, m] = size(X); % get dimensions of input
a = 0:0.1:1; % set range of alpha
[ra, ca] = size(a); % get dimensions of output
% for each setting of alpha, call RBAP and store results







Appendix C. Code: KPP-2 (NR.m)
This code finds the minimum size kp-set required to reach all nodes, using
m-steps or less between a key player and his assigned actor. Note that this and other
programs also use the function Mreach.m presented at the end of this appendix.
function [ kp_nr ] = NR( X, MR, enum )
% Useage NR(X, MR, enum)
% X - Adjacency matrix
% MR - Maximum reach allowed by any key player
% (-1 for maximum (N-1))
% enum - Enumerate solutions until infeasible or maximum number have
% been found (maxsol is currently set at 100 solutions)
% Updated 4 JUL 2006, jth
% Requires the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox
% The current objective function assumes that all options are equal.
% This, however, is amenable to change to accommodate external and
% internal costs associated with selecting/targeting the individual
% and the workload demanded/assumed of the individual, respectively.
%
% Notes:
% -- This program appears to be computationally competitive to the
% heuristic provided by Borgatti. Large-scale problems (n > 1000),
% however, may require linking up CPLEX to MATLAB, or using other
% specialized optimization programs with more efficient algorithms
% (e.g. LINGO.
tic
% ***** initialize variables *****
maxSol = 100; % maximum number of solutions (for enum = 1)
numSol = 0; % current number of solutions
N = size(X,1); % dimension of X
A = zeros(N); % constraint matrix
b = - ones(N,1); % column vector as RHS
f = ones(N,1); % column vector as obj. function coeff.
kp_nr = []; % storage for solutions
firstSol = 1; % boolean flag to control enumeration loops
foundall = 0; % boolean flag to control enumeration loops
kpK = 0; % kp-set size, facilitates enumeration loops
% Develop constraint matrix based upon inputs X and reach MR
% Note: See Mreach code for details
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if MR == -1
rX = Mreach(X,(N-1)); % calculate maximum reach matrix
else
rX = Mreach(X,MR); % calculate reach matrix up to MR
end
dc = find(rX>0); % find non-zeros in reach matrix
A(dc) = - 1; % set up constraint matrix, A
if enum
while not(foundall)
% column vector of x as solution
[mpSol, obj, flag] = bintprog(f, A, b);
if firstSol
kpK = obj; % size of min. dom. set
firstSol = 0;
end % if firstSol...




kp_nr = [kp_nr kp_set];
b = [b; (kpK - 1)]; % add extra rhs
A = [A; mpSol’]; % add extra constraint
numSol = numSol + 1;
end % if flag...
end % while not...
% Plot data in histogram
% (only required when enumerating solutions)
[a, b] = size(kp_nr);
pdata = [];
xaxis = 1:N;
for j = 1:a






% column vector of x as solution
mpSol = bintprog(f, A, b);
kp_nr = find(mpSol(1:N)==1) % key players
end % if enum...
toc % time elapsed
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The following function is used within some of the KPP-2 optimization prob-
lems, and may also be used stand-alone.
function [rmatrix] = Mreach( X, M )
% Useage Mreach(X,M)
% X - Sociomatrix
% M - Maximum number of steps allowed for reachability.
% This function determines which actors are reachable from others,
% based upon a limit of M-steps or less.
% This currently assumes symmetric relationships.
[n, m] = size(X); rmatrix = X; for i = 2:M
lastStep = find(rmatrix==0);
nextStep = find((X^i)>0);
reach = intersect(nextStep, lastStep);
rmatrix(reach) = i;
if (sum(find(rmatrix==0))==0) % all
break
end




Appendix D. Code: KPP-2 (FNRK)
This code minimizes the number of actors missed if the size of the key player
set is less than the m-domatic number of the graph. For this code, the maximum
reach allowed m is assumed to be either 1 or 2, which is modeled by FNRK1.m and
FNRK2.m, respectively. The output is a listing of the key players, a separator of 0,
and the total number of actors missed.
function [ kp_fnrk1 ] = FNRK1( X, K, enum )
%Usage FNRK1( X, K, enum )
% X - Adjacency matrix
% K - Size of kp-set
% enum - Enumerate solutions until infeasible or maximum
% number has been found
% (maxsol is currently set at 300 solutions)
% Updated 22 MAR 2006, jth
% Requires the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox
% Seeks to minimize f(x) : Ax >= 1, x is binary {0, 1}






R1 = (X’ + eye(N));
A = [(-R1) (-eye(N))];
Aeq = [ones(1,N) zeros(1,N)];
b = - ones(N,1);
beq = K;
% column vector as obj. function coeff.
f = [zeros(N,1); ones(N,1)];
% While continue, keep solving until the cardinality of the kp set






% column vector of x as solution
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if flag == -2 | (numSol > maxSol)
foundall = 1
else
if (nnz(tmp_kp_fnrk1) <= kpK) &
(tmp_miss_fnrk1 <= numMiss)
numSol = numSol + 1;
kp_fnrk1 =
[kp_fnrk1 [tmp_kp_fnrk1; 0; tmp_miss_fnrk1]];
kpK = nnz(tmp_kp_fnrk1);
numMiss = tmp_miss_fnrk1;
% add extra rhs for additional constraint
b = [b; (kpK - 1)];







% column vector of x as solution





kp_fnrk1 = [tmp_kp_fnrk1; 0; tmp_miss_fnrk1];
end
toc
function [ kp_fnrk2 ] = FNRK2( X, K, enum )
%Usage FNRK2( X, K, enum )
% X - Adjacency matrix
% K - Size of kp-set
% enum - Enumerate solutions until infeasible or maximum
% number has been found
% (maxsol is currently set at 300 solutions)
% Updated 22 MAR 2006, jth
% Requires the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox
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% Seeks to minimize f(x) : Ax >= 1, x is binary {0, 1}






R1 = (X’ + eye(N));
tR2 = (X’)^2 + R1;
dc = find(tR2>0);
R2 = zeros(N);
R2(dc) = - 1;
A = [(-R1) R2 (-eye(N))];
Aeq = [ones(1,2*N) zeros(1,N)];
b = - ones(N,1);
beq = K; % column vector as RHS
b = - ones(N,1); % column vector as RHS
% column vector as obj. function coeff.
f = [zeros(2*N,1); ones(N,1)];
% While continue, keep solving until the cardinality of the kp set






% column vector of x as solution
[mpSol, obj, flag] = bintprog(f, A, b, Aeq, beq);
% key players, 1-step
tmp1 = mpSol(1:N);
% key players, 2-step
tmp2 = mpSol((N+1):2*N);
% all key players
tmp_kp_fnrk2 = [ find(tmp1==1); find(tmp2==1) ];
% missed players
tmp_miss_fnrk2 = nnz(mpSol((2*N+1):3*N));
if flag == -2 | (numSol > maxSol)
foundall = 1
else
if (nnz(tmp_kp_fnrk2) <= kpK) &
(tmp_miss_fnrk2 <= numMiss)
numSol = numSol + 1;
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kp_fnrk2 =
[kp_fnrk2 [tmp_kp_fnrk2; 0; tmp_miss_fnrk2]];
kpK = nnz(tmp_kp_fnrk2);
numMiss = tmp_miss_fnrk2;
% add extra rhs for additional constraint
b = [b; (kpK - 1)];







% column vector of x as solution
mpSol = bintprog(f, A, b, Aeq, beq);
% key players, 1-step
tmp1 = mpSol(1:N);
% key players, 2-step
tmp2 = mpSol((N+1):2*N);
% all key players
tmp_kp_fnrk2 = [ find(tmp1==1); find(tmp2==1) ];
% missed players
tmp_miss_fnrk2 = nnz(mpSol((2*N+1):3*N));
kp_fnrk2 = [tmp_kp_fnrk2; 0; tmp_miss_fnrk2];
end
toc % time elapsed
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Appendix E. Code: KPP-2 (FNR.m)
This code minimizes the number of key players required to cover (1-PC)
percent of the network members, with the additional constraint upon the maximum
reach allowed between a key player and its assigned actor(s). The output is a listing
of the key players, a separator of 0, and the total number of actors covered.
function [ kp_fnrm ] = FNR( X, MR, PC, enum )
% Useage FNR(X, MR, PC, enum)
% X - Adjacency matrix
% MR - Maximum reach allowed by any key player
% (-1 for maximum (N-1))
% PC - Percent of network that can be MISSED
% enum - Enumerate solutions until infeasible or maximum number
% have been found (1=Yes, 0=No)
% (maxsol is currently set at 100 solutions)
% Updated 4 JUL 2006, jth
% Requires the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox
% Seeks to minimize f(x) : Ax >= 1, x is binary {0, 1}
% Objective is FNRm
% ***** initialize variables *****
maxSol = 100; % maximum number of solutions (for enum = 1)
numSol = 0; % current number of solutions
N = size(X,1); % dimension of X
U = floor(PC*N);
A = zeros(N); % constraint matrix
b = - ones(N,1); % column vector as RHS
f = ones(N,1); % column vector as obj. function coeff.
kp_fnrm = []; % storage for solutions
firstSol = 1; % boolean flag to control enumeration loops
foundall = 0; % boolean flag to control enumeration loops
kpK = 0; % kp-set size, facilitates enumeration loops
% Develop constraint matrix based upon inputs X and reach MR
% Note: See Mreach code for details
if MR == -1
rX = Mreach(X,(N-1)); % calculate maximum reach matrix
else
rX = Mreach(X,MR); % calculate reach matrix up to MR
end
dc = find(rX>0); % find non-zeros in reach matrix
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A(dc) = - 1; % set up constraint matrix, A
A = [A -eye(N); zeros(1,N) ones(1,N)];
b = [-ones(N,1); U]; % column vector as RHS
% column vector as obj. function coeff.
f = [ones(1,N) zeros(1,N)]’;
tic
% While continue, keep solving until the cardinality of the kp set
% increases by one...
if enum
while not(foundall)
% column vector of x as solution
[mpSol, obj, flag] = bintprog(f, A, b);
if firstSol
kpK = obj; % size of min. partially dom. set
firstSol = 0;
end % if firstSol...





kp_fnrm = [kp_fnrm [kp_set; 0; missed]];
% add extra rhs
b = [b; (kpK - 1)];
% add extra constraint
A = [A; [mpSol(1:N)’ zeros(1,N)]];
numSol = numSol + 1;
end % if flag...
end % while...
else
mpSol = bintprog(f, A, b); % column vector of x as solution
% key players
kp_fnrm = [find(mpSol(1:N)==1); 0; sum(mpSol((N+1:2*N)))]
end % if enum...
toc % time elapsed
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Appendix F. Code: KPP-2 (DNR.m)
This code finds the minimum size kp-set required to reach all nodes, using
m-steps or less between a key player and his assigned actor, while distributing the
workload among the key players. This is accomplished by using the inverse of the
out-degree of each individual as the cost coefficient in the objective function.
function [ kp_dnr, f ] = DNR( X, MR, enum )
% Useage DNR(X, MR, enum)
% X - Adjacency matrix
% MR - Maximum reach allowed by any key player
% (-1 for maximum (N-1))
% enum - Enumerate solutions until infeasible or maximum
% number have been found
% (maxsol is currently set at 100 solutions)
% Updated 5 JUL 2006, jth
% Requires the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox
% ***** initialize variables *****
maxSol = 100; % maximum number of solutions (for enum = 1)
numSol = 0; % current number of solutions
N = size(X,1); % dimension of X
A = zeros(N); % constraint matrix
C = zeros(N); % temporary cost matrix
b = - ones(N,1); % column vector as RHS
kp_dnr = []; % storage for solutions
firstSol = 1; % boolean flag to control enumeration loops
foundall = 0; % boolean flag to control enumeration loops
kpK = 0; % kp-set size, facilitates enumeration loops
% Develop constraint matrix based upon inputs X and reach MR
% Note: See Mreach code for details
if MR == -1
rX = Mreach(X,(N-1)); % calculate maximum reach matrix
else
rX = Mreach(X,MR); % calculate reach matrix up to MR
end
dc = find(rX>0); % find non-zeros in reach matrix
A(dc) = - 1; % set up constraint matrix, A






% column vector of x as solution
[mpSol, obj, flag] = bintprog(f, A, b);
if firstSol
kpK = obj; % size of min. dom. set
firstSol = 0;
end % if firstSol...




kp_dnr = [kp_dnr kp_set];
b = [b; (kpK - 1)]; % add extra rhs
A = [A; mpSol’]; % add extra constraint
numSol = numSol + 1;
end % if flag...
end % while not...
% Plot data in histogram
[a, b] = size(kp_dnr);
pdata = [];
xaxis = 1:N;
for j = 1:a






mpSol = bintprog(f, A, b); % column vector of x as solution
kp_dnr = find(mpSol(1:N)==1) % key players
end % if enum...
toc % time elapsed
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Appendix G. Code: KPP-2 (PMED)
This appendix outlines the process to apply the p-Median problem to KPP-
2. Initial efforts revealed that this class of problem is too computationally intensive
for the branch-and-bound method implemented within the MATLAB optimization
toolkit environment.
Consequently, more efficient solution algorithms are recommended in order to
implement this type of analysis. For the following process proposed, several files are
required. The first sample file depicts the mathematical model developed in LINGO.
This model requires network data as input. As an illustrative example, the input for
the (‘methodscamp’) network accompanying the key player software is also provided.
MODEL: ! P-Median approach to KPP2;
! Sets defining the data structure;
SETS:
KP / @FILE(’pmed_mc.LDT’) /: FCOST, KPSET;
ACTORS / @FILE(’pmed_mc.LDT’) /: ;
ARCS( KP, ACTORS ) : COST, X;
ENDSETS
DATA: ! The cost (i,j) to reach actor j from kp i;
COST = @FILE(’pmed_mc.LDT’);
! The maximum kp-set size;
KPMAX = 2;
! Fixed cost of coopting a key player may be included;
! FCOST = (csv row vector of cost/actor here) ;
ENDDATA
! The objective is to Minimze the weighted distance from ! key
players to all actors;
[TTL_COST] MIN = @SUM( ARCS | (COST #GT# 0) :
-1/COST * X);
! + @SUM( KP: FCOST * KPSET);
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! Assign all actors to at least one key player;
@FOR( ACTORS ( J): [ASSIGN]
@SUM( KP( I) | (COST(I, J) #GT# 0 #OR# I #EQ# J):
X(I, J)) = 1
);
! Actors cannot be assigned to someone not in the KP SET;
@FOR( KP( I):
@FOR( ACTORS ( J) | (COST(I, J) #GT# 0 #OR# I #EQ# J) :
[KPA] X( I, J) <= KPSET( I) );
);
! Number of key players allowed in the KP SET;
[KPTOT] @SUM( KP( I): KPSET( I)) = KPMAX;
! Make KPSET choice (OPEN) binary(0/1);
@FOR( KP: @BIN( KPSET));
END
The following sample file is the input corresponding to the (‘methodscamp’)
network data used as a demonstration with the key player software developed by
Borgatti [2003b]. Given a network of size N , the indices should range from K1
. . .KN, and A1 . . . AN, respectively. For this example, N = 18. The reach matrix
is as expected, with the exception that the reachability values must be obtained
using the transpose of the sociomatrix. Note that the function Mreach.m provided
in Appendix C may be used to determine these values. Since the objective function
uses the additive inverse of these values, this matrix could be constructed in order to
place restrictions upon maximum allowable reach, where the value would be 0 if two
actors could not reach each other in a given number of steps. In addition, although
the values here are based upon a dichotomous network, other measures of distance
between actors may be used.
! P-Median data for Methodscamp data;
























The solution to this mathematical program is KPSET(K1) = KPSET(K16) =
1, indicating that actors 1 and 16 are the key players. The objective function value of
-15 is equivalent to the normalized objective function for Borgatti’s heuristic output
of 15/18 = 0.8333.
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Appendix H. Note on Information Centrality
This note addresses an underlying, potential mathematical issue with the
information centrality measure developed by Stephenson and Zelen [1989]. In the
current effort to develop new means to study network structures, a MATLAB pro-
gram to enumerate all paths within a graph or digraph was developed (See Appendix
J). Due to interest and previous applications [e.g., Clark, 2005] of the information
centrality measure, the example graph used by Stephenson and Zelen was used to
validate the path enumeration code. Interestingly, Stephenson and Zelen missed
two paths. The graph and the path lists are shown below. The paths highlighted,
3-4-1-2-5 and 4-1-2-5, are those either missed or ignored by Stephenson and Zelen.
As the information centrality measure is “based on the information contained
in all possible paths between pairs of points,” (emphasis added) the next logical step
is to compare results, using their methodology, between datasets. This initial effort is
investigating dichotomous graphs only; applying this methodology to valued graphs
is also suspect.
As defined in their article, the information in the combined path Iij is the sum
of all the elements of the D−1ij matrix [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989, pg. 9-10]. Given
all k paths between i and j, the Dij matrix is k × k, and defined as
Table 8.1: Paths for each node pairs
Node Pair Corresponding Paths
1-2 1-2, 1-5-2, 1-4-3-2
1-3 1-4-3, 1-2-3, 1-5-2-3
1-4 1-4, 1-2-3-4, 1-5-2-3-4
1-5 1-5, 1-2-5, 1-4-3-2-5
2-3 2-3, 2-1-4-3, 2-5-1-4-3
2-4 2-1-4, 2-3-4, 2-5-1-4
2-5 2-5, 2-1-5, 2-3-4-1-5
3-4 3-4, 3-2-1-4, 3-2-5-1-4
3-5 3-2-5, 3-2-1-5, 3-4-1-5, 3-4-1-2-5





Figure 8.1: Exemplar Network [Stephenson and Zelen, 1989]
Dij(r, s) = number of lines in paths, r = s
Dij(r, s) = number of lines in common between path r and path s, r 	= s
As an example, node pair 1-2 has 3 paths, none of which have any arcs in















⎥⎥⎥⎦⇒ I12 = 1.833
Additionally, node pair 1-4 has 3 paths, two of which (the second and third















⎥⎥⎥⎦⇒ I14 = 1.375
The results of both node pairs with missing paths are consistent with the data
presented by the authors. For example, ignoring the missed path for node pair 3-5,
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⎥⎥⎥⎦⇒ I35 = 0.8462
Note that these calculations, using the construct developed by Stephenson
and Zelen, match those presented on Stephenson and Zelen [1989, pg. 10]. More
importantly, these calculations, and all others, also coincide to the results when
using the overall procedure as described on Stephenson and Zelen [1989, pg. 12].
This procedure, taken verbatim from Stephenson and Zelen [1989], is presented as
follows.
Consider a network with n points where every pair of points is reachable.
Define the n × n matrix B = (bij) by:
bij =
⎧⎨
⎩ 0 if points i and j are incident1 otherwise
bii = 1 + degree of point (i)
Defining C = (cij) = B
−1, Iij = (cii + cjj − 2cij)−1 and using this information,




4 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
1 0 3 0 1
0 1 0 3 1







0.2764 0.0036 −0.1055 −0.0145 0.0400
0.0036 0.2764 −0.0145 −0.1055 0.0400
−0.1055 −0.0145 0.4218 0.0582 −0.1600
−0.0145 −0.1055 0.0582 0.4218 −0.1600
0.0400 0.0400 −0.1600 −0.1600 0.4400
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
I12 = (c11 + c22 − 2c12)−1 = (0.2764 + 0.2764 − 2 · 0.0036)−1 = 1.8328 ≈ 1.8333
I14 = (c11 + c44 − 2c14)−1 = (0.2764 + 0.4218 − 2 · (−0.0145))−1 = 1.3751 ≈ 1.3750
I35 = (c33 + c55 − 2c35)−1 = (0.4218 + 0.4400 − 2 · (−0.1600))−1 = 0.8461 ≈ 0.8462
These comparisons confirm that the steps used to develop the methodology and
the actual calculations taken to assess the measure are identical, within round-off
error. This provides satisfactory confirmation that the analytic approach is consis-
tent with the data presented thus far. However, the fact that paths were missed
causes some concern for the validity of the measure, at least in its claim to account
for the information ‘along all paths.’ Differences in results can, at this point in the
review, only be ascertained when doing the calculations ‘by hand,’ as the overall
methodology (i.e., the construction of the C matrix) currently allows no room to
account for this oversight.
Revisiting the information content for node pairs 3-5 and 4-5 via calculations




2 1 0 1
1 3 1 0
0 1 3 1






0.7838 −0.3243 0.1892 −0.2432
−0.3243 0.5135 −0.2162 0.1351
0.1892 −0.2162 0.4595 −0.1622
−0.2432 0.1351 −0.1622 0.3514
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦





2 0 1 1
0 3 1 1
1 1 4 0






0.7838 0.1892 −0.2432 −0.3243
0.1892 0.4595 −0.1622 −0.2162
−0.2432 −0.1622 0.3514 0.1351
−0.3243 −0.2162 0.1351 0.5135
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⇒ I45 = 0.8649 	= 0.8462
Some interesting observations are readily apparent. First, each node pair has
three associated paths. Second, both node-pairs that are missing paths (3-5 and 4-5)
have identical values for both the initial calculation and the actual value suggested
by Stephenson and Zelen–differing by a constant of ≈ 0.0187. Although this error is
seemingly small, it is an indication that the underlying methodology is flawed and
the interpretation of the measure as advertised is suspect. Applying this measure to
larger and/or valued graphs is likely to further confound or mislead the analyst.
Based upon the test network described in the article, UCINET (Version 6)
and NetMiner II currently calculate the information centrality measure exactly as
described by Stephenson and Zelen [1989]. Due to the prevalence of sociological stud-
ies applying the information centrality measure, informing the academic community
of this issue, preferably with a corresponding resolution, would provide immediate
value.
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Appendix I. Code: jaccard.m
This function calculates the Jaccard similarity coefficient for a given network
comprised of one or more layers. To deal with multi-layered networks, the node-edge
adjacency matrices for each layer must be horizontally concatenated. The output is
a symmetric matrix, SJS, where each (i, j)th element represents the strength of the
tie between actors i and j.
function [js] = jaccard(NE)
% Usage jaccard(X)
%
% - NE is the node-edge adjacency matrix of one or more layers of
% a social network. This automatically implies network symmetry.
% - js is the tie strength based upon the Jaccard Similarity
% Coefficient;
% This value ranges from zero to one
%
% - jth / last modified on 2 AUG 06
[N, numE] = size(NE);
js = zeros(N);
for i = 1:(N-1)
for j = (i+1):N
js(i,j) = sum(NE(i,:)& NE(j,:)) / sum(NE(i,:)|NE(j,:));
js(j,i) = js(i,j);
end % for j...
end % for i...
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Appendix J. Code: enumeratePaths.m
This MATLAB function enumerates all paths within a graph or digraph.
Depending upon the size and complexity of the graph, this function can be very
expensive computationally. The input is a sociomatrix. The output is a multi-
dimensional cell array with the ith entry containing all paths of length i + 1. The
code below currently limits the enumeration procedure to paths of length 6 or less,
but could be modified (see below) to continue until all paths up to length (n − 1)
are found. As this function was developed primarily for the testing and investigation
into the nature of small social networks, this function has a great deal of room for
improvements in computational efficiency.
function [PathList] = enumeratePaths(X)
% Usage enumeratePaths(X)
%
% - X is the sociomatrix (adjacency matrix) of a network (graph);
% This procedure enumerates all paths of length 1 (essentially
% the edge list) to length (n-1) if such paths exist.
% - X may be a symmetric (asymmetric) graph (digraph).
% - The output (PathList) is a cell array where PathList{n} contains
% the listing of all paths of length n.
%
% - jth / last modified on 23 NOV 05
tic % - begin time stamp
[nR nC] = size(X); % get dimensions of sociomatrix
% mpl = nR - 1; % maximum path length (mpl) is (n-1)
mpl = 6;
% paths of length 1... (essentially the edge list)
[f t] = find(X);
PathList{1} = [f t];
% find paths of length 2 to (n-1) or (mpl)
for p_length = 2:mpl
% initialize path list of length p_length
PathList{p_length} = [];
% initialize number in current path list
PathCount = 1;
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% temporary array containing path list of previous distance
tmpPrevList = PathList{(p_length-1)};
% number of paths and columns in path list of previous distance
[nPrevList colPrevList] = size(tmpPrevList);
% for each path in previous list, see if it can continue...
for i = 1:nPrevList
% get the actor index of the last in line for current path
nextStart = tmpPrevList(i,colPrevList);
% find the possible next steps that can be made
potentialEnd = find(X(nextStart,:));
% index of how many possible next steps exist
npe = nnz(potentialEnd);
% run through possibilities;
% if an edge can be added, do so...
for j = 1:npe
% if this actor has not already been visited
% in the current path, add him
if ismember(potentialEnd(j), tmpPrevList(i,:))==0 ;
PathList{p_length}(PathCount,:) =
[tmpPrevList(i,:) potentialEnd(j)];
PathCount = PathCount + 1;
end % (if) check for already visited node and update
end % (j) check for possible edges to add (nodes to visit)
end % (i) action on i-th path in previous path-length list
% if no more moves/updates are possible, end the program





% - end time stamp (tells user how long it took this program to run)
toc
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Appendix K. Code: netflowCent.m
This MATLAB function calculates the network flow centrality measure devel-
oped by Freeman et al. [1991], given a sociomatrix and the capacity of influence that
may flow between each possible (i, j) pair of individuals. Although the sample, taken
from [Freeman et al., 1991], indicates a symmetric network, both in connections and
arc capacities, this code can accept asymmetric inputs for both categories of data.
function [ sna_flowcent ] = netflowCent( X, U )
% Useage netflowCent(X, U)
% X = Adjacency matrix (symmetric or asymmetric)
% U = Matrix capturing upper bounds -- (i,j) entries must match X
% Assumes lower bound is zero for all arcs
%
% Data from netflow article (Freeman, et al)
% X = [0 1 1 1 0
% 1 0 1 0 0
% 1 1 0 1 1
% 1 0 1 0 0
% 0 0 1 0 0];
%
% U = [0 3 1 2 0
% 3 0 3 0 0
% 1 3 0 2 2
% 2 0 2 0 0
% 0 0 2 0 0];
% Answer with X and U above is...
% 1.0000 7.0000 20.0000 0.3500
% 2.0000 5.0000 20.0000 0.2500
% 3.0000 13.0000 20.0000 0.6500
% 4.0000 6.0000 24.0000 0.2500
% 5.0000 0.0000 30.0000 0.0000
tic
% n = number of nodes (and number of rows) for A
[n m] = size(X);
% Develop A matrix from X...
xij = nnz(X); % xij = number of edges (columns) for A
A = zeros(n,xij); % initialize
[pos neg] = find(X > 0); % index for +/-1
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% develop s-t pairs to solve for...
nstPairs = nchoosek(n,2); % number of solution pairs required
stPairs = nchoosek((1:n),2); % index of solution pairs
% objective function (note -1 since linprog always minimizes)
f = [zeros(1,xij) -1]’;








end % if isempty...
% right-hand side
beq = [zeros(1,n)]’;




% for each possible s-t pair t>s, solve






Aeq = [A fCol];
[x, fval] = linprog(f,[],[],Aeq,beq,lb,ub);
objfns = [objfns; [s t x’]];
results = [results; [s t 0 -fval 0]];
% for each possible s-t pair t>s solution,
% remove all other nodes other than s or t to ascertain the flow
for killNode = 1:n % for all nodes...
% if it is neither s nor t
if killNode ~= s & killNode ~= t




% remove those columns
tmpAeq(:,killCols)=[];
% remove that row
tmpAeq(killNode,:) = [];
% adjust the length of the objective function, f
tmpf = [zeros(1,(xij-nnz(killCols))) -1]’;
% adjust the length of the rhs, beq
tmpbeq = [zeros(1,(n-1))]’;
% adjust the length of the lower bounds, lb
tmplb = zeros(1,(xij-nnz(killCols)))’;
% adjust the length of the upper bounds, ub
tmpub = ub;
tmpub(killCols) = [];





[results; [s t killNode -kfval (-fval + kfval)]];
end %if killNode...
end % for killNode...
end % for stflow
% calculate measure for each actor....
% get index of number of solution pairs to facilitate measure
[solPairs, c] = size(results);
for i = 1:n
tmpDenom = 0;
tmpNumer = 0;
for j = 1:solPairs
% denominator data
if results(j,1)~=i & results(j,2)~=i & results(j,3)==0
tmpDenom = tmpDenom + results(j,4);
end % if results(j, 1)...
% numerator data
if results(j,3) == i
tmpNumer = tmpNumer + results(j,5);
end % if results(j,3)...
end % for j = ...
% Layout for tstData is ...
% Col 1: Actor ID (i)
% Col 2: Flow that must pass through i from...
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% Col 3: Sum of all s-t max flows where i is neither s nor t
% Col 4: (Col 2) / (Col 3) the centrality measure for i
tstData = [tstData; [i tmpNumer tmpDenom (tmpNumer/tmpDenom)]];




Appendix L. Code: gnfCent.m
This MATLAB function calculates generalized network flow centrality mea-
sure developed in chapter VI. This measure is based upon the centrality measure
posited by Freeman et al. [1991], but also incorporates the interpersonal gain multi-
pliers as discussed in chapter VII.
function [ tstData ] = gnfCent( G, U )
% Useage gnfCent(G, U)
% G = Gains (or loss) matrix -- (i,j) entries must match X
% U = Matrix capturing upper bounds -- (i,j) entries must match X
% Assumes lower bound is zero for all arcs
tic
% n = number of nodes (and number of rows) for A
[n m] = size(U);
look = 0;
% Develop A matrix from X...
% ***** Still need to incorporate G once this is working well *****
xij = nnz(U); % xij = number of edges (columns) for A
A = zeros(n,xij); % initialize
% [pos neg] = find(X > 0); % index for +/-1
[pos neg] = find(G > 0); % index for +/-1




% develop s-t pairs to solve for...
nstPairs = nchoosek(n,2); % number of solution pairs required
stPairs = nchoosek((1:n),2); % index of solution pairs
% objective function (note -1 since linprog always minimizes)
f = [zeros(1,xij) -1]’;
















% for each possible s-t pair t>s, solve






Aeq = [A fCol];
[x, fval] = linprog(f,[],[],Aeq,beq,lb,ub);
objfns = [objfns; [s t x’]];
results = [results; [s t 0 -fval 0]];
% for each possible s-t pair t>s solution,
% remove all other nodes
% other than s or t to ascertain the flow
for killNode = 1:n % for all nodes...
% if it is neither s nor t
if killNode ~= s & killNode ~= t
% find cols associated with this node
killCols = find(Aeq(killNode,:)~=0);
tmpAeq = Aeq;
% remove those columns
tmpAeq(:,killCols)=[];
% remove that row
tmpAeq(killNode,:) = [];
% adjust the length of the objective function, f
tmpf = [zeros(1,(xij-nnz(killCols))) -1]’;
% adjust the length of the rhs, beq
tmpbeq = [zeros(1,(n-1))]’;
% adjust the length of the lower bounds, lb
tmplb = zeros(1,(xij-nnz(killCols)))’;
% adjust the length of the upper bounds, ub
tmpub = ub;
tmpub(killCols) = [];






[results; [s t killNode -kfval (-fval + kfval)]];
look = look + 1
end %if killNode...
end % for killNode...
end % for stflow
% calculate measure for each actor....
% get index of number of solution pairs to facilitate measure
[solPairs, c] = size(results);
for i = 1:n
tmpDenom = 0;
tmpNumer = 0;
for j = 1:solPairs
% denominator data
if results(j,1)~=i & results(j,2)~=i & results(j,3)==0
tmpDenom = tmpDenom + results(j,4);
end % if results(j, 1)...
% numerator data
if results(j,3) == i
tmpNumer = tmpNumer + results(j,5);
end % if results(j,3)...
end % for j = ...
% Layout for tstData is ...
% Col 1: Actor ID (i)
% Col 2: Flow that must pass through i from...
% Col 3: The sum of all s-t max flows where i is neither s nor t
% Col 4: (Col 2) / (Col 3)... the centrality measure for i
tstData = [tstData; [i tmpNumer tmpDenom (tmpNumer/tmpDenom)]];
end % for i = ...
toc
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Appendix M. KPP-2 and Layered Networks
The underlying assumption applicable to the KPP-2 methodologies devel-
oped is that the network of interest is connected. When applying the key player
methodologies developed in this dissertation to layered networks, not all layers are
guaranteed to be connected. In addition, not all layers may share the same set of
actors. Therefore, slight modifications to the constraint matrix must be considered.
The code presented in this appendix facilitates the analysis methodology described
in Section 5.7.
The following function, buildKPPA.m, takes a sociomatrix of a given layer
as input, and provides the requisite constraint matrix for the KPP-2 applications
presented within this research.




kppA = -(X + eye(N));
kppA(notavail,:) = [];
Assuming a symmetric sociomatrix, this function prevents the inclusion of rows
associated with actors that do not have interpersonal relationships within the given
context of interest. If the sociomatrix is asymmetric, then X′ must be input into
this function.
To account for multiple layers simultaneously, the output of this function for
each layer must be horizontally concatenated, forming the multi-layer constraint
matrix for input into a modified version of the KPP-2 programs presented. Note that
this approach currently presented assumes a reach of one-step. If a reach greater than
one between a key player and its assigned actors is desired, the analyst should input
a dichotomized version of the 2-step reachability matrix, which can be determined
by the code presented in Appendix C. An example of the modification required for
the NRm.m code is provided below.
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function [ kp_nr ] = NR_layers( A , enum )
% Useage NR_layers(A, enum)
% A - Multi-layer constraint matrix
% enum - Enumerate solutions until infeasible or maximum
% number have been found
% (maxsol is currently set at 100 solutions)
% Requires the MATLAB Optimization Toolbox
% This determines the minimum number of key players required to
% cover multiple relationship layers. The input A must be
% developed prior to implementing this function.
tic
% ***** initialize variables *****
maxSol = 100; % maximum number of solutions (for enum = 1)
numSol = 0; % current number of solutions
[N, M] = size(A); % dimension of X
b = - ones(N,1); % column vector as RHS
f = ones(M,1); % column vector as obj. function coeff.
kp_nr = []; % storage for solutions
firstSol = 1; % boolean flag to control enumeration loops
foundall = 0; % boolean flag to control enumeration loops
kpK = 0; % kp-set size, facilitates enumeration loops
if enum
while not(foundall)
% column vector of x as solution
[mpSol, obj, flag] = bintprog(f, A, b);
if firstSol
kpK = obj; % size of min. dom. set
firstSol = 0;
end % if firstSol...




kp_nr = [kp_nr kp_set];
% add extra rhs
b = [b; (kpK - 1)];
% add extra constraint
A = [A; mpSol’];
numSol = numSol + 1;
end % if flag...
end % while not...
% Plot data in histogram (only when enumerating solutions)
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[a, b] = size(kp_nr);
pdata = [];
xaxis = 1:N;
for j = 1:a






% column vector of x as solution
mpSol = bintprog(f, A, b);
kp_nr = find(mpSol==1) % key players
end % if enum...
toc % time elapsed
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Appendix N. Pair-wise Gains Process
This appendix details the process used to develop pair-wise gain multipliers.
The steps of the process include:
1. Collect personal attribute data on individuals of interest. This data must
comprise components of the charisma model depicted in Figure 7.2.
2. Determine which individuals are charismatic (combination of authority and
persuasive influence) and which are not. Assign a response variable 1 (0) for
charismatic (non charismatic) individuals.
3. Use logistic regression to determine a model sufficient for use in obtaining
probability estimates P (Yi = 1|X).
4. Use vector of probability estimates and appropriate sociomatrix as input to
the MATLAB function provided below.
5. Output of generateG is an n × n matrix of gain multipliers gij that can be
used as input for the generalized network flow centrality measure provided
in Appendix L or as input to the influence course of action analysis process
described in Section 7.3
function [G] = generateG(ep, X)
% Useage, generateG(ep, X) generates a gain matrix for use in the
% gnfCent( G, U ) generalized network flow centrality measure.
% ep is a vector of estimated probabilities of a set of actors
% based upon a logistic regression
% G is the gain multiplier matrix as applied to all pair-wise
% links in X
[n, m] = size(X); G = zeros(n,n); noX = find(X==0); [i, j] =
find(G==0); idx = [i j]; for k=1:(size(idx,1))
G(idx(k,1),idx(k,2)) = 1+ep(idx(k,1))-ep(idx(k,2));
end G(noX) = 0;
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Appendix O. JI Member Data
This appendix provides the descriptive data of the 48 JI members of interest
used in various portions of this research. The network and attribute data are derived
from Sageman’s book, Understanding Terror Networks, published in 2004. Tables
15.1 and 15.2 provide the index and list of study names, full names, age of the
member when he joined JI, and the year when the member joined JI. The latter
two columns present the data used in the logistic regression approach to measuring
interpersonal gains (or losses) of influence.
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Table 15.1: JI Membership (Subset of 48 Actors)
Year Age
Index Study Name Full Name Joined Joined
1 Baasyir Abu Bakar Baasyir 1989 51
2 Sungkar Abdullah Sungkar 1989 52
3 Hambali Encep Nurjaman 1989 25
4 Mukhlas Ali Ghufron bin Nurhasyim 1989 29
5 Iqbal Fikiruddin Muqti 1989 30
6 Faruq Omar al-Faruq 1991 20
7 Syawal Yassin Syawal 1989 24
8 Ghozi Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi 1989 18
9 Samudra Abdul Aziz 1991 21
10 Jabir Enjang Bastaman 1991 31
11 Amrozi Amrozi bin Nurhasyim 1992 30
12 Imron Ali Imron bin Nurhasyim 1990 18
13 Sufaat Yazid Sufaat 1998 33
14 Dwikarna Agus Dwikarna 1990 26
15 Mobarok Hutomo Pamungkus 1990 20
16 Yunos Saifullah Yunos 1989 19
17 Mistooki Jafaar bin Mistooki 1990 29
18 Faiz Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana 1991 29
19 Hasyim Hasyim bin Abbas 1991 30
20 Sulaeman Mohammed Nasir bin Abbas 1989 20
21 Hussein Abdul Rahman Ayub 1989 23
22 Ayub Abdul Rahim Ayub 1989 23
23 Azahari Azahari bin Husin 1990 33
24 Zulkarnaen Aris Sumarsomo 1989 26
324
Table 15.2: JI Membership (Subset of 48 Actors)
Year Age
Index Study Name Full Name Joined Joined
25 Ghoni Suranto Abdul Ghoni 1991 23
26 Top Noordin Mohammad Top 1990 20
27 Idris Jhoni Hendrawan 1993 23
28 Mustofa Pranata Yudha 1989 27
29 WanMin Wan Min bin Wan Mat 1990 29
30 Maidin Ibrahim bin Maidin 1989 39
31 Sani Asmar Latin Sani 1993 18
32 Dulmatin Umar Dul Matin 1990 20
33 Farik Mohammad Farik bin Amin 1993 26
34 Lillie Bashir bin Lap 1993 26
35 Yunos2 Muhammad Amin Mohamed Yunos 1999 17
36 Naharudin Muhammad Arif Naharudin 2000 17
37 Gungun Rusman Gunawan 1999 23
38 Marzuki Zulkifli Marzuki 1990 26
39 Kastari Mas Selamat bin Kastari 1990 29
40 Hafidh Mohammed Faiq bin Hafidh 1989 31
41 Setiono Edy Setiono 1989 28
42 BinHir Zulkifli bin Hir 1991 25
43 Rusdan Thoriqudin 1989 29
44 Mustaqim Mustaqim 1989 28
45 Fathi Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana 1991 26
46 Khalim Mohamed Khalim bin Jaffar 1993 31
47 Roche Jack Roche 1998 45
48 Thomas Jack Thomas 2001 27
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